

THE RAMBLER.

VOL. V. *New Series.*

MAY 1861.

PART XIII.

CATHOLIC POLICY.

IN a former Number we laid before our readers some general views on the Theory of Party. We pointed out the dangers and evils which must always follow the attempt to construct a separate Catholic party without any connection with either of the great political parties which alternately govern the country.

Nothing, however, was further from our intention than to deny that Catholics had peculiar interests which they were bound to defend, and that the only condition on which sincere Catholics could act with any party was, that a fair consideration should be given to those interests. If a party is composed of several of those subdivisions to which we referred, a systematic neglect of any one of those subdivisions imposes upon it the duty of vindicating its rights; and it may be forced into a course of conduct calculated for the moment to weaken, or even to overthrow, the party with which it generally acts.

It would be manifestly absurd for the representatives of any large section of electors to enter into combinations from which the views of those electors were excluded; and, as generosity is not the distinguishing characteristic of political parties, such weak and tame submission would be infallibly followed by permanent ostracism.

A leader of a party has difficulties enough to contend with. He has a number of earnest yet sometimes diverging convictions to fuse together into one whole by compromise; and if he found any considerable section ready to follow him

at any price,—docile when disregarded, and, like the ancient cavaliers,

“True as the dial to the sun,
Although it be not shined upon,”—

he would rejoice at having one difficulty the less in his course, and would continue to disregard those whose *souple* submission had shown him that he might disregard them with impunity. We need not say, therefore, that we have seen without pain the demonstrations hostile to the present government made on a remarkable and critical occasion last year, and continued during the present session, by many of the most influential and most sincerely liberal Catholics in the House of Commons; and, much as we should regret to see the Tory party restored to power, we consider, upon the whole, that their temporary occupancy of the Treasury benches would be a lesser evil than the tame submission of an influential portion of the liberal party to insult and to ostracism. Thus much, to prevent any misconception of our views, we have thought it necessary to say, by way of preface to the question which we now propose to discuss.

We should rejoice to see the Catholics of these kingdoms acting, as they used to act, in combination with that party which upon the whole is most prepared to give effect to the principles involved in the passing of the Emancipation Act; and just in proportion as we should object to their being leagued together in a separate faction, is our desire that, in the difficult times on which we are now entering, their influence should not be frittered away by any difference of opinion as to which party most demands their independent allegiance. In times such as these united and energetic action is necessary. In the face of the events which in rapid succession are subverting the ancient European system, those miserable quarrels and petty piques which have divided us ought to be forgotten.

At best we are a minority, weak in numbers, weaker in influence; a minority that was called into political existence only thirty years ago. We are always in the face of active and unsleeping as well as unscrupulous foes. Forgetful of the lessons which the history of 1800 years teaches, for the hundredth time the song of triumph is raised, and they begin to ring again the knell of the old faith. We know that the passion will once again, as it has been a hundred times before, be followed by a glorious resurrection; but faith is not fatalism, and we must rely on our own energies, and use the means which Providence provides for us, just as if

there were no promise of invincibility to the see and to the faith of Peter. We doubt not that the Catholics of these kingdoms will thus act, and our object now is, by a careful investigation of the causes which have produced our present divisions, to facilitate their removal. If the truth must be told, the main cause of the secession that has lately taken place from those serried ranks which won, under a great leader, the battle of Emancipation, is to be found in the anti-Irish spirit which pervades a portion, small but influential, of the English Catholics. We do not speak of fine ladies or fine gentlemen who lisp their contempt of every thing Irish, still less do we care to mention those humbler votaries of fashion who vindicate their gentility by denying their country; they are a great deal more contemptible themselves, and infinitely more culpable, than the poor Pats and Mikes who, on their arrival in England, attempt to disguise a nationality which their speech betrays, by assuming Saxon Christian names. But putting aside these not very numerous, and certainly not very influential, classes, we admit with pain that among the best and most earnest Catholics on this side of the water are to be found some who have their eyes so exclusively occupied by the scene before them, that they forget their Irish brethren, and act and feel as if no part of the United Kingdom but their own had any claim on their regard; but they are few. It was, we believe, Mr. O'Connell who said that the English Catholics have in their days of power been as oppressive and as contemptuous of the Irish as the English Protestants have since been, and that there still remains in the minds of some of the former as bitter a hostility as ever to the Irish. These expressions are too strong; but we put it to our readers whether they have not at least some foundation in fact; and the natural result of such feelings is to look upon the Irish as a race so difficult to understand,—so little governed by English common sense,—that it is useless to try to comprehend their grievances, and hopeless to attempt to redress them. Admit these premises, and the conclusion is not illogical. Isolate England from Ireland, admit that English Catholic interests are alone to be considered, and we freely grant that the importance of party questions is much diminished. Looking from an exclusively English point of view at the parties which contend for power, we can understand a preference for Lord Derby to any liberal leader. The Tories are weak and therefore civil; they have to make their characters with Catholics; the liberal party is too apt to live on the memory of former services. At this moment its chief, like an attorney-general

who anticipates a speedy and secure refuge on the bench, evidently considers that his government can be made to last for his time without Catholic support, and with unbridled tongue exults in a foreign policy which his opponents silently approve. His warmest English supporters are to be found among the ranks of those Dissenters whose bigoted hatred of Catholicism takes the most offensive shape. Lord Shaftesbury and the Protestant Alliance forgive his heresies on the subject of original sin, in consideration for the mitres distributed among their followers; and the gloomy constellation of North Warwickshire shines approbation on the liberal statesman who has handed over Mr. Turnbull to the Protestant lions. Such shameless abnegation of former principles naturally and properly excites our indignation. We are a small minority in England; the dominance of the Established Church does not wound our pride. Protestant officials of all descriptions administer the affairs of the country, because the vast majority of the country is Protestant. We may sigh after the times when these things were otherwise; but in a Protestant country we cannot repine at Protestant ascendancy.

Such is the position of English Catholics—citizens of a Protestant state—not, indeed, what they were when Edmund Burke said of them, that they were enough to torment, but not enough to fear—rescued from that position mainly by Irish influence. We have no political position; our social grievances are great. Those who ran wild about the young Mortara, have no mercy on our children, and rear them up as Protestants in their workhouses. Every obstacle is put in the way of the priest who desires to move our Catholic prisoners to repentance; but the Tory party is at least as willing to remedy these grievances as the Liberals are. In Ireland the Catholics are the nation. To every privilege which rightly belongs to the members of the Established Church in England they are by the strictest rules of justice entitled. Until a time within the memory of young men—until Lord Normanby's vice-royalty—they were dominated over by a small and foreign sect, and excluded from almost every privilege and every influence in the land of their birth.

“In that country,” to use the words of Sir Robert Peel, “there exist two religious establishments—two coextensive hierarchies; the one sedulously affecting, the other legally possessing, the same dignities, titles, and spiritual authorities: the former superintending the religious concerns of the great majority of the people, not endowed, indeed, not encouraged, by the State, but exercising over the minds of its

adherents, from the very nature of its doctrines and the solemnity of its ceremonies, an almost unbounded influence; the other, the Church of the minority, splendidly endowed, no doubt, but endowed with the temporalities which once belonged to its excluded but aspiring rival."

This Church is the symbol and the effect of an odious ascendancy. In Irish parishes the Protestant minister has glebe and church provided for him. He has large revenues. The pastor of the Catholic majority has no revenue except what he derives from the voluntary alms of the people. When he is appointed to a parish, he has, as best he may, to hire a residence, to build and repair his church, without the assistance of one shilling from any public fund. Well might Lord Macaulay say that England and Scotland are one because their churches are two, and England and Ireland are two because their churches are one. But the Protestants of Ireland are not contented with ecclesiastical, they insist also on civil ascendancy. They insist on the right which a prescription of two centuries has given them to administer the whole of the affairs of the country, political as well as social. Alien in feeling no less than in creed from the majority among whom they live, they consider every Catholic appointment to every office an encroachment on their rights. Italians had a far larger share in the government of their own country by Austria, Poles have infinitely more political power in Poland, than Irish Catholics in Ireland under a Tory government. Not one single Catholic during the last two periods when they held office received any part in the administration of the country. To the question proposed by Sir Robert Peel they have a ready answer. He said: "Do you mean *bonâ fide* to give the Catholics the practical advantages of the eligibility you propose to confer upon them? Do you mean to give them that fair proportion of political power to which their numbers, wealth, talents, and education, will entitle them?" By the mouth of their Irish supporters, by their own conduct, by the rigid rule of exclusion from which they have never even for an instant varied, every successive Tory government have answered, 'No.' Wiser than their forefathers, they have offered some tempting material baits: they have dangled packet-stations and railroads before the eyes of Ireland.

They have said, 'All these things will we give thee,' but they have sternly and unwaveringly attached the condition, that from every sort of political weight, influence, and

authority, the Catholic majority must consent to be excluded in the land of their birth. An Irish Tory Catholic—if, with the exception of Mr. Hennessy, such an extraordinary phenomenon exists—deliberately by his acts adopts the whole system. He may bring forward measures inconsistent with these views as a private member of Parliament. The Tory party allow him to do so, because they know he cannot pass them. He may skirmish as a free lance on behalf of Catholic interests; but when the pitched battle comes,—when the question arises, who is to govern the country, who is to make and administer the laws,—he must fight under the banner of Protestant ascendancy; and his only fruitful acts are those by which he excludes every one of his coreligionists from having any share of political power. The effect of his act is felt through every fibre of the political frame—the Orange squireen, the docile policeman aspiring to promotion, the freeman of Dublin. Look at them when the news comes that a Tory majority has placed a Tory government in office; see their dilated eyes, their greetings in the streets, their exultation; they feel that they are now the government of Ireland—that the whole force of the executive is behind them to back them. They unlearn those lessons of liberality which they had awkwardly endeavoured to recite, and that which Elie de Beaumont describes as the worst curse of Ireland, the *mauvaise aristocratie*, reigns supreme. Would any English Protestant, we don't say promote, but even submit to such a system for himself? Would he support, if by his support he were to gain any amount of material prosperity, a government which treated him as the Tory party treat the Irish Catholics? And can English Catholics be justified, for the sake of any advantages—admitting, for the sake of argument, that there are advantages—which a Tory government may offer them, to subject the people who won Emancipation for them to such degrading and odious helotism? At all events, any one who thinks otherwise must abandon all hopes of Catholic union. He cannot expect the Irish nation to sign the decree for its own political annihilation.

With them politics are no question of abstract speculation. They care perhaps too little for the doctrines of the Whigs or the doctrines of the Tories. Reform, or free-trade, or even, in ordinary times, foreign policy, are overshadowed in their minds by the—to them—vital question whether Ireland is to be governed by the representatives of the Irish nation, or by the representatives of the Protestant squire-

archy; and any lukewarmness on their parts in late party struggles has been caused, not by any vacillation in their convictions, but by the degree in which the present prime minister has himself vacillated in carrying out the tradition of his present party at home, and by his utter abnegation, in his foreign policy, of every one of those principles which all parties in this country have hitherto considered sacred, and which, so long as the English people retain the love of justice, the manly instincts, and the generosity which have hitherto distinguished them, will, except when religious prejudice blinds them, be the distinguishing characteristics of their policy abroad.

Look at what has just happened in the House of Commons. Our readers no doubt remember the Orange demonstrations which took place in the north of Ireland last July: Orange flags were hoisted on the Protestant churches; one of her Majesty's judges, who is a Catholic, was insulted by the Orange grand jury of the county of Fermanagh; some Orangemen marching in illegal procession in the neighbourhood of Lurgan fired upon an unarmed body of Catholics, one of whom was killed, and several others were grievously wounded. The effect produced on the public mind was such, that a new law as to party demonstrations, opposed by a considerable section of the Tory party, was passed through Parliament. On the spot vigorous measures to discover the murderers were adopted; informations were sworn against several of the Orangemen; they were committed for trial, and at the spring assizes Mr. O'Hagan, the Irish Attorney-General proceeded to Armagh to conduct the prosecution. Three cases were tried, with extreme moderation and exemplary fairness on the part of the crown; and the Attorney-General gave a precedent of vast importance to all who may succeed him in the conduct of political trials in Ireland, for he directed that partisanship and prejudice only, and not religious opinion, should exclude men from the jury. In the two first cases, the prisoners having challenged every Catholic, Protestants exclusively were impaneled; and on the third, a misdemeanour case, there was a mixed jury—eight Catholics and four Protestants. The first and the third juries convicted; the second gave a verdict of acquittal. The Orangemen were in consternation. Forthwith they assailed the prosecution and the Attorney-General with an outrageous malignity and audacity of falsehood which have had no parallel in our time. They howled like baffled fiends about the packing of the jury! *They*, whose settled practice it had been never to

permit one Catholic to sit upon a jury for the trial of a Catholic when it could possibly be prevented ;—*they*, who tried Daniel O'Connell by twelve Protestants seventeen years ago, and with a desperate consistency of action, on their last advent to power, tried Daniel Sullivan, the young "Phoenix" prisoner of Kerry, also a Catholic, by twelve Protestants, every Catholic, however high his station or pure his character, being deliberately driven from the box ;—*they*, who have repeated this operation of wrong and insult until it has become too familiar to Irishmen to stir their wonder, though it has not ceased to move them to indignation ;—*they* dared to assail a Catholic attorney-general because he would not permit Orange partisans to try an Orangeman charged with an Orange murder. They got two exclusively Protestant juries and a mixed jury ; they *never* have given a Catholic jury, and rarely a mixed jury, to a Catholic in any political case. Yet they had the impudence to rave and roar as if they had suffered injury. To them mere justice, simple fair play, wears the show of oppression, because for generations they have had license to tyrannise and trample down their fellow-beings, and interference with the precious privilege is utterly intolerable to them. So they attacked the Catholic Attorney-General as not even Plunkett was attacked, when he ventured to do his duty and encounter them forty years ago in Dublin. They manufactured lies ; they charged the suppression of proof, and the withholding of witnesses, and official partiality, without the shadow of evidence ; and they went on, day after day and week after week, scattering the "poison-spume" of their rancour through all their organs, with an unconquerable malice which made them wholly reckless of exposure and refutation.

We venture to say that there is no one whose character stands higher with all classes and creeds than Mr. O'Hagan. He is not only a great orator and an accomplished scholar, but his scrupulous justice and his tolerant spirit have won for him the love and the approbation, often recorded in public documents, of those who most widely differ from him in religion and in politics ; but he is a Catholic,—the culprit was an Orangeman. The Orange feeling of Ireland was roused just as in the southern states of America the indignation of the slave-owners will be roused if—the blacks having been placed by the law on an equality with the whites—a black attorney-general ever prosecutes to conviction a white criminal.

How did this indignation find a voice in the House of

Commons? Where did outraged Protestant ascendancy find advocates there? Was it Mr. Spooner, or Mr. Newdegate, or that new and fitting antagonist of Maynooth, Mr. Whalley, who was chosen for the purpose? No; Sir Hugh Cairns, the late English Solicitor-General, and Mr. Whiteside, late Irish Attorney-General, were the two men to whom was intrusted the task of impugning the conduct of the Queen's law-officer, and of vindicating for Orange delinquents a virtual impunity from the terrors of the law.

Some fourteen Orangemen were found guilty at Armagh. One of them, convicted of manslaughter by an exclusively Protestant jury, escaped, we believe, from some doubt expressed by the judge who tried him as to the effect of evidence which happened to be given on a subsequent trial. The executive acted according to usage on the suggestion of the judge. And there was great jubilation amongst the Orangemen; their rancour was intensified instead of being subdued, and they raved for the destruction of the Attorney-General. The whole of the incidents of this transaction, to which we cannot more fully advert, are frightfully illustrative of the unchanged ferocity of this terrible faction, and of their resolution, so far as they have power, to deal with the Catholic people as insolently and as barbarously as in the darkest period of the penal times.

We have dwelt on this matter at so much length because we think that it brings out in the clearest light the point we are insisting on,—the ingrained, ineradicable conviction of the Tory leaders, that whatever the Act of Emancipation may have done as to the law in fact, Protestants and Catholics are not, and ought not to be, treated as equals. They are ready to rule us as kind masters, but masters they are determined to be.

Mr. Whiteside has often said in the House of Commons, "I don't know how things are looked upon in the rest of Ireland; I know the opinion of Ulster." Ulster is his Ireland and that of his party; the rest of Ireland is a conquered province, to be treated generously, kindly, even liberally, but to be kept in subjection. This is well understood in Ireland. Hence her influence has maintained the liberal party in power perhaps for the greater part of the last thirty years. But if the Irish Catholics never can be supporters of Tory rule, are they bound to support Lord Palmerston's government? must they be either Derbyites or Palmerstonians? Nothing can be more absurd, more contrary to reason, more unsustained by parliamentary precedent, than such a view. When

Lord John Russell turned out Lord Palmerston from his government, did Lord Palmerston join the Tories? Far from it. He took a line of his own, and, with the assistance of Tory votes, he overthrew Lord John's government. When the Manchester party were disgusted by the exclusiveness and nepotism of Lord Palmerston's administration, did they inscribe Church and Queen upon their banners, and join that Tory party whose principles were far more opposed to theirs than the principles of the existing government were? Nothing of the sort. They took an independent line, watched their opportunity, and drove Lord Palmerston from office. We could multiply instances of a similar line of conduct. The two we have mentioned are, however, sufficient for our present purpose; and be it observed, that in both these instances the result aimed at by the actors was obtained. Lord Palmerston wished for revenge; he certainly had no intention of joining the Tories, or of spending the rest of his life in opposition. After a short Tory administration he came into power himself as prime minister, and he humiliated his rival. In the case of the Manchester party, within a few months a new liberal government was formed, in the constitution and direction of which they had their fair share of influence.

It is true that in each of these cases Lord Derby was given a short possession of power; but after all, in this country, no government can long remain in office that does not represent popular opinion. If the popular opinion had been with the Tories, they would have gained and kept power without the intervention of Lord Palmerston at the one period, or of the Manchester party at the other. As the popular opinion was liberal, the Tories were not able to maintain the position they had accidentally gained.

That policy, therefore, which recommends itself not only to the instinct of the great mass of the Catholics of the United Kingdom, but also to the deliberate convictions of the deepest thinkers among them, involves no abandonment of liberal principles, and no defection from the liberal party. They may turn out the government over which Lord Palmerston and Lord John preside, but they will not become Tories. It would be madness on our parts to establish Orange ascendancy because for a moment, under the influence of politico-religious excitement, the party with which we have been identified has been untrue to its principles. Let us not undo the work of O'Connell, and bind round our neck and kiss those chains which he struck off from the necks of

our forefathers, because a statesman who never sacrificed once in the course of his long life his own interest to any principle, sees us weak from division, and, thinking that he can do without us, insults us in order to conciliate our enemies; but, on the other hand, let us not submit to outrage or to insult from those whose battles we have fought, and whose victories without our sacrifices could never have been achieved.

The leaders of Catholic opinion in the county of Cork have recently set us a good example. Mr. Baron Deasy, after having through their influence represented the county for a long time, thought fit to insult them, and to proclaim that his party could do without them. An election came on; they stood aloof, and the liberal party was ignominiously defeated. We doubt not that this salutary lesson has already purged the mental error of Mr. Deasy's friends, and made them forget those vows made at ease, as violent as void.—A similar process on a wider amphitheatre will produce a similar effect on the leaders of the liberal party. We regret, as much as any one can do, the necessity of giving them such a lesson, but that necessity under existing circumstances is imperative. Nothing, however, can be further from our intention than to maintain that we ourselves are not in a large degree responsible for the unfortunate position in which we are now placed; on the contrary, we believe that the insolence of those few among us who are *Veneziani e poi Cattolici*—first Whigs and then Catholics, the absolute ignoring of the convictions of one-fourth of her Majesty's subjects by Lord John's foreign policy, the exclusion of Catholics from every position of influence or authority,—all these injuries and all these insults would never have been possible if it had not been for our own disunion. No party, we may be quite sure, will deal justly by us from any exuberance of affection for us. It is quite true that the Tories are faithful, and the Liberals unfaithful to their principles when they wrong us. Carry out the principles of the one party to their logical results, and we have all we ask for or desire—liberty; a clear stage, and no favour; absolute and entire equality, civil and religious; in foreign affairs *bonâ-fide* non-intervention. Tory principles, on the other hand, involve privilege—exceptional favour towards the Established Church. Church and king is the idea on which the one party subsists, civil and religious liberty, the very life-blood of the other; the reason for which it exists, and the negation of which would make it cease to exist. A very slight consideration of these simple truths will show how utterly absurd is the view of those who say, How can Catholics

support the party which represents the Dissenters, and oppose that which represents the Established Church, when the former sect is much more anti-Catholic than the latter? As politicians we have nothing to say to the theological opinions of either. The interests of the Established Church are bound up with privilege, therefore they refuse to treat us as their equals. The interests of the Dissenters are against privilege, and therefore in favour of the entire equality of all. The one invoke the assistance of the State to maintain their preëminence, the other deprecate all State interference in religious matters, because, where the State does interfere, it necessarily interferes against them. This is obviously true, but parties are not governed by logic, but by interest, and often by prejudice. Politicians instinctively dislike any real spiritual power, and therefore they dislike us. They find us an obstacle in their way. Mr. Fox's dictum, that "power is the only security for political liberty," is therefore especially applicable to us. We have influence when we have power. Every government will neglect and ill-treat us if it dare. Individuals there are—we rejoice to believe that there are many such—who wish to treat us fairly simply from a love of justice. We could mention not a few names of strong Protestants who have sacrificed every thing they most prized rather than consent to violate in our regard the principles of civil and religious liberty. But certainly the age of party chivalry is gone. We see before our eyes the Conservative party afraid to protest against a revolutionary foreign policy, because they believe it to be popular; among them, at the present crisis, the principles of Edmund Burke have not found a single exponent, and those who call themselves the disciples of Mr. Pitt have looked on in ignominious silence while the Government has stamped with its approbation acts from which the truthful English spirit of Mr. Fox, even in the excitement of the first French revolution, would have revolted from as base and would have condemned as anarchical. As to the Government, *il n'y a personne qui change si souvent d'idées fixes*—in other words, they have no *idées fixes* at all. Talk of Abbé Sièyes constitutions, all ticketed and all ready for every emergency, why in the Foreign Office there is a whole repository of contradictory principles,—some for the Ionian Islands, some for Turkey, some for Rome,—ready to be applied, as the occasion may demand, to every possible combination of circumstances.

In the East the remnant of those Christian races which have not yet been massacred by the Sultan's troops, cry out for emancipation from the Turkish yoke. Lord John

Russell and Lord Palmerston declare that the integrity of the Turkish empire must be maintained at any price. In Italy, according to them, the popular will is to override every law. Within the last few weeks Mr. Gladstone expressed his astonishment at any one daring to invoke the principles of international law in behalf of King Francis II., the son of that sovereign who had broken the solemn oath by which he had engaged to give a constitution to his subjects.

That same Mr. Gladstone had, in 1850 (the sovereign who, as he alleges—into the truth of the assertion we don't enter—had thus absolved his subjects from their allegiance by his perjury then reigning), declared that “the more we
“may be tempted to sympathise with Sicily, the less we
“admire Neapolitan institutions and usages of government,
“the more tenacious, as he contended, we should be of our
“duty to do them full justice, the more careful that we do
“not, because we differ from them, impair, in their case, the
“application of those great and sacred principles that govern
“and harmonise the intercourse between states, and from
“which you can never depart without producing mischiefs
“by the violation of the rule a thousandfold greater than
“any benefit you may promise yourself to achieve in the
“special instance.”

About the same time Lords Palmerston and John Russell were emphatic in their declarations that the temporal power of the Pope—which they now proclaim to be a nuisance which must be abated—ought to be maintained. Are we wrong in believing that men who enunciate such opposite principles have no principles at all? God help us if we have nothing more firm or stable to rest upon than their moral convictions! We console ourselves by meditating on the elasticity of their consciences. They profess to look upon the Pope's weakness as a proof that it is God's will that His temporal power should be abolished, and that the oldest throne in Europe should be overthrown. Depend upon it, if we regain our natural strength and power, they will perceive in that fact a providential intimation that our feelings ought no longer to be wounded, and that a just weight should be given to us in the councils of the empire. They will reverently bow their heads and carry out the divine decree, if the doing so appears to be the only means of preventing the faithful from languishing in opposition while the impious Tory crew possess the earth. As to that question which most occupies now the thoughts and wounds the hearts of

Catholics, as to the insults and injuries which our Holy Father so meekly endures, it was Lord Derby's government that first proposed to despoil him of a portion of his states, and the present government has bettered their example; but neither the one nor the other cabinet would have dared thus to act if there had been sixty or seventy Catholic representatives, party men, as others are in ordinary times, bound together in a vigorous union in sight of a great emergency, ready to avenge any insult offered to their religion or its earthly chief. Such a body would have been able to insist on the only thing that they could reasonably ask for in a country where they are a minority, real non-intervention, perfect and scrupulous neutrality.

There are some among the Catholics of these kingdoms who turn, through indolence or through disdain, from political strife, and inquire what advantages the great mass of Catholics have gained from their admission to political power, and from the sacrifices they have made in electoral strifes.

No doubt they have often been deceived by those who sought their suffrages. Personal ambition has put on the mask of patriotism, and vows to defend religion or to promote social improvement have resulted in the selfish abandonment of both.

Such deception and such perjury there will always be. The histories of all parties and of all countries are full of them. But who ever thinks of renouncing marriage because some wives have been unfaithful, or of not settling his property because some trustees have been robbers? It is sometimes asked, by those who point to the miseries and religious persecutions to which the Catholic poor are subjected, what has been gained by Emancipation for any except the few who have seats in either house of Parliament, and those friends or followers for whom they have procured places? Such an objection goes very deep. It strikes at the very root of political liberty, and resolves the question of constitutions and forms of government into the consideration of material well-being. Food and lodging satisfy brutes. It makes no difference to the animal creation of Warsaw or of Bulgaria what flag floats over the habitations of their masters; but those masters consider that man does not live by bread alone, and the poorest peasant among them is ready to risk his little all for his religion and his country.

But is it true that, judging even by this low material standard, the few only among the Catholics have been benefited by a participation in political power? Has the magic

touch of liberty had no effect in elevating, not only our moral, but also our social position? Is ours the only country in which the struggle of life is not carried on more successfully by freemen than by serfs? There is not one town in England with a large Catholic population, there is not one county or town in Ireland, in which not only churches, and convents, and schools have not sprung up since 1829, but also Catholics have not risen in the social scale,—emerging from that dead level of degradation and of inferiority in which a long night of slavery had enveloped them, acquiring property and habits of self-respect and self-reliance, and successfully asserting their equality with the Protestants around them. Such transformations are not accomplished in a moment. The habits and demeanour burnt in by long ages of ill-treatment, require more than one generation to be eradicated. All we ask is, that any one through whose mind have passed timid and desponding thoughts should open his eyes. Let him look upon the position of Catholics now, and let him compare it with their position when O'Connell won the battle of Emancipation. Any one who, in 1829, had drawn a picture of us as we now are, and had said, 'Such will be Catholic power and Catholic social influence thirty years hence,' would have been looked upon as a vain dreamer. No faith in the vivifying power of liberty could have anticipated for us any approximation to the reality. We have the power in our own hands. We may continue to increase in strength, and we may win back much of which our ancestors were violently deprived. Upon the other hand, we may abandon the struggle like spoiled children, because we do not obtain all we want, or consider ourselves entitled to, at once, and we may relapse into obscurity and impotence. In our hands the future position of the Catholic Church in these countries, under God, is placed. Every one on whom the franchise has been conferred has had a duty imposed on him for the exercise of which he is responsible. We may, if we please, sacrifice our rights. No man, without sin, can decline to perform a duty: God has placed in the hands of almost every one of our readers a portion of the power which rules this mighty realm. We cannot consent to be as foreigners, enjoying the material advantages, but not controlling the destinies of our native land; nor are our duties and our responsibilities confined even within its limits. The whole civilised world is now as it were one vast assembly,—“the parliament of men, the federation of the world,”—in which the voice and the influence of the statesman affects not his own country only, but the welfare of the whole. Lord Palmerston the other

day, at Tiverton, said that England had changed the fate of Italy, although not a single English soldier had taken part in the Italian struggle, and he and Cavour and Mazzini understand this well. If the confederation of revolution and impiety is widely spread, and acts together as if moved by one soul, and by its baneful influence perplexes nations; if

“the ark of God is in the field,
And all around the alien armies sweep,”

are not those who are the enemies of anarchy, and the friends of social order and of true liberty, to band themselves together also, to be as active and as energetic for good as their adversaries are for evil? In every age there is a tendency to exaggerate the relative importance of its own trials and difficulties. We cannot, however, believe that we exaggerate when we say, that not for centuries has there been a crisis so pregnant with good or with evil, with blessing or with cursing, as the present. Never were the confines of good and of evil more clearly defined. Never were there such world-wide combinations. The conflict is not confined to any one country. It is no mere skirmish; the battle-field is the whole world, and the engagement reaches along the whole line. The importance of the issue to be decided it is impossible to exaggerate, or even completely to realise. Is the Church to be free, or is the State to be absolute? Is the law of God to be trammelled, modified, adapted to the will or the caprice of man, or is it to have free course? Is right or is might to be the arbiter of nations? In one word, is the world to progress and to develop according to the Christian idea, or is it to relapse into pagan habits of thought? In the presence of such momentous issues, can we refuse to make great sacrifices,—sacrifices of ease, of quiet, of peculiar views, of resentments, of party interests? If such sacrifices were never more required, never, we rejoice to believe, were they, if generously made, more certain to be rewarded with victory, because, never since the day of Pentecost, were the children of the Church more entirely of one mind. We have no secret enemies in our own bosoms; the enemy is before us.

We have no right to dictate to any one. We have no jurisdiction even over those who do us the favour to peruse our pages. We can appeal only to their reason and their consciences. To reason and to conscience we do appeal. We appeal through them to the Catholics of these kingdoms not to neutralise one another's efforts by intestine division; to forget past differences, and injuries, and disappointments; above all, to banish national prejudices, and to resolve, in

their own stations, at any cost to play their part worthily in a united effort to vindicate for themselves that amount of influence in the direction of public affairs to which, by their intelligence and their numbers, they are justly entitled.

By so acting in their own parishes, or towns, or counties, or in the larger sphere of public life, they will contribute in the most effectual manner their aid throughout the world to that sacred cause which, under circumstances far more difficult than ours, has rallied round it the best men in all nations, and upon which the benediction rests of our Sovereign Pontiff, the representative of that law whose seat is the bosom of God, and whose voice is the harmony of the world.

POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

At the time of the utmost degradation of the Athenian democracy, when the commanders at Arginusæ were condemned by an unconstitutional decree, and Socrates alone upheld the sanctity of the law, the people, says Xenophon, cried out that it was monstrous to prevent them from doing whatever they pleased.* A few years later the archonship of Euclides witnessed the restoration of the old constitution, by which the liberty, though not the power, of Athens was revived and prolonged for ages; and the palladium of the new settlement was the provision that no decree of the council or of the people should be permitted to overrule any existing law.†

The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the sovereignty of the people, depends on the choice it makes between these opposite principles, absolute power on the one hand, and on the other, the restraints of legality and the authority of tradition. It must stand or fall according to its choice, whether to give the supremacy to the law or to the will of the people; whether to constitute a moral association maintained by duty, or a physical one kept together by force. Republics offer, in this respect, a strict analogy with monarchies, which are also either absolute or organic, either governed by law, and therefore constitutional, or by a will which, being the source, cannot be the object of laws,

* Τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ μὴ τις ἑάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὃ αὐτὸν βούληται. Hellen. i. 7, 12.

† Ψήφισμα δὲ μηδὲν μῆτε βουλῆς μῆτε δήμου νόμου κυριώτερον εἶναι. Andocides de Myst. Or. Att., ed. Dobson i. 259.

and is therefore despotic. But in their mode of growth, in the direction in which they gravitate, they are directly contrary to each other. Democracy tends naturally to realise its principle, the sovereignty of the people, and to remove all limits and conditions of its exercise; whilst monarchy tends to surround itself with such conditions. In one instance force yields to right; in the other might prevails over law. The resistance of the king is gradually overcome by those who resist and seek to share his power; in a democracy the power is already in the hands of those who seek to subvert and to abolish the law. The process of subversion is consequently irresistible, and far more rapid.

They differ, therefore, not only in the direction, but in the principle of their development. The organisation of a constitutional monarchy is the work of opposing powers, interests, and opinions, by which the monarch is deprived of his exclusive authority, and the throne is surrounded with and guarded by political institutions. In a purely popular government this antagonism of forces does not exist, for all power is united in the same sovereign; subject and citizen are one, and there is no external power that can enforce the surrender of a part of the supreme authority, or establish a security against its abuse. The elements of organisation are wanting. If not obtained at starting, they will not naturally spring up. They have no germs in the system. Hence monarchy grows more free, in obedience to the laws of its existence, whilst democracy becomes more arbitrary. The people is induced less easily than the king to abdicate the plenitude of its power, because it has not only the right of might on its side, but that which comes from possession, and the absence of a prior claimant. The only antagonism that can arise is that of contending parties and interests in the sovereign community, the condition of whose existence is that it should be homogeneous. These separate interests can protect themselves only by setting bounds to the power of the majority; and to this the majority cannot be compelled, or consistently persuaded, to consent. It would be a surrender of the direct authority of the people, and of the principle that in every political community authority must be commensurate with power.

“*Infirma minoris*

Vox cedat numeri, parvaque in parte quiescat.”

“*La pluralité,*” says Pascal, “*est la meilleure voie, parce qu’elle est visible, et qu’elle a la force pour se faire obéir; cependant c’est l’avis des moins habiles.*” The minority can

have no permanent security against the oppression of preponderating numbers, or against the government which these numbers control, and the moment will inevitably come when separation will be preferred to submission. When the classes which compose the majority and the minority are not defined with local distinctness, but are mingled together throughout the country, the remedy is found in emigration ; and it was thus that many of the ancient Mediterranean states, and some of the chief American colonies, took their rise. But when the opposite interests are grouped together, so as to be separated not only politically but geographically, there will ensue a territorial disruption of the state, developed with a rapidity and certainty proportioned to the degree of local corporate organisation that exists in the community. It cannot, in the long-run, be prevented by the majority, which is made up of many future, contingent minorities, all secretly sympathising with the seceders because they foresee a similar danger for themselves, and unwilling to compel them to remain, because they dread to perpetuate the tyranny of majorities. The strict principle of popular sovereignty must therefore lead to the destruction of the state that adopts it, unless it sacrifices itself by concession.

The greatest of all modern republics has given the most complete example of the truth of this law. The dispute between absolute and limited power, between centralisation and self-government, has been, like that between privilege and prerogative in England, the substance of the constitutional history of the United States. This is the argument which confers on the whole period that intervenes between the convention of 1787 and the election of Mr. Davis in 1861 an almost epic unity. It is this problem that has supplied the impulse to the political progress of the United States, that underlies all the great questions that have agitated the Union, and bestows on them all their constitutional importance. It has recurred in many forms, but on each occasion the solution has failed, and the decision has been avoided. Hence the American government is justly termed a system of compromises, that is to say, an inconsistent system. It is not founded, like the old governments of Europe, on tradition, nor on principles, like those which have followed the French Revolution ; but on a series of mutual concessions, and momentary suspensions of war between opposite principles, neither of which could prevail. Necessarily, as the country grew more populous, and the population more extended, as the various interests grew in

importance, and the various parties in internal strength, as new regions, contrasting with each other in all things in which the influence of nature and the condition of society bear upon political life, were formed into states, the conflict grew into vaster proportions and greater intensity, each opinion became more stubborn and unyielding, compromise was more difficult, and the peril to the Union increased.

Viewed in the light of recent events, the history of the American Republic is intelligible and singularly instructive. For the dissolution of the Union is no accidental or hasty or violent proceeding, but the normal and inevitable result of a long course of events, which trace their origin to the rise of the constitution itself. There we find the germs of the disunion that have taken seventy years to ripen, the beginning of an antagonism which constantly asserted itself and could never be reconciled, until the differences widened into a breach.

The convention which sat at Philadelphia in 1787, for the purpose of substituting a permanent constitution in the place of the confederacy, which had been formed to resist the arms of England, but which had broken down in the first years of peace, was not a very numerous body, but it included the most eminent men of America. It is astounding to observe the political wisdom, and still more the political foresight, which their deliberations exhibit. Franklin, indeed, appears to have been the only very foolish man among them, and his colleagues seem to have been aware of it. Washington presided, but he exercised very little influence upon the assembly, in which there were men who far exceeded him in intellectual power. Adams and Jefferson were in Europe, and the absence of the latter is conspicuous in the debates and in the remarkable work which issued from them. For it is a most striking thing that the views of pure democracy, which we are accustomed to associate with American politics, were almost entirely unrepresented in that convention. Far from being the product of a democratic revolution, and of an opposition to English institutions, the constitution of the United States was the result of a powerful reaction against democracy, and in favour of the traditions of the mother country. On this point nearly all the leading statesmen were agreed, and no contradiction was given to such speeches as the following. Madison said: "In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger. What motives are to restrain them? A prudent regard to the maxim, that honesty is the best policy, is found by experience to be as little re-

garded by bodies of men as by individuals. Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number among whom the blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in individuals; in large numbers little is to be expected from it."*

Mr. Sherman opposed the election by the people, "insisting that it ought to be by the State legislatures. The people immediately should have as little to do as may be about the government."

Mr. Gerry said: "The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. . . . He had been too republican heretofore: he was still, however, republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the levelling spirit." Mr. Mason "admitted that we had been too democratic, but was afraid we should incautiously run into the opposite extreme." Mr. Randolph observed "that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the United States laboured; that, in tracing these evils to their origin, every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy: that some check, therefore, was to be sought for against this tendency of our governments."†

Mr. Wilson, speaking in 1787, as if with the experience of the seventy years that followed, said, "Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes; sometimes in an executive, sometimes in a military one. Is there no danger of a legislative despotism? Theory and practice both proclaim it. If the legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability."‡ "However the legislative power may be formed," said Gouverneur Morris, the most conservative man in the convention, "it will, if disposed, be able to ruin the country."§

Still stronger was the language of Alexander Hamilton: "If government is in the hands of the few, they will tyrannise over the many; if in the hands of the many, they will tyrannise over the few. It ought to be in the hands of both, and they should be separated. This separation must be permanent. Representation alone will not do; demagogues will generally prevail; and, if separated, they will need a mutual check. This check is a monarch. . . . The monarch must have proportional strength. He ought to be hereditary, and to have so much power that it will not be his interest to risk much to acquire more. . . . Those who mean to form a

* Madison's Reports, 162.

† Ibid. 196.

‡ Ibid. 135, 138.

§ Ibid. 433.

solid republican government ought to proceed to the confines of another government. . . . But if we incline too much to democracy, we shall soon shoot into a monarchy.”* “He acknowledged himself not to think favourably of republican government, but addressed his remarks to those who did think favourably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone their government as high as possible.”† Soon after, in the New York convention, for the adoption of the constitution, he said, “It has been observed that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved that no position in politics is more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. Their very character was tyranny.”‡

Hamilton’s opinions were in favour of monarchy, though he despaired of introducing it into America. He constantly held up the British constitution as the only guide and model; and Jefferson has recorded his conversations, which show how strong his convictions were. Adams had said that the English government might, if reformed, be made excellent; Hamilton paused and said: “Purge it of its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality of representation, and it would become an impracticable government; as it stands at present, with all its supposed defects, it is the most perfect government which ever existed.” And on another occasion he declared to Jefferson, “I own it is my own opinion that the present government is not that which will answer the ends of society, by giving stability and protection to its rights; and that it will probably be found expedient to go into the British form.”§

In his great speech on the constitution, he spoke with equal decision: “He had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinion of so many of the wise and good, that the British government was the best in the world, and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. . . . As to the executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on republican principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the question? for can there be a good government without a good executive? The English model was the only good one on this subject. . . . We ought to go as far, in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will admit.”||

* Hamilton’s Works, ii. 413-417. † Madison’s Reports, 244.

‡ Hamilton’s Works, ii. 440.

§ Rayner’s Life of Jefferson, 268, 269.

|| Madison’s Reports, 202.

Mr. Dickinson "wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters,—distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible."*

Mr. Pinckney, of South Carolina, said, "Much has been said of the constitution of Great Britain. I will confess that I believe it to be the best constitution in existence; but, at the same time, I am confident it is one that will not or cannot be introduced into this country for many centuries."†

The question on which the founders of the constitution really differed, and which has ever since divided, and at last dissolved the Union, was to determine how far the rights of the States were merged in the federal power, and how far they retained their independence. The problem arose chiefly upon the mode in which the central Congress was to be elected. If the people voted by numbers or by electoral districts, the less populous States must entirely disappear. If the States, and not the population, were represented, the necessary unity could never be obtained, and all the evils of the old confederation would be perpetuated. "The knot," wrote Madison in 1831, "felt as the Gordian one, was the question between the larger and the smaller States, on the rule of voting."

There was a general apprehension on the part of the smaller States that they would be reduced to subjection by the rest. Not that any great specific differences separated the different States; for though the questions of the regulation of commerce and of slavery afterwards renewed the dispute, yet interests were so different from what they have since become, and so differently distributed, that there is little analogy, excepting in principle, with later contests; what was then a dispute on a general principle, has since been envenomed by the great interests and great passions which have become involved in it. South Carolina, which at that time looked forward to a rapid increase by immigration, took part with the large States on behalf of the central power; and Charles Pinckney presented a plan of a constitution which nearly resembled that which was ultimately adopted. The chief subject of discussion was the Virginia plan, presented by Edmund Randolph, in opposition to which the small State of New Jersey introduced another plan founded on the centrifugal or State-rights principle. The object of this party was to confirm the sovereignty of the several States, and to surrender as little as possible to the federal government. This feeling was expressed by Mr.

* Madison's Reports, 166.

† Ibid. 234.

Bedford: "Is there no difference of interests, no rivalry of commerce, of manufactures? Will not these large States crush the small ones, whenever they stand in the way of their ambitions or interested views?"*

"The State legislatures," said Colonel Mason, "ought to have some means of defending themselves against encroachments of the national government. In every other department we have studiously endeavoured to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with means for this purpose?"†

These speakers may have been good or bad politicians, they were certainly good prophets. They were nearly balanced in numbers, and surpassed in ability, by the centralising party. Madison, at that time under the powerful influence of Hamilton, and a federalist, but who afterwards was carried by Jefferson into the democratic camp, occupied an uncertain intermediate position. A note preserved in Washington's handwriting records: "Mr. Madison thinks an individual independence of the States utterly irreconcilable with their aggregate sovereignty, and that a consolidation of the whole into one simple republic would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable."‡

In convention he said: "Any government for the United States formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress."§

The consistent Federalists went farther: "Too much attachment," said Mr. Read, "is betrayed to the State governments. We must look beyond their continuance; a national government must soon, of necessity, swallow them all up."||

Two years before the meeting of the convention, in 1785, Jay, the very type of a federalist, wrote: "It is my first wish to see the United States assume and merit the character of one great nation, whose territory is divided into different States merely for more convenient government."

Alexander Hamilton went further than all his colleagues. He had taken no part in the early debates, when he brought forward an elaborate plan of his own; the most characteristic features of which are, that the State governments are to be altogether superseded; their governors to be appointed by the general government, with a veto on all State laws, and the president is to hold office on good behaviour. An executive, elected for life, but personally responsible, made the

* Madison's Reports, 173.

† *Ib.* 170.

‡ Williams's Statesman's Manual, 268.

§ Reports, 171.

|| *Ibid.* 163.

nearest possible approach to an elective monarchy; and it was with a view to this all but monarchical constitution that he designed to destroy the independence of the States. This scheme was not adopted as the basis of discussion. "He has been praised," said Mr. Johnson, "by all, but supported by none." Hamilton's speech is very imperfectly reported, but his own sketch, the notes from which he spoke, are preserved, and outweigh, in depth and in originality of thought, all that we have ever heard or read of American oratory. He left Philadelphia shortly after, and continued absent many weeks; but there can be no doubt that the spirit of his speech greatly influenced the subsequent deliberations. "He was convinced," he said, "that no amendment of the confederation, leaving the States in possession of their sovereignty, could answer the purpose. . . . The general power, whatever be its form, if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. . . . They are not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities, he was aware, would be necessary. There must be distinct tribunals; corporations for local purposes. . . . By an abolition of the States, he meant that no boundary could be drawn between the national and State legislatures; that the former must therefore have indefinite authority. If it were limited at all, the rivalry of the States would gradually subvert it. . . . As States, he thought they ought to be abolished. But he admitted the necessity of leaving in them subordinate jurisdictions."*

This policy could be justified only on the presumption that when all State authorities should disappear before a great central power, the democratic principles, against which the founders of the constitution were contending, would be entirely overcome. But in this Hamilton's hopes were not fulfilled. The democratic principles acquired new force, the spirit of the convention did not long survive, and then a strong federal authority became the greatest of all dangers to the opinions and institutions which he advocated. It became the instrument of the popular will instead of its barrier; the organ of arbitrary power instead of a security against it. There was a fundamental error and contradiction in Hamilton's system. The end at which he aimed was the best, but he sought it by means radically wrong, and necessarily ruinous to the cause they were meant to serve. In order to give to the Union the best government it could enjoy, it was necessary to destroy, or rather to ignore, the existing authorities. The people was compelled to return to

* Madison's Reports, 201, 212.

a political state of nature, irrespective of the governments it already possessed, and to assume to itself powers of which there were constituted administrators. No adaptation of existing facts to the ideal was possible. They required to be entirely sacrificed to the new design. All political rights, authorities, and powers must be restored to the masses, before such a scheme could be carried into effect. For the most conservative and anti-democratic government the most revolutionary basis was sought. These objections were urged against all plans inconsistent with the independence of the several States by Luther Martin, Attorney General for Maryland.

"He conceived," he said, "that the people of the States, having already vested their powers in their respective legislatures, could not resume them without a dissolution of their governments. . . . To resort to the citizens at large for their sanction to a new government, will be throwing them back into a state of nature; the dissolution of the State governments is involved in the nature of the process;—the people have no right to do this without the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for State purposes."* And in his report to the convention of Maryland of the proceedings out of which the constitution arose, he said: "If we, contrary to the purpose for which we were intrusted, considering ourselves as master-builders, too proud to amend our original government, should demolish it entirely, and erect a new system of our own, a short time might show the new system as defective as the old, perhaps more so. Should a convention be found necessary again, if the members thereof, acting upon the same principles, instead of amending and correcting its defects, should demolish that entirely, and bring forward a third system, that also might soon be found no better than either of the former; and thus we might always remain young in government, and always suffering the inconveniences of an incorrect imperfect system."†

It is very remarkable that, while the Federalists, headed by Hamilton and Madison, advocated, for the soundest and wisest object, opinions which have since been fatal to the Union, by furnishing the democratic party with an irresistible instrument, and consequently an irresistible temptation, Martin supported a policy in reality far more conservative, although his opinions were more revolutionary, and although he quoted as political authorities writers such as Price and Priestley. The controversy, although identical in substance

* Madison's Reports, 218, 248.

† Elliot's Debates, i. 350.

with that which has at last destroyed the Union, was so different in form, and consequently in its bearings, that the position of the contending parties became inverted as their interests or their principles predominated. The result of this great constitutional debate was, that the States were represented as units in the Senate, and the people according to numbers in the House. This was the first of the three great compromises. The others were the laws by which the regulation of commerce was made over to the central power, and the slave-trade was tolerated for only twenty years. On these two questions, the regulation of commerce and the extension of slavery, the interests afterwards grew more divided, and it is by them that the preservation of the Union has been constantly called in question. This was not felt at first, when Jay wrote "that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people; a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs."* The weakening of all these bonds of union gradually brought on the calamities which are described by Madison in another number of the same publication: "A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilised nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by common interests, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render one unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if

* Federalist, 2.

not impracticable. . . . In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists, in the one case, in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects."* That Madison should have given so absurd a reason for security in the new constitution, can be explained only by the fact that he was writing to recommend it as it was, and had to make the best of his case. It had been Hamilton's earnest endeavour to establish that security for right which Madison considers peculiar to monarchy, an authority which should not be the organ of the majority. "Tis essential there should be a permanent will in a community. . . . The principle chiefly intended to be established is this, that there must be a permanent will. . . . There ought to be a principle in government capable of resisting the popular current."†

This is precisely what Judge Story means when he says: "I would say in a republican government the fundamental truth, that the minority have indisputable and inalienable rights; that the majority are not every thing, and the minority nothing; that the people may not do what they please."

Webster thought the same, but he took a sanguine view of actual facts when he said: "It is another principle, equally true and certain, and, according to my judgment of things, equally important, that the people often limit themselves. They set bounds to their own power. They have chosen to secure the institutions which they establish against the sudden impulses of mere majorities."‡

Channing was nearer the truth when he wrote: "The doctrine that the majority ought to govern passes with the multitude as an intuition, and they have never thought how far it is to be modified in practice, and how far the application of it ought to be controlled by other principles."§

In reality, the total absence of a provision of this kind, which should raise up a law above the arbitrary will of the people, and prevent it from being sovereign, led the greatest of the statesmen who sat in the convention to despair of the success and permanence of their work. Jefferson informs us that it was so with Washington: "Washington had not a firm confidence in the durability of our government. Washington was influenced by the belief that we must at length end in something like a British constitution."

Hamilton, who by his writings contributed more than any other man to the adoption of the constitution, declared

* Federalist, 10, 51. † Works, ii. 414, 415. ‡ Works, vi. 225. § Memoir, 417.

in the convention that "no man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his own," and he explained what he thought of the kind of security that had been obtained: "Gentlemen say that we need to be rescued from the democracy. But what the means proposed? A democratic Assembly is to be checked by a democratic Senate, and both these by a democratic chief magistrate."*

"A large and well-organised republic," he said, "can scarcely lose its liberty from any other cause than that of anarchy, to which a contempt of the laws is the high-road. A sacred respect for the constitutional law is the vital principle, the sustaining energy of a free government. The instruments by which it must act are either the authority of the laws, or force. If the first be destroyed, the last must be substituted; and where this becomes the ordinary instrument of government, there is an end to liberty."†

His anticipations may be gathered from the following passages: "A good administration will conciliate the confidence and affection of the people, and perhaps enable the government to acquire more consistency than the proposed constitution seems to promise for so great a country. It may then triumph altogether over the State governments, and reduce them to an entire subordination, dividing the larger States into smaller districts. If this should not be the case, in the course of a few years it is probable that the contests about the boundaries of power between the particular governments and the general government, and the momentum of the larger States in such contests, will produce a dissolution of the Union. This, after all, seems to be the most likely result. The probable evil is, that the general government will be too dependent on the State legislatures, too much governed by their prejudices, and too obsequious to their humours; that the States, with every power in their hands, will make encroachments on the national authority, till the Union is weakened and dissolved."‡

The result has justified the fears of Hamilton, and the course of events has been that which he predicted. Democratic opinions, which he had so earnestly combated, gained ground rapidly during the French revolutionary period. Jefferson, who, even at the time of the declaration of independence, which was his work, entertained views resembling those of Rousseau and Paine, and sought the source of freedom in the abstract rights of man, returned

* Works, ii. 415.

† Ibid. vii. 164.

‡ Ibid. ii. 421, 450.

from France with his mind full of the doctrines of equality and popular sovereignty. By the defeat of Adams in the contest for the presidency, he carried these principles to power, and altered the nature of the American government. As the Federalists interpreted and administered the constitution, under Washington and Adams, the executive was, what Hamilton intended it to be, supreme in great measure over the popular will. Against this predominance the State legislatures were the only counterpoise, and accordingly the democratic party, which was the creature of Jefferson, vehemently defended their rights as a means of giving power to the people. In apparent contradiction, but in real accordance with this, and upon the same theory of the direct sovereignty of the people, Jefferson, when he was elected president, denied the right of the States to control the action of the executive. Regarding the President as the representative and agent of a power wholly arbitrary, he admitted no limits to its exercise. He held himself bound to obey the popular will even against his own opinions, and to allow of no resistance to it. He acted as the helpless tool of the majority, and the absolute ruler of the minority, as endowed with despotic power, but without free-will.

It is of this principle of the revolution that Tocqueville says: "*Les gouvernements qu'elle a fondés sont plus fragiles, il est vrai, mais cent fois plus puissants qu'aucun de ceux qu'elle a renversés; fragiles et puissants par les mêmes causes.*"*

Hence Jefferson's determined aversion to every authority which could oppose or restrain the will of the sovereign people, especially to the State legislatures and to the judiciary. Speaking of an occasion in which the judges had acted with independence, Hildreth says: "Jefferson was not a little vexed at this proceeding, which served, indeed, to confirm his strong prejudices against judges and courts. To him, indeed, they were doubly objects of hatred, as instruments of tyranny in the hands of the Federalists, and as obstacles to himself in exercises of power."†

His views of government are contained in a paper which is printed in Rayner's life of him, p. 378: "Governments are republican only in proportion as they embody the will of their people, and execute it. . . . Each generation is as independent of the one preceding as that was of all which had gone before. It has, then, like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive

* *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, p. 13.

† *History of the United States*, vi. 70.

of its own happiness it is for the peace and good of mankind, that a solemn opportunity of doing this, every nineteen or twenty years, should be provided by the constitution. The dead have no rights. This corporeal globe and every thing upon it belong to its present corporeal inhabitants during their generation. That majority, then, has a right to depute representatives to a convention, and to make the constitution which they think will be best for themselves. Independence can be trusted nowhere but with the people in mass." With these doctrines Jefferson subverted the republicanism of America, and consequently the Republic itself.

Hildreth describes as follows the contest between the two systems, at the time of the accession of Jefferson to power, in 1801: "From the first moment that party lines had been distinctly drawn, the opposition had possessed a numerical majority, against which nothing but the superior energy, intelligence, and practical skill of the Federalists, backed by the great and venerable name and towering influence of Washington, had enabled them to maintain for eight years past an arduous and doubtful struggle. The Federal party, with Washington and Hamilton at its head, represented the experience, the prudence, the practical wisdom, the discipline, the conservative reason and instincts of the country. The opposition, headed by Jefferson, expressed its hopes, wishes, theories, many of them enthusiastic and impracticable, more especially its passions, its sympathies and antipathies, its impatience of restraint. The Federalists had their strength in those narrow districts where a concentrated population had produced and contributed to maintain that complexity of institutions, and that reverence for social order, which, in proportion as men are brought into contiguity, become more absolutely necessities of existence. The ultra-democratical ideas of the opposition prevailed in all that more extensive region in which the dispersion of population, and the despotic authority vested in individuals over families of slaves, kept society in a state of immaturity."*

Upon the principle that the majority have no duties, and the minority no rights, that it is lawful to do whatever it is possible to do, measures were to be expected which would oppress most tyrannically the rights and interests of portions of the Union, for whom there was no security and no redress. The apprehension was so great among the Federalists, that Hamilton wrote in 1804: "The ill opinion

* History of the United States, v. 414.

of Jefferson, and jealousy of the ambition of Virginia, is no inconsiderable prop of good principles in that country (New England). But these causes are leading to an opinion, that a dismemberment of the Union is expedient.”*

Jefferson had given the example of such threats, and owed his election to them during his contest for the presidency with Colonel Burr. He wrote to Monroe, 15 February 1801: “If they could have been permitted to pass a law for putting the government into the hands of an officer, they would certainly have prevented an election. But we thought it best to declare openly and firmly, one and all, that the day such an act passed the middle States would arm, and that no such usurpation, even for a single day, should be submitted to.”

Shortly afterwards a conjuncture arose in which Jefferson put his principles into practice in such a way as greatly to increase the alarm of the North-Eastern States. In consequence of Napoleon’s Berlin decree and of the British orders in council, he determined to lay an embargo on all American vessels. He sent a pressing message to Congress, and the Senate passed the measure after a four hours’ debate with closed doors. In the House the debate was also secret, but it lasted several days, and was often prolonged far into the night, in the hope of obtaining a division. The Bill was passed December 22, 1807. The public had no voice in the matter; those whom the measure touched most nearly were taken by surprise, and a conspicuous example was given of secrecy and promptitude in a species of government which is not commonly remarkable for these qualities.

The embargo was a heavy blow to the ship-owning states of New England. The others were less affected by it. “The natural situation of this country,” says Hamilton, “seems to divide its interests into different classes. There are navigating and non-navigating States. The Northern are properly the navigating states; the Southern appear to possess neither the means nor the spirit of navigation. This difference in situation naturally produces a dissimilarity of interests and views respecting foreign commerce.”†

Accordingly the law was received in those States with a storm of indignation. Quincy, of Massachusetts, declared in the House: “It would be as unreasonable to undertake to stop the rivers from running into the sea, as to keep the people of New England from the ocean. They did not believe in the constitutionality of any such law. He might be told that the courts had already settled that question.

* Works, vii. 852.

† Ibid. ii. 433.

But it was one thing to decide a question before a court of law, and another to decide it before the people.”*

Even in a juridical point of view the right to make such a law was very doubtful. Story, who first took part in public affairs on this occasion, says: “I have ever considered the embargo a measure which went to the extreme limit of constructive power under the constitution. It stands upon the extreme verge of the constitution.”†

The doctrine of State-rights, or nullification, which afterwards became so prominent in the hands of the Southern party, was distinctly enunciated on behalf of the North on this occasion. Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, summoned the legislature to meet, and in his opening address to them he took the ground that, on great emergencies, when the national legislature had been led to overstep its constitutional power, it became the right and duty of the State legislatures “to interpose their protecting shield between the rights and liberties of the people, and the assumed power of the general government.”‡

They went further, and prepared to secede from the Union, and thus gave the example which has been followed, on exactly analogous grounds, by the opposite party. Randolph warned the administration that they were treading fast in the fatal footsteps of Lord North.§

John Quincy Adams declared in Congress that there was a determination to secede. “He urged that a continuance of the embargo much longer would certainly be met by forcible resistance, supported by the legislature, and probably by the judiciary of the State. . . . Their object was, and had been for several years, a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confederation.” Twenty years later, when Adams was President, the truth of this statement was impugned. At that time the tables had been turned, and the South was denying the right of Congress to legislate for the exclusive benefit of the North-Eastern States, whilst these were vigorously and profitably supporting the federal authorities. It was important that they should not be convicted out of their own mouths, and that the doctrine they were opposing should not be shown to have been inaugurated by themselves. Adams therefore published a statement, October 21, 1828, reiterating his original declaration. “The people were constantly instigated to forcible resistance against it, and juries after juries acquitted the violators of it, upon the ground that it was

* Hildreth, vi. 100.

† Hildreth, vi. 120.

‡ Life, i. 185.

§ Ibid. vi. 117.

unconstitutional, assumed in the face of a solemn decision of the district court of the United States. A separation of the Union was openly stimulated in the public prints, and a convention of delegates of the New-England States, to meet at New Haven, was intended and proposed." That this was true is proved by the letters of Story, written at the time. "I was well satisfied," he says, "that such a course would not and could not be borne by New England, and would bring on a direct rebellion. . . . The stories here of rebellion in Massachusetts are continually circulating. My own impressions are, that the Junto would awaken it, if they dared; but it will not do. . . . A division of the States has been meditated, but I suspect that the public pulse was not sufficiently inflamed. . . . I am sorry to perceive the spirit of disaffection in Massachusetts increasing to so high a degree; and I fear that it is stimulated by a desire, in a very few ambitious men, to dissolve the Union. . . . I have my fears when I perceive that the public prints openly advocate a resort to arms to sweep away the present embarrassments of commerce."*

It was chiefly due to the influence of Story that the embargo was at length removed, with great reluctance and disgust on the part of the President. "I ascribe all this," he says, "to one pseudo-republican, Story."† On which Story, who was justly proud of his achievement, remarks, "Pseudo-republican of course I must be, as every one was, in Mr. Jefferson's opinion, who dared to venture upon a doubt of his infallibility."‡ In reality Jefferson meant that a man was not a republican who made the interests of the minority prevail against the wish of the majority. His enthusiastic admirer, Professor Tucker, describes very justly and openly his policy in this affair. "If his perseverance in the embargo policy so long, against the wishes and interests of New England, and the mercantile community generally, may seem to afford some contradiction to the self-denying merit here claimed, the answer is, that he therein fulfilled the wishes of a large majority of the people. . . . A portion of the community here suffered an evil necessarily incident to the great merit of a republican government, that the will of the majority must prevail."§

We have seen that in the case of the embargo, as soon as this democratic theory was acted upon, it called up a corresponding claim of the right of the minority to secede, and that the democratic principle was forced to yield. But

* Life, i. 187, 191, 243, 182.

† Life, i. 185.

‡ Correspondence, iv. 148.

§ Life of Jefferson, ii. 322.

secession was not a theory of the constitution, but a remedy against a vicious theory of the constitution. A sounder theory would have avoided the absolutism of the democrats and the necessity for secession. The next great controversy was fought upon this ground. It exhibits an attempt to set up a law against the arbitrary will of the government, and to escape the tyranny of the majority, and the remedy, which was worse than the disease. An ideal of this kind had already been sketched by Hamilton. "This balance between the national and state governments ought to be dwelt on with peculiar attention, as it is of the utmost importance. It forms a double security to the people. If one encroaches on their rights, they will find a powerful protection in the other. Indeed, they will both be prevented from overpassing their constitutional limits, by a certain rivalry which will ever subsist between them."* This was also what Mr. Dickinson looked forward to when he said in the Convention of 1787: "One source of stability is the double branch of the legislature. The division of the country into distinct States forms the other principal source of stability."†

The war with England, and the long suspension of commerce which preceded it, laid the foundations of a manufacturing interest in the United States. Manufactories began to spring up in Pennsylvania, and more slowly in New England. In 1816 a tariff was introduced, bearing a slightly protective character, as it was necessary to accommodate the war prohibitions to peaceful times. It was rather intended to facilitate the period of transition than to protect the new industry; and that interest was still so feeble, and so little affected by the tariff, that Webster, who was already a representative of Massachusetts in Congress, voted against it. It was carried by the coalition of Clay with the South-Carolina statesmen, Lowndes and Calhoun, against whom this vote was afterwards a favourite weapon of attack. In the following years the increasing importance of the cultivation of cotton, and the growth of manufactures, placed the Northern and Southern interests in a new position of great divergency. Hamilton had said long before: "The difference of property is already great amongst us. Commerce and industry will still increase the disparity. Your government must meet this state of things, or combinations will, in process of time, undermine your system."‡

The New-England manufacturers were awakened to the advantage of protection for their wares. In a memorial of

* Works, ii. 444.

† Madison's Debates, 148.

‡ Elliot's Debates, i. 450.

the merchants of Salem, written by Story in 1820, he says : " Nothing can be more obvious than that many of the manufacturers and their friends are attempting, by fallacious statements, founded on an interested policy, or a misguided zeal, or very short-sighted views, to uproot some of the fundamental principles of our revenue policy. . . . If we are unwilling to receive foreign manufactures, we cannot reasonably suppose that foreign nations will receive our raw materials. . . . We cannot force them to become buyers when they are not sellers, or to consume our cotton when they cannot pay the price in their own fabrics. We may compel them to use the cotton of the West Indies, or of the Brazils, or of the East Indies." About the same time, May 20, 1820, he writes to Lord Stowell on the same subject : " We are beginning also to become a manufacturing nation ; but I am not much pleased, I am free to confess, with the efforts made to give an artificial stimulus to these establishments in our country. . . . The example of your great manufacturing cities, apparently the seats of great vices, and great political fermentations, affords no very agreeable contemplation to the statesman or the patriot, or the friend of liberty."* The manufacturers obtained a new tariff in 1824, another was carried by great majorities in 1828, and another in 1832 by a majority of two to one. It is the measure of 1828, which raised the duties on an average to nearly fifty per cent on the value of the imports, that possesses the greatest importance in a constitutional point of view. " To it," says the biographer of Mr. Calhoun, " may be traced almost every important incident in our political history since that time, as far as our internal affairs are concerned."† At this time the interests of North and South were perfectly distinct. The South was teeming with agricultural produce, for which there was a great European demand ; whilst the industry of the North, unable to compete with European manufactures, tried to secure the monopoly of the home market. Unlike the course of the same controversy in England, the agriculturists (at least the cotton-growers) desired free trade, because they were exporters ; the manufacturers protection, because they could not meet competition. " The question," said Calhoun, " is in reality one between the exporting and non-exporting interests of the country." The exporting interest required the utmost freedom of imports, in order not to barter at a disadvantage. " He must be ignorant of the first principles of commerce, and the policy of Europe, particularly England, who does

* Life, i. 385.

† Life of Calhoun, p. 34.

not see that it is impossible to carry on a trade of such vast extent on any other basis than barter; and that if it were not so carried on, it would not long be tolerated. . . . The last remains of our great and once flourishing agriculture must be annihilated in the conflict. In the first place, we will be thrown on the home market, which cannot consume a fourth of our products; and instead of supplying the world, as we would with a free trade, we would be compelled to abandon the cultivation of three-fourths of what we now raise, and receive for the residue whatever the manufacturers—who would then have their policy consummated by the entire possession of our market—might choose to give.”* It seemed a fulfilment of the prophecy of Mr. Lowndes, who, in resisting the adoption of the constitution in South Carolina forty years before, declared, that “when this new constitution should be adopted, the sun of the Southern States would set, never to rise again. . . . The interest of the Northern States would so predominate as to divest us of any pretensions to the title of a republic.”† Cobbett, who knew America better than any Englishman of that day, described, in his *Political Register* for 1833, the position of these hostile interests in a way which is very much to the point. “All these Southern and Western States are, commercially speaking, closely connected with Birmingham, Sheffield, Manchester, and Leeds; . . . they have no such connection with the Northern States, and there is no tie whatsoever to bind them together, except that which is of a mere political nature. . . . Here is a natural division of interests, and of interests so powerful, too, as not to be counteracted by any thing that man can do. The heavy duties imposed by the Congress upon British manufactured goods is neither more nor less than so many millions a year taken from the Southern and Western States, and given to the Northern States.”‡

Whilst in England protection benefited one class of the population at the expense of another, in America it was for the advantage of one part of the country at the expense of another. “Government,” said Calhoun, “is to descend from its high appointed duty, and become the agent of a portion of the community to extort, under the guise of protection, tribute from the rest of the community.”§

Where such a controversy is carried on between opposite

* Exposition of South-Carolina Committee on the Tariff, 1828, in Calhoun's Works, vi. 12.

† Elliot's Debates, iv. 272.

‡ Political Works, vi. 662.

§ Works, iv. 181.

classes in the same State, the violence of factions may endanger the government, but they cannot divide the State. But the violence is much greater, the wrong is more keenly felt, the means of resistance are more legitimate and constitutional, where the oppressed party is a sovereign State.

The South had every reason to resist to the utmost a measure which would be so injurious to them. It was opposed to their political as well as to their financial interests. For the tariff, while it impoverished them, enriched the government, and filled the treasury with superfluous gold. Now the Southern statesmen were always opposed to the predominance of the central authority, especially since it lent itself to a policy by which they suffered. They had practical and theoretical objections to it. The increase of the revenue beyond the ordinary wants of the government placed in its hands a tempting and dangerous instrument of influence. Means must be devised for the disposal of these sums, and the means adopted by the advocates of restriction was the execution of public works, by which the people of the different States were bribed to favour the central power. A protective tariff therefore, and internal improvement, were the chief points in the policy of the party which, headed by Henry Clay, sought to strengthen the Union at the expense of the States, and which the South opposed, as both hostile to their interests and as unconstitutional. "It would be in vain to attempt to conceal," wrote Calhoun of the tariff in 1831, "that it has divided the country into two great geographical divisions, and arrayed them against each other, in opinion at least, if not interests also, on some of the most vital of political subjects—on its finance, its commerce, and its industry. . . . Nor has the effect of this dangerous conflict ended here. It has not only divided the two sections on the important point already stated, but on the deeper and more dangerous questions, the constitutionality of a protective tariff, and the general principles and theory of the constitution itself: the stronger, in order to maintain their superiority, giving a construction to the instrument which the other believes would convert the general government into a consolidated irresponsible government, with the total destruction of liberty."* "On the great and vital point—the industry of the country, which comprehends almost every interest—the interest of the two great sections is opposed. We want free trade, they restrictions; we want moderate taxes, frugality in the government, economy, accountability, and a rigid application of the public money to the payment of the debt, and to the objects authorised by the

* Works, vi. 77, 78.

constitution. In all these particulars, if we may judge by experience, their views of their interest are precisely the opposite.* In 1828 he said of the protective system: "No system can be more efficient to rear up a moneyed aristocracy;" wherein he is again supported by Cobbett, in the well-known saying, uttered five years later, concerning the United States: "It is there the aristocracy of money, the most damned of all aristocracies." South Carolina took the lead in resisting the introduction of the protective system, and being defeated by many votes on the question itself, took its stand on the constitutional right of each sovereign State to arrest by its veto any general legislation of a kind which would be injurious to its particular interests. "The country," said Calhoun, "is now more divided than in 1824, and then more than in 1816. The majority may have increased, but the opposite sides are, beyond dispute, more determined and excited than at any preceding period. Formerly the system was resisted mainly as inexpedient, but now as unconstitutional, unequal, unjust, and oppressive. Then relief was sought exclusively from the general government; but now many, driven to despair, are raising their eyes to the reserved sovereignty of the States as the only refuge."† Calhoun was at that time Vice-President of the United States, and without a seat in Congress. The defence of his theory of the constitution devolved therefore upon the senator from South Carolina, General Hayne; and a debate ensued between Hayne and Webster, in January 1830, which is reckoned by Americans the most memorable in the parliamentary history of their country. Hayne declared that he did not contend for the mere right of revolution, but for the right of constitutional resistance; and in reply to Webster's defence of the supreme power, he said: "This I know is a popular notion, and it is founded on the idea that as all the States are represented here, nothing can prevail which is not in conformity with the will of the majority; and it is supposed to be a republican maxim, 'that the majority must govern.' . . . If the will of a majority of Congress is to be the supreme law of the land, it is clear the constitution is a dead letter, and has utterly failed of the very object for which it was designed—the protection of the rights of the minority. . . . The whole difference between us consists in this—the gentleman would make force the only arbiter in all cases of collision between the States and the federal government; I would resort to a peaceful remedy."‡

Two years later Mr. Calhoun succeeded Hayne as senator

* Works, vi. 31.

† Ibid. vi. 80.

‡ Elliot's Debates, iv. 498.

for South Carolina, and the contest was renewed. After the tariff of 1828 Virginia, Georgia, and North Carolina, joined in the recognition of the principle of nullification. When the tariff of 1832 was carried, South Carolina announced that the levying of dues would be resisted in the State. Calhoun defended the nullifying ordinance in the Senate, and in speeches and writings, with arguments which are the very perfection of political truth, and which combine with the realities of modern democracy the theory and the securities of mediæval freedom. "The essence of liberty," he said, "comprehends the idea of responsible power,—that those who make and execute the laws should be controlled by those on whom they operate,—that the governed should govern. No government based on the naked principle that the majority ought to govern, however true the maxim in its proper sense, and under proper restrictions, can preserve its liberty even for a single generation. The history of all has been the same,—violence, injustice, and anarchy, succeeded by the government of one, or a few, under which the people seek refuge from the more oppressive despotism of the many. Stripped of all its covering, the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the States, or on the unrestrained will of a majority; a form of government, as in all other unlimited ones, in which injustice and violence and force must finally prevail. Let it never be forgotten that, where the majority rules without restriction, the minority is the subject. Nor is the right of suffrage more indispensable to enforce the responsibility of the rulers to the ruled, than a federal organisation to compel the parts to respect the rights of each other. It requires the united action of both to prevent the abuse of power and oppression, and to constitute really and truly a constitutional government. To supersede either is to convert it in fact, whatever may be its theory, into an absolute government."*

In his disquisition on government Calhoun has expounded his theory of a constitution in a manner so profound, and so extremely applicable to the politics of the present day, that we regret that we can only give a very feeble notion of the argument by the few extracts for which we can make room.

"The powers which it is necessary for government to possess, in order to repress violence and preserve order, cannot execute themselves. They must be administered by men in whom, like others, the individual are stronger than the social

* Works, vi. 32, 33, 75.

feelings. And hence the powers vested in them to prevent injustice and oppression on the part of others, will, if left unguarded, be by them converted into instruments to oppress the rest of the community. That by which this is prevented, by whatever name called, is what is meant by constitution, in its most comprehensive sense, when applied to government. Having its origin in the same principle of our nature, constitution stands to government as government stands to society; and, as the end for which society is ordained would be defeated without government, so that for which government is ordained would, in a great measure, be defeated without constitution. Constitution is the contrivance of man, while government is of divine ordination. Power can only be resisted by power, and tendency by tendency. I call the right of suffrage the indispensable and primary principle; for it would be a great and dangerous mistake to suppose, as many do, that it is of itself sufficient to form constitutional governments. To this erroneous opinion may be traced one of the causes why so few attempts to form constitutional governments have succeeded; and why, of the few which have, so small a number have had durable existence. So far from being of itself sufficient,—however well-guarded it might be, and however enlightened the people,—it would, unaided by other provisions, leave the government as absolute as it would be in the hands of irresponsible rulers, and with a tendency at least as strong towards oppression and abuse of its powers. . . . The process may be slow, and much time may be required before a compact, organised majority can be formed; but formed it will be in time, even without preconcert or design, by the sure workings of that principle or constitution of our nature in which government itself originates. The dominant majority, for the time, would have the same tendency to oppression and abuse of power which, without the right of suffrage, irresponsible rulers would have. No reason, indeed, can be assigned why the latter would abuse their power, which would not apply with equal force to the former. The minority, for the time, will be as much the governed or subject portion as are the people in an aristocracy, or the subject in a monarchy. The duration or uncertainty of the tenure by which power is held cannot of itself counteract the tendency inherent in government to oppression and abuse of power. On the contrary, the very uncertainty of the tenure, combined with the violent party warfare which must ever precede a change of parties under such governments, would rather tend to increase than diminish the tendency to oppression. It is manifest that this provision must be of a character calculated to prevent any

one interest, or combination of interests, from using the powers of government to aggrandise itself at the expense of the others. . . . This too can be accomplished only in one way, and that is, by such an organism of the government—and, if necessary for the purpose, of the community also—as will, by dividing and distributing the powers of government, give to each division or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws, or a veto on their execution. . . . Such an organism as this, combined with the right of suffrage, constitutes, in fact, the elements of constitutional government. The one, by rendering those who make and execute the laws responsible to those on whom they operate, prevents the rulers from oppressing the ruled; and the other, by making it impossible for any one interest or combination of interests, or class, or order, or portion of the community, to obtain exclusive control, prevents any one of them from oppressing the other. . . . It is this negative power,—the power of preventing or arresting the action of the government,—be it called by what term it may, veto, interposition, nullification, check, or balance of power,—which in fact forms the constitution. . . . It is, indeed, the negative power which makes the constitution, and the positive which makes the government. . . . It follows necessarily that where the numerical majority has the sole control of the government, there can be no constitution; as constitution implies limitation or restriction; . . . and hence, the numerical, unmixed with the concurrent majority, necessarily forms in all cases absolute government. . . . Constitutional governments, of whatever form, are, indeed, much more similar to each other in their structure and character than they are, respectively, to the absolute governments even of their own class; . . . and hence the great and broad distinction between governments is,—not that of the one, the few, or the many,—but of the constitutional and the absolute. . . . Among the other advantages which governments of the concurrent have over those of the numerical majority,—and which strongly illustrates their more popular character,—is, that they admit, with safety, a much greater extension of the right of suffrage. It may be safely extended in such governments to universal suffrage, that is, to every male citizen of mature age, with few ordinary exceptions; but it cannot be so far extended in those of the numerical majority, without placing them ultimately under the control of the more ignorant and dependent portions of the community. For, as the community becomes populous, wealthy, refined, and highly civilised, the difference between the rich and the poor will become more strongly marked, and the number of the ignorant and

dependent greater in proportion to the rest of the community. The tendency of the concurrent government is to unite the community, let its interests be ever so diversified or opposed; while that of the numerical is to divide it into two conflicting portions, let its interest be naturally ever so united and identified. The numerical majority, by regarding the community as a unit, and having as such the same interests throughout all its parts, must, by its necessary operation, divide it into two hostile parts, waging, under the forms of law, incessant hostilities against each other. To make equality of condition essential to liberty, would be to destroy liberty and progress. The reason is both that inequality of condition, while it is a necessary consequence of liberty, is at the same time indispensable to progress. . . . It is, indeed, this inequality of condition between the front and rear ranks, in the march of progress, which gives so strong an impulse to the former to maintain their position, and to the latter to press forward into their files. This gives to progress its greatest impulse. These great and dangerous errors have their origin in the prevalent opinion, that all men are born free and equal, than which nothing can be more unfounded and false. In an absolute democracy party conflicts between the majority and minority can hardly ever terminate in compromise. The object of the opposing minority is to expel the majority from power, and of the majority to maintain their hold upon it. It is on both sides a struggle for the whole; a struggle that must determine which shall be the governing and which the subject party. Hence, among other reasons, aristocracies and monarchies more readily assume the constitutional form than absolute popular governments."*

This was written in the last years of Calhoun's life, and published after his death; but the ideas, though he matured them in the subsequent contest on slavery, guided him in the earlier stage of the dispute which developed nullification into secession, during the tariff controversy of the years 1828 to 1833. Many of those who differed from him most widely deemed that his resistance was justified by the selfish and unscrupulous policy of the North. Legaré, the most accomplished scholar among American statesmen, afterwards attorney-general, made a Fourth-of-July oration in South Carolina, during the height of the excitement of 1831, in which he said: "The authors of this policy are indirectly responsible for this deplorable state of things, and for all the consequences that may grow out of it. They have been guilty of an inexpressible

* Works, i. 7-83.

offence against their country. They found us a united, they have made us a distracted people. They found the union of these States an object of fervent love and religious veneration; they have made even its utility a subject of controversy among very enlightened men. . . . I do not wonder at the indignation which the imposition of such a burden of taxation has excited in our people, in the present unprosperous state of their affairs. . . . Great nations cannot be held together under a united government by any thing short of despotic power, if any one part of the country is to be arrayed against another in a perpetual scramble for privilege and protection, under any system of protection.”*

Brownson, at that time the most influential journalist of America, and a strong partisan of Calhoun, advocated in 1844 his claims to the Presidency, and would, we believe, have held office in his cabinet if he had been elected. In one of the earliest numbers of his well-known Review he wrote: “Even Mr. Calhoun’s theory, though unquestionably the true theory of the federal constitution, is yet insufficient. . . . It does not, as a matter of fact, arrest the unequal, unjust, and oppressive measures of the federal government. South Carolina in 1833 forced a compromise; but in 1842 the obnoxious policy was revived, is pursued now successfully, and there is no State to attempt again the virtue of State interposition. . . . The State, if she judged proper, had the sovereign right to set aside this obnoxious tariff enactment in her own dominions, and prohibit her subjects or citizens from obeying it. . . . The parties to the compact being equal, and there being no common umpire, each, as a matter of course, is its own judge of the infraction of the compact, and of the mode and measure of redress.”†

The President, General Jackson, had a strong aversion for the theory and for the person of Calhoun. He swore that he would have him impeached for treason, and that he should hang on a gallows higher than Haman’s. One of the nullifying declarations of his Vice-President reached him late at night; in a fit of exultation he had the law officers of the government called out of their beds, to say whether at last here was not hanging matter. He issued a manifesto condemning the doctrine of nullification and the acts of South Carolina, which was very ably drawn up by Livingston, the Secretary of State, famous in the history of legislation as the author of the Louisiana code. Webster, the first orator of the day, though not a supporter of the administration, undertook to answer Calhoun in the Senate, and he was fetched

* Writings of Legaré, i. 272.

† Quarterly Review, ii 522, i. 124.

from his lodging, when the time came, in the President's carriage. His speech, considered the greatest he ever delivered, was regarded by the friends of the Union as conclusive against State-rights. Madison, who was approaching the term of his long career, wrote to congratulate the speaker in words which ought to have been a warning: "It crushes nullification, and must hasten an abandonment of secession. But this dodges the blow by confounding the claim to secede at will with the right of seceding from intolerable oppression."

Secession is but the alternative of interposition. The defeat of the latter doctrine on the ground of the constitution, deprived the South of the only possible protection from the increasing tyranny of the majority, for the defeat of nullification coincided in time with the final triumph of the pure democratic views; and at the same time that it was resolved that the rights of the minority had no security, it was established that the power of the majority had no bounds. Calhoun's elaborate theory was an earnest attempt to save the Union from the defects of its constitution. It is useless to inquire whether it is legally right, according to the letter of the constitution, for it is certain that it is in contradiction with its spirit as it has grown up since Jefferson. Webster may have been the truest interpreter of the law; Calhoun was the real defender of the Union. Even the Unionists made the dangerous admission, that there were cases in which, as there was no redress known to the law, secession was fully justified. Livingston gave the opinion, that "if the act be one of the few which, in its operation, cannot be submitted to the Supreme Court, and be one that will, in the opinion of the State, justify the risk of a withdrawal from the Union, this last extremity may at once be resorted to."*

The intimate connection between nullification and secession is shown by the biographer of Clay, though he fails to see that one is not the consequence, but the surrogate, of the other: "The first idea of nullification was doubtless limited to the action of a State in making null and void a federal law or laws within the circle of its own jurisdiction, without contemplating the absolute independence of a secession. Seeing, however, that nullification, in its practical operation, could hardly stop short of secession, the propounders of the doctrine in its first and limited signification, afterwards came boldly up to the claim of the right of secession."†

Practically, South Carolina triumphed, though her claims were repudiated. The tariff was withdrawn, and a measure

* Elliot's Debates, iv. 519.

† Colton's Life and Speeches of Clay, v. 392.

of compromise was introduced by Clay, the leading protectionist, which was felt to be so great a concession that Calhoun accepted, whilst Webster opposed it, and it was carried. But the evil day, the final crisis, was only postponed. The spirit of the country had taken a course in which it could not be permanently checked; and it was certain that new opportunities would be made to assert the omnipotence of the popular will, and to exhibit the total subservience of the executive to it.* Already a new controversy had begun, which has since overshadowed that which shook the Union from 1828 to 1833. The commercial question was not settled; the economical antagonism, and the determination on the part of the North to extend its advantages, did not slumber from Clay's Compromise Act to the Morrill Tariff in 1861; and in his farewell address, in 1837, Jackson drew a gloomy and desponding picture of the period which is filled with his name. "Many powerful interests are continually at work to procure heavy duties on commerce, and to swell the revenue beyond the real necessities of the public service; and the country has already felt the injurious effects of their combined influence. They succeeded in obtaining a tariff of duties bearing most oppressively on the agricultural and labouring classes of society, and producing a revenue that could not be usefully employed within the range of the powers conferred upon Congress; and in order to fasten upon the people this unjust and unequal system of taxation, extravagant schemes of internal improvement were got up in various quarters to squander the money and to purchase support. . . . Rely upon it, the design to collect an extravagant revenue, and to burden you with taxes beyond the economical wants of the government, is not yet abandoned. The various interests which have combined together to impose a heavy tariff, and to produce an overflowing treasury, are too strong, and have too much at stake, to surrender the contest. The corporations and wealthy individuals who are engaged in large manufacturing establishments, desire a high tariff to increase their gains. Designing politicians will support it to conciliate their favour, and to obtain the means of profuse expenditure, for the purpose of purchasing influence in other quarters. . . . It is from within, among yourselves—from cupidity, from corruption, from disappointed ambition, and inordinate thirst for power,—that factions will be formed and liberty endangered."†

* 'Ο γὰρ δῆμος οὐ βούλεται εὐνομουμένης τῆς πόλεως αὐτὸς δουλεύειν, ἀλλ' ἐλεύθερος εἶναι καὶ ἄρχειν, τῆς δὲ κακονομίας αὐτῷ ὀλίγον μέλει· ὃ γὰρ σὺ νομίζεις οὐκ εὐνομεῖσθαι, αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τούτου ἰσχύει ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν. Xenophon, Athen. Respub. i 8.

† Statesman's Manual, 953-960.

Jackson was himself answerable for much of what was most deplorable in the political state of the country. The democratic tendency, which began under Jefferson, attained in Jackson's presidency its culminating point. The immense change in this respect may be shown in a single example. Pure democracy demands quick rotation of office, in order that, as all men have an equal claim to official power and profit, and must be supposed nearly equally qualified for it, and require no long experience (so that at Athens offices were distributed by lot), the greatest possible number of citizens should successively take part in the administration. It diminishes the distinction between the rulers and the ruled, between the State and the community, and increases the dependence of the first upon the last. At first such changes were not contemplated. Washington dismissed only nine officials in eight years, Adams removed only ten, Madison five, Monroe nine, John Quincy Adams only two, both on specific disqualifying grounds. Jefferson was naturally in favour of rotation in office, and caused a storm of anger when he displaced 39 official men in order to supply vacancies for supporters. Jackson, on succeeding the younger Adams, instantly made 176 alterations, and in the course of the first year 491 postmasters lost their places. Mr. Everett says very truly: "It may be stated as the general characteristic of the political tendencies of this period, that there was a decided weakening of respect for constitutional restraint. Vague ideas of executive discretion prevailed on the one hand in the interpretation of the constitution, and of popular sovereignty on the other, as represented by a President elevated to office by overwhelming majorities of the people."*

This was the period of Tocqueville's visit to America, when he passed the following judgment: "When a man, or a party, suffers an injustice in the United States, to whom can he have recourse? To public opinion? It is that which forms the majority. To the legislative body? It represents the majority, and obeys it blindly. To the executive power? It is appointed by the majority, and serves as its passive instrument. To public force? It is nothing but the majority under arms. To the jury? It is the majority invested with the right of finding verdicts. The judges themselves, in some States, are elected by the majority. However iniquitous, therefore, or unreasonable the measure from which you suffer, you must submit."† Very eminent Americans‡ quite agreed with him in his censure of the course

* *Memoir of Webster*, p. 101.

† *Vol. ii. cap. 7.*

‡ There is a remarkable passage in Story's letters on Tocqueville's cele-

things had taken, and which had been seen long beforehand. In 1818 Story writes: "A new race of men is springing up to govern the nation; they are the hunters after popularity; men ambitious, not of the honour so much as of the profits of office,—the demagogues whose principles hang laxly upon them, and who follow, not so much what is right as what leads to a temporary vulgar applause. There is great, very great danger that these men will usurp so much of popular favour that they will rule the nation; and if so, we may yet live to see many of our best institutions crumble in the dust."*

The following passages are from the conclusion of his *Commentary on the Constitution*: "The influence of the disturbing causes, which, more than once in the convention, were on the point of breaking up the Union, have since immeasurably increased in concentration and vigour. "If, under these circumstances, the Union should once be broken up, it is impossible that a new constitution should ever be formed, embracing the whole territory. We shall be divided into several nations or confederacies, rivals in power and interest, too proud to brook injury, and too close to make retaliation distant or ineffectual." On the 18th February 1834, he writes of Jackson's administration: "I feel humiliated at the truth, which cannot be disguised, that though we live under the form of a republic, we are in fact under the absolute rule of a single man." And a few years later, 3d November 1837, he tells Miss Martineau that she has judged too favourably of his country: "You have overlooked the terrible influence of a corrupting patronage, and the system of exclusiveness in official appointments, which have already wrought such extensive mischiefs among us, and threaten to destroy all the safeguards of our civil liberties. You would have learned, I think, that there may be a despotism exercised in a republic, as irresistible and as ruinous as in any form of monarchy."

The foremost of the Southern statesmen thought exactly like the New-England judge. "I care not," said Calhoun, "what the form of the government is; it is nothing, if the government be despotic, whether it be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of many men, without limitation. . . . While these measures were destroying the equilibrium between the two sections, the action of the government was leading to a radical change in its character, by concentrating all the power
brated book: "The work of De Tocqueville has had great reputation abroad, partly founded on their ignorance that he has borrowed the greater part of his reflections from American works, and little from his own observations. The main body of his materials will be found in the *Federalist* and in Story's *Commentaries*." Life of Story, ii. 330. * Life, i. 311.

of the system in itself. . . . What was once a constitutional federal republic is now converted, in reality, into one as absolute as that of the autocrat of Russia, and as despotic in its tendency as any absolute government that ever existed. . . . The increasing power of this government, and of the control of the Northern section over all its departments, furnished the cause. It was this which made an impression on the minds of many, that there was little or no restraint to prevent the government from doing whatever it might choose to do.”* At the same period, though reverting to a much earlier date, Cobbett wrote: “I lived eight years under the republican government of Pennsylvania; and I declare that I believe that to have been the most corrupt and tyrannical government that the world ever knew. . . . I have seen enough of republican government to convince me that the mere name is not worth a straw.”† Channing touches on a very important point, the influence of European liberalism on the republicanism of America: “Ever since our revolution we have had a number of men who have wanted faith in our free institutions, and have seen in our almost unlimited extension of the elective franchise the germ of convulsion and ruin. When the demagogues succeed in inflaming the ignorant multitude, and get office and power, this anti-popular party increases; in better times it declines. It has been built up in a measure by the errors and crimes of the liberals of Europe. . . . I have endeavoured on all occasions to disprove the notion that the labouring classes are unfit depositaries of political power. I owe it, however, to truth to say that I believe that the elective franchise is extended too far in this country.”‡ In 1841 he described very accurately the perils which have since proved fatal: “The great danger to our institutions, which alarms our conservatives most, has not perhaps entered Mr. Smith’s mind. It is the danger of a party organisation, so subtle and strong as to make the government the monopoly of a few leaders, and to insure the transmission of the executive power from hand to hand almost as regularly as in a monarchy. . . . That this danger is real cannot be doubted. So that we have to watch against despotism as well as, or more than, anarchy.”§ On this topic it is impossible to speak more strongly, and nobody could speak with greater authority than Dr. Brownson: “Our own government, in its origin and constitutional form, is not a democracy, but, if we may use the expression, a limited elec-

* Works, iv. 351, 550, 553.

† Political Register, November 1833; Works, vi. 683.

‡ Memoir of Channing, 418, 419. § Ibid. 421.

tive aristocracy. . . . But practically the government framed by our fathers no longer exists, save in name. Its original character has disappeared, or is rapidly disappearing. The constitution is a dead letter, except so far as it serves to prescribe the modes of election, the rule of the majority, the distribution and tenure of offices, and the union and separation of the functions of government. Since 1828 it has been becoming in practice, and is now substantially, a pure democracy, with no effective constitution but the will of the majority for the time being. . . . The constitution is practically abolished, and our government is virtually, to all intents and purposes, as we have said, a pure democracy, with nothing to prevent it from obeying the interest or interests which for the time being can succeed in commanding it."* Shortly before his conversion he wrote: "Looking at what we were in the beginning, and what we now are, it may well be doubted whether another country in Christendom has so rapidly declined as we have, in the stern and rigid virtues, in the high-toned and manly principles of conduct essential to the stability and wise administration of popular government. . . . The established political order in this country is not the democratic; and every attempt to apply the democratic theory as the principle of its interpretation is an attempt at revolution, and to be resisted. By a democracy I understand a political order,—if that may be called order which is none,—in which the people, primarily and without reference to any authority constituting them a body politic, are held to be the source of all the legitimate power in the state."†

The partisans of democratic absolutism who opposed State-rights in the affair of the tariff, and led to the unhappy consequences and lamentations we have seen, were already supplied with another topic to test the power of their principle. The question of abolition, subordinate at first, though auxiliary to the question of protection, came into the front when the other had lost its interest, and had been suspended for a season by the Compromise Act. It served to enlist higher sympathies on the side of revolution than could be won by considerations of mere profit. It adorned cupidity with the appearance of philanthropy, but the two motives were not quite distinct, and one is something of a pretext, and serves to disguise the other. They were equally available as means of establishing the supremacy of the absolute democracy, only one was its own reward; the other was not so clearly a matter of pecuniary interest, but of not inferior political

* Brownson's Quarterly Review, 1844, ii. 515, 523.

† Ibid. i. 84, 19.

advantage. A power which is questioned, however real it may be, must assert and manifest itself if it is to last. When the right of the States to resist the Union was rejected, although the question which occasioned the dispute was amicably arranged, it was certain to be succeeded by another, in order that so doubtful a victory might be commemorated by a trophy.

The question of slavery first exhibited itself as a constitutional difficulty about 1820, in the dispute which was settled by the Missouri compromise. Even at this early period the whole gravity of its consequences was understood by discerning men. Jefferson wrote : " This momentous question, like a fire-bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. It is hushed, indeed, for the moment. But this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence."

In 1828, when South Carolina was proclaiming the right of veto, and was followed by several of the Southern States, abolition was taken up in the North as a means of coercion against them, by way of reprisal, and as a very powerful instrument of party warfare. Channing writes to Webster, 14th May 1828 : " A little while ago, Mr. Lundy of Baltimore, the editor of a paper called *The Genius of Universal Emancipation*, visited this part of the country, to stir us up to the work of abolishing slavery at the South ; and the intention is to organise societies for this purpose. . . . My fear in regard to our efforts against slavery is, that we shall make the case worse by rousing sectional pride and passion for its support, and that we shall only break the country into two great parties, which may shake the foundations of government."

In the heat of the great controversies of Jackson's administration, on the Bank question and the Veto question, slavery was not brought prominently forward ; but when the democratic central power had triumphed, when the Bank question was settled, and there was no longer an immediate occasion for discussing State-rights, the party whose opinions had prevailed in the constitution resolved to make use of their predominance for its extinction. Thenceforward, from about the year 1835, it became the leading question, and the form in which the antagonism between the principles of arbitrary power and of self-government displayed itself. At every acquisition of territory, at the formation of new States, the same question caused a crisis ; then in the Fugitive-Slave Act, and finally in the formation of the republican party, and its triumph in 1860. The first effect of making abolition a political party question, and embodying in it the great constitu-

tional quarrel which had already threatened the existence of the Union in the question of taxation, was to verify the prophecy of Channing. Webster, who had been the foremost antagonist of nullification in the affair of the tariff, lived to acknowledge that even secession was being provoked by the insane aggression of the North. In one of his latest speeches, in that which is known as his speech for the Union, 7th March 1850, he denounced the policy of the abolitionists: "I do not mean to impute gross motives even to the leaders of these societies, but I am not blind to the consequences of their proceedings. I cannot but see what mischiefs their interference with the South has produced. And is it not plain to every man? Let any gentleman who entertains doubts on this point recur to the debates in the Virginia House of Delegates in 1832, and he will see with what freedom a proposition made by Mr. J. Randolph for the gradual abolition of slavery was discussed in that body. . . . Public opinion, which in Virginia had begun to be exhibited against slavery, and was opening out for the discussion of the question, drew back and shut itself up in its castle. . . . We all know the fact, and we all know the cause; and every thing that these agitating people have done has been, not to enlarge, but to restrain, not to set free, but to bind faster, the slave-population of the South."*

Howe, the Virginian historian, in principle though not in policy an abolitionist, says: "That a question so vitally important would have been renewed with more success at an early subsequent period, seems more than probable, if the current opinions of the day can be relied on; but there were obvious causes in operation which paralysed the friends of abolition, and have had the effect of silencing all agitation on the subject. The abolitionists in the Northern and Eastern States, gradually increasing their strength as a party, became louder in their denunciations of slavery, and more and more reckless in the means adopted for assailing the constitutional rights of the South."†

Story writes, 19th January 1839: "The question of slavery is becoming more and more an absorbing one, and will, if it continues to extend its influence, lead to a dissolution of the Union. At least there are many of our soundest statesmen who look to this as a highly probable event."‡

At that time the abolitionist party was yet in its infancy, and had not succeeded in combining together in a single party all the interests that were hostile to the slave States.

* Works, v. 357.

† Historical Collections of Virginia, p. 128.

‡ Life, ii. 307.

Lord Carlisle, describing a conversation he had in 1841 with the present Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, says, "I find that I noted at the time that he was the first person I had met who did not speak slightly of the abolitionists; he thought they were gradually gaining ground."*

But in the following year the abolitionist policy rapidly grew up into a great danger to the Union, which the great rivals, Webster and Calhoun, united to resist at the close of their lives. Commercially speaking, it is not certain that the North would gain by the abolition of slavery. It would increase the Southern market by encouraging white emigration from the North; but the commerce of New England depends largely on the cotton-crop, and the New-England merchants are not for abolition. Calhoun did not attribute the movement to a desire of gain: "The crusade against our domestic institution does not originate in hostility of interests. The rabid fanatics regard slavery as a sin, and thus regarding it deem it their highest duty to destroy it, even should it involve the destruction of the constitution and the Union."†

In this view he is fully supported by Webster: "Under the cry of universal freedom, and that other cry that there is a rule for the government of public men and private men which is of superior obligation to the constitution of the country, several of the States have enacted laws to hinder, obstruct, and defeat the enactments in this act of Congress to the utmost of their power. . . . I suspect all this to be the effect of that wandering and vagrant philanthropy which disturbs and annoys all that is present, in time or place, by heating the imagination on subjects distant, remote, and uncertain."‡

Webster justly considered that the real enemies of the constitution were the abolitionists, not the slave-owners, who threatened to secede. To appeal from the constitution to a higher law, to denounce as sinful and contrary to natural right an institution expressly recognised by it, is manifestly an assault upon the Union itself. The South have the letter and the spirit of the law in their favour. The consistent abolitionists must be ready to sacrifice the Union to their theory. If the objection to slavery is on moral grounds, paramount to all political rights and interests, abolition is a peremptory duty, to which the Union itself, whose law is opposed to compulsory abolition, must succumb. It was therefore perfectly just to remind Mr. Seward, that in attack-

* Lecture on America, p. 27. † Works, iv. 386. ‡ Ibid. vi. 556, 561.

ing slavery, and denying that it could be tolerated, he was assailing the law to which he owed his seat in Congress. "No man," said Webster, "is at liberty to set up, or affect to set up, his own conscience as above the law, in a matter which respects the rights of others, and the obligations, civil, social, and political, due to others from him."*

Dr. Brownson says, with great truth, as only a Catholic can, "No civil government can exist, none is conceivable even, where every individual is free to disobey its orders, whenever they do not happen to square with his private convictions of what is the law of God. . . . To appeal from the government to private judgment, is to place private judgment above public authority, the individual above the state."†

Calhoun was entirely justified in saying that, in the presence of these tendencies, "the conservative power is in the slave-holding States. They are the conservative portion of the country."‡

His own political doctrines, as we have described them, fully bear out this view. But the conservative, anti-revolutionary character of the South depended on other causes than the influence of its master mind. Slavery is itself in contradiction with the equal rights of man, as they are laid down in the Declaration of Independence. Slave-owners are incapacitated from interpreting that instrument with literal consistency, for it would contradict both their interests and their daily experience. But as there are advanced democrats at the South as well as at the North, and as, indeed, they succeeded in resisting so long the Northern politicians, by using the jealousy of the Northern people against the wealthy capitalists, and the appearance of aristocracy, they find means of escaping from this dilemma. This is supplied by the theory of the original inferiority of the African race to the rest of mankind, for which the authority of the greatest naturalist in America is quoted. "The result of my researches," says Agassiz, "is, that Negroes are intellectually children; physically one of the lowest races; inclining with the other blacks, especially the South-Sea Negroes, most of all to the monkey type, though with a tendency, even in the extremes, towards the real human form. This opinion I have repeatedly expressed, without drawing from it any objectionable consequence, unless, perhaps, that no coloured race, least of all the Negroes, can have a common origin with ourselves." If this theory were not the property of the infidel science of Europe, one would suppose it must have been invented for the Americans, whom it suits so well.

* Works, vi. 578. † Essays and Reviews, pp. 357, 359. ‡ Works, iv. 360.

Webster spoke with great power against the projects of the North: "There is kept up a general cry of one party against the other, that its rights are invaded, its honour insulted, its character assailed, and its just participation in political power denied. Sagacious men cannot but suspect from all this, that more is intended than is avowed; and that there lies at the bottom a purpose of the separation of the States, for reasons avowed or disavowed, or for grievances redressed or unredressed."

"In the South, the separation of the States is openly professed, discussed, and recommended, absolutely or conditionally, in legislative halls, and in conventions called together by the authority of the law.

"In the North, the State governments have not run into such excess, and the purpose of overturning the government shows itself more clearly in resolutions agreed to in voluntary assemblies of individuals, denouncing the laws of the land, and declaring a fixed intent to disobey them. . . . It is evident that, if this spirit be not checked, it will endanger the government; if it spread far and wide, it will overthrow the government."*

The language of Calhoun about the same period is almost identical with Webster's. "The danger is of a character—whether we regard our safety or the preservation of the Union—which cannot be safely tampered with. If not met promptly and decidedly, the two portions of the Union will become thoroughly alienated, when no alternative will be left to us, as the weaker of the two, but to sever all political ties, or sink down into abject submission."†

His last great speech, delivered March 4, 1850, a few days before his death, opened with the words, "I have believed from the first that the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in disunion." And he went on to say: "If something is not done to avert it, the South will be forced to choose between abolition and secession. Indeed, as events are now moving, it will not require the South to secede in order to dissolve the Union."‡

The calamity which these eminent men agreed in apprehending and in endeavouring to avert, was brought on after their death by the rise of the republican party,—a party in its aims and principles quite revolutionary, and not only inconsistent with the existence of the Union, but ready from the first to give it up. "I do not see," said the New-England

* Speech of 17th June 1850; Works, vi. 567, 582.

† Works, iv. 395.

‡ Ibid. 542, 556.

philosopher Emerson, "how a barbarous community and a civilised community can constitute one State." In order to estimate the extravagance of this party declaration, we will only quote two unexceptionable witnesses, who visited the South at an interval of about forty years from each other; one a Boston divine, the other an eager abolitionist. "How different from our Northern manners! There, avarice and ceremony, at the age of twenty, graft the coldness and unfeelingness of age on the disinterested ardour of youth. I blush for my own people when I compare the selfish prudence of the Yankee with the generous confidence of a Virginian. Here I find great vices, but greater virtues than I left behind me. There is one single trait which attaches me to the people I live with more than all the virtues of New England,—they love money less than we do."* Lord Carlisle says, in the lecture already referred to, "It would be uncandid to deny that the planter in the Southern States has much more in his manner and mode of intercourse that resembles the English country gentleman than any other class of his countrymen."†

Emerson's saying is a sign of the extent to which rapid abolitionists were ready to go. Declaring that the Federal Government was devoted to Southern interests, against Northern doctrines, they openly defied it. Disunion societies started up at the North for the purpose of bringing about separation. Several States passed laws against the South and against the constitution, and there were loud demands for separation. This was the disposition of the North at the presidential election of a successor to Pierce. The North threatened to part company, and if it carried its candidate, it threatened the Southern institutions. The South proclaimed the intention of seceding if Fremont should be elected, and threatened to march upon Washington and burn the archives of the Union. Buchanan's election pacified the South; but it was evident, from the growing strength of the republican party, that it was their last victory. They accordingly made use of their friends in office to take advantage of the time that remained to them to be in readiness when the next election came. Secession was resolved upon and prepared from the time when the strength of the republicans was exhibited in 1856. In spite of all the horrors of American slavery, it is impossible for us to have any sympathy with the party of which Mr. Seward is the chief. His politics are not only revolutionary, but aggressive; he is not only for absolutism but for annexation. In a speech on January 26,

* *Memoir of Channing*, p. 43.

† p. 35.

1853, he spoke as follows: "The tendency of commercial and political events invites the United States to assume and exercise a paramount influence in the affairs of the nations situated in this hemisphere; that is, to become and remain a great Western continental power, balancing itself against the possible combinations of Europe. The advance of the country toward that position constitutes what, in the language of many, is called 'progress,' and the position itself is what, by the same class, is called 'manifest destiny.' "*

When Cass moved a resolution affirming the Monroe doctrine with regard to Cuba, Seward supported it, together with another resolution perfectly consistent with it, of which he said: "It is not well expressed; but it implies the same policy in regard to Canada which the main resolutions assert concerning Cuba."† Nor is this the limit of his ambition. "You are already," he says to his countrymen, "the great continental power of America. But does that content you? I trust it does not. You want the commerce of the world, which is the empire of the world."‡

When Kossuth was received in the Senate, he was introduced by Mr. Seward, whose European policy is as definite and about as respectable as his American. Speaking of Hungary, he writes, in December 1851: "I trust that some measure may be adopted by the government which, while it will not at all hazard the peace or prosperity of the country, may serve to promote a cause that appeals so strongly to our interests and our sympathies, viz. the establishment of republicanism, in the countries prepared for it, in Europe."§ And again, two days later: "Every nation may, and every nation ought, to make its position distinctly known in every case of conflict between despots and States struggling for the inalienable and indefeasible rights of independence and self-government, that when despots combine, free States may lawfully unite."

It is as impossible to sympathise on religious grounds with the categorical prohibition of slavery as, on political grounds, with the opinions of the abolitionists. In this, as in all other things, they exhibit the same abstract, ideal absolutism, which is equally hostile with the Catholic and with the English spirit. Their democratic system poisons every thing it touches. All constitutional questions are referred to the one fundamental principle of popular sovereignty, without consideration of policy or expediency. In the Massachusetts convention of 1853, it was argued by one of the most famous Americans, that the election of the judiciary

* Works, iii. 606.

† Ibid. 609.

‡ Ibid. 618.

§ Ibid. 505.

could not be discussed on the grounds of its influence on the administration of justice, as it was clearly consonant with the constitutional theory. "What greater right," says the *North-American Review* (lxxxvi. 477), "has government to deprive the people of their representation in the executive and judicial, than in the legislative department?" In claiming absolute freedom, they have created absolute power, whilst we have inherited from the middle ages the notion that both liberty and authority must be subject to limits and conditions. The same intolerance of restraints and obligations, the same aversion to recognise the existence of popular duty, and of the divine right which is its correlative, disturb their notions of government and of freedom. The influence of these habits of abstract reasoning, to which we owe the revolution in Europe, is to make all things questions of principle and of abstract law. A principle is always appealed to in all cases, either of interest or necessity, and the consequence is, that a false and arbitrary political system produces a false and arbitrary code of ethics, and the theory of abolition is as erroneous as the theory of freedom.

Very different is the mode in which the Church labours to reform mankind by assimilating realities with ideals, and accommodating herself to times and circumstances. Her system of Christian liberty is essentially incompatible with slavery; and the power of masters over their slaves was one of the bulwarks of corruption and vice which most seriously impeded her progress. Yet the Apostles never condemned slavery even within the Christian fold. The sort of civil liberty which came with Christianity into the world, and was one of her postulates, did not require the abolition of slavery. If men were free by virtue of their being formed after the image of God, the proportion in which they realised that image would be the measure of their freedom. Accordingly, St. Paul prescribed to the Christian slave to remain content with his condition.*

We have gone at inordinate length into the causes and peculiarities of the revolution in the United States, because of the constant analogy they present to the theories and the events which are at the same time disturbing Europe. It is too late to touch upon more than one further point, which is extremely suggestive. The Secession movement was not provoked merely by the alarm of the slave-owners for their property, when the election of Lincoln sent down

* 1 Cor. vii. 21. The opposite interpretation, common among Protestant commentators, is inconsistent with the verses 20 and 24, and with the tradition of the Greek Fathers.

the price of slaves from twenty-five to fifty per cent, but by the political danger of Northern preponderance; and the mean whites of the Southern States are just as eager for separation as those who have property in slaves. For they fear lest the republicans, in carrying emancipation, should abolish the barriers which separate the Negroes from their own caste. At the same time, the slaves show no disposition to help the republicans, and be raised to the level of the whites. There is a just reason for this fear, which lies in the simple fact that the United States are a republic. The population of a republic must be homogeneous. Civil equality must be founded on social equality, and on national and physiological unity. This has been the strength of the American republic. Pure democracy is that form of government in which the community is sovereign, in which, therefore, the State is most nearly identified with society. But society exists for the protection of interests; the State for the realisation of right—*concilia cœtusque hominum jure sociati, quæ civitates appellantur*.^{*} The State sets up a moral, objective law, and pursues a common object distinct from the ends and purposes of society. This is essentially repugnant to democracy, which recognises only the interests and rights of the community, and is therefore inconsistent with the consolidation of authority which is implied in the notion of the State. It resists the development of the social into the moral community. If, therefore, a democracy includes persons with separate interests or an inferior nature, it tyrannises over them. There is no mediator between the part and the whole; there is no room, therefore, for differences of class, of wealth, of race; equality is necessary to the liberty which is sought by a pure democracy.

Where society is constituted without equality of condition or unity of race, where there are different classes and national varieties, they require a protector in a form of government which shall be distinct from and superior to every class, and not the instrument of one of them, in an authority representing the State, not any portion of society. This can be supplied only by monarchy; and in this sense it is fair to say that constitutional government, that is, the authority of law as distinguished from interest, can exist only under a king. This is also the reason why even absolute monarchies have been better governors of dependencies than popular governments. In one case they are governed for the benefit of a ruling class; in the other, there is no ruling class, and

* Cicero, *Somnium Scipionis*, 3.

they are governed in the name of the State. Rome under the Republic and under the Empire is the most striking instance of this contrast. But the tyranny of republics is greatest when differences of races are combined with distinctions of class. Hence South America was a flourishing and prosperous country so long as the Spanish crown served as moderator between the various races, and is still prosperous where monarchy has been retained; whilst the establishment of republics in countries with classes divided by blood has led to hopeless misery and disorder, and constant recourse to dictatorships as a refuge from anarchy and tyranny. Democracy inevitably takes the tone of the lower portions of society, and, if there are great diversities, degrades the higher. Slavery is the only protection that has ever been known against this tendency, and it is so far true that slavery is essential to democracy. For where there are great incongruities in the constitution of society, if the Americans were to admit the Indians, the Chinese, the Negroes, to the rights to which they are justly jealous of admitting European emigrants, the country would be thrown into disorder, and if not, would be degraded to the level of the barbarous races. Accordingly, the Know-nothings rose up as the reaction of the democratic principle against the influx of an alien population. The Red Indian is gradually retreating before the pioneer, and will perish before many generations, or dwindle away in the desert. The Chinese in California inspire great alarm for the same reason, and plans have been proposed of shipping them all off again. This is a good argument too, in the interest of all parties, against the emancipation of the blacks.

This necessity for social equality and national unity has been felt in all democracies where the mass as a unit governs itself. Above all, it is felt as a necessity in France, since the downfall of the old society, and the recognition, under republic, charter, and despotism, of the sovereignty of the people. Those principles with which France revolutionises Europe are perfectly right in her own case. They are detestable in other countries where they cause revolutions, but they are a true and just consequence of the French Revolution. Men easily lose sight of the substance in the form, and suppose that because France is not a republic she is not a democracy, and that her principles therefore will apply elsewhere. This is the reason of the power of the national principle in Europe. It is essential as a consequence of equality to the notion of the people as the source of power. Where there is an aristocracy it has generally more sympathy and connection with foreign aristocracies than with the rest of the nation. The bonds of

class are stronger than those of nationality. A democracy, in abolishing classes, renders national unity imperative.

These are some of the political lessons we have learnt from the consideration of the vast process of which we are witnessing the consummation. We may consult the history of the American Union to understand the true theory of republicanism, and the danger of mistaking it. It is simply the spurious democracy of the French Revolution that has destroyed the Union, by disintegrating the remnants of English traditions and institutions. All the great controversies—on the embargo, restriction, internal improvement, the Bank-Charter Act, the formation of new States, the acquisition of new territory, abolition—are phases of this mighty change, steps in the passage from a constitution framed on an English model to a system imitating that of France. The secession of the Southern States—pregnant with infinite consequences to the African race, by altering the condition of slavery, to America by awakening an intenser thirst for conquest, to Europe by its reaction on European democracy, to England, above all, by threatening for a moment one of the pillars of her social existence, but still more by the enormous augmentation of her power, on which the United States were always a most formidable restraint—is chiefly important in a political light as a protest and reaction against revolutionary doctrines, and as a move in the opposite direction to that which prevails in Europe.

DR. WARD'S PHILOSOPHY.*

THE late theological lecturer at St. Edmund's commences his course, not with God, but with human nature, not because he fails to found moral obligation on the Divine nature and attributes, but because, after this foundation has been once assumed, the discussion of human nature can be conducted independently to the end. The trifling inconvenience of the assumption may be well pardoned in a teacher who feels a special predilection and vocation to the moral and anthropological side of theology.

The present volume contains the philosophical introduction to the theological course, and only treats of those truths which, though they may be enforced by revelation, are de-

* *On Nature and Grace. A Theological Treatise.* Book I.: *Philosophical Introduction.* By W. G. Ward, Ph. D. London: Burns and Lambert.

monstrable by reason alone, and which the lecturer judges necessary or useful to those who would rightly understand the course that is to follow: till we have this course, it is, he reminds us, impossible to say with what skill the foundation has been prepared for the superstructure. All that the critic can do is to examine its texture, and satisfy himself that there are no flaws in the workmanship.

The volume is divided into two main parts; one is ontological, or metaphysical, and shows that the notions of good and evil, and of moral obligation are real intuitions, subjectively necessary and objectively valid; so that by intrinsic necessity such and such acts are virtuous, and such and such vicious. The second is psychological, and shows that the constitution of our nature in its propensions, intellect, and will is adapted for the exercise of virtue and avoidance of vice; so that the first is natural, the other destructive of nature.

That the first part treats of no idle question may be soon shown. Three years ago, M. Proudhon published at Paris a book entitled *Justice in the Church and in the Revolution*. It was intended to destroy Christianity, by proving that justice and virtue must be something absolute, inherent in the intellect; that deriving it from God, or any other external source, makes it foreign to man's nature, accidental, arbitrary, capricious. Now, he said, the Christian doctrine is, that the soul is empty and dark, incapable of any morality but that of selfishness, and unable of itself to understand, far less to practise, the social law, which has no foundation in reason and the nature of things, like other truths, but is given solely by revelation; but the decrees of Heaven depend on God's wishes, which can never be calculated beforehand, which can be reduced to no system, because they follow no law, the motives of which cannot be penetrated, so that we should know how to apply and modify them as circumstances arise: hence these external decrees and commands are in themselves the moral light of man, and without them he is as incapable of morality as a beast; revelation is the only basis of virtue and justice, and there is no obligation to practise them before revelation; therefore society, which is founded on justice, is impossible without revealed religion.

This it will be readily seen is a caricature, not so much of Catholic doctrine, as of the peculiar tenets of the traditionalists, from whose writings exclusively Proudhon draws his proofs. The existence of a Christian school whose teaching is capable of being so perverted, shows the necessity of

clearing the true doctrine on this point, and of proving that moral good and evil do not originally result from any arbitrary appointment, or even from the necessary command of God; but that they are necessary ideas prior to all appointment and to all command, confining the Creator as well as obliging the creature, attributes of God, and therefore no more created or appointed by Him than His own eternity and omnipotence. This is the assumption from the course *De Deo* which Dr. Ward has to make in his course of moral theology. Not that he founds his argument entirely upon it; on the contrary, he proves the necessary character of moral truth by arguments which are not theological, especially by refuting those who hold the opposite theory, and who invest the principles of morals with a contingent character. In the following paragraphs we will attempt to develop some of his arguments.

He begins by showing that moral judgments are "intuitive;" to explain this term, he distinguishes between two classes of intellectual acts, judgments of consciousness and judgments of intuition. (1) The former, he says, "amount to no more than this—'my present feeling is what I now feel it to be;'" they are declarations that "I am at this moment affected in a certain way. The judgment begins there and ends there," *i. e.* has no consequences, and cannot be used as a premiss; it does not pass the bounds of mere impression or feeling; it is always subjective (p. 6), and it includes such acknowledgments of "intellectual impotence" as "I cannot help feeling that this is so." (2) The latter are acts of "intellectual perception" (p. 43), "declarations of reason" (p. 24), and are objective, or declarations of what we consider to be facts, independently of the present impression; and he gives, as examples of them, all acts of memory, the assertion of the validity of logical reasoning, mathematical axioms, belief in an external world, and the perception of objects (p. 8).

But he warns us to be careful in distinguishing judgments that are immediately evident from those which are only clear after a course of reasoning or inference. Thus, "this corn is in excellent condition," is a judgment that can only be formed after we have studied the marks which usually indicate good condition in corn; we "intue" the presence of these marks, and we infer thence the good condition of this corn. But these inferences are in no case intuitions; an intuition must be immediately evident, and not in any way inferred from other judgments. The interposition of any step of reasoning destroys the intuitive character; in-

tuitions must be ultimate truths. Hence the judgment "the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles," though it seems immediately evident to the experienced mathematician, is not intuitive, because it was originally inferred from ulterior truths. It is, however, intuitive to God, who is expressly said (p. 43) to "intue" it necessarily but for us men the word "intue" is confined to those judgments "which we elicit as true self-evidently, and not by way of inference" (p. 40). [Is it an obscurity of words, or a confusion of thought, or a tacit abandonment of an artificial distinction that has served its purpose, that after this we are said (p. 119) to "intue" various acts to be wrong "*because* they are contrary" to various virtues?]

Again, though the judgment, "this corn is in good condition," is not "intued," because we cannot see the "good condition" itself, but only the marks or signs from which it is inferred, yet in some true intuitions it may require a preliminary exercise of reason to see what is meant by the subject and predicate; the predicate by itself may not be immediately seen, but when seen its agreement with the subject (p. 66) must be immediately visible. In these cases, we suppose that no inference must come in, no interpretation of signs or marks must be allowed, in the investigation of the terms, for fear of destroying the intuitive character of the judgment.

Once more; intuitive judgments may be connected with judgments of consciousness, but they cannot be inferred from them. We may say at the same time, "I have the impression that I saw this before," and "I did see this before," but the latter is in no sense deduced from the former. The fact remembered is not inferred from the present impression on the sensibility, nor the external substance from the impression on the sight or touch, nor the truth of personal existence from the phenomena of life. In Dr. Ward's system the formula *cogito ergo sum* has neither place nor meaning, if for no other reason, because a judgment of consciousness can never be a premiss. Judgments of consciousness, then, being mere declarations of present impression, but intuitive judgments being declarations of objective facts of which we have immediate conviction, it follows that "many of these latter judgments are true, many are false," though, whether true or false, all are to be called intuitions, provided they are immediate, and not judgments of consciousness.

With these arms in his quiver, Dr. Ward is prepared to do battle with "philosophical scepticism," of which he declares the only exact enunciation to be: "We are unable to

know with certainty any thing whatever beyond the facts of our present consciousness, because no intuitive judgment can possibly carry with it its own evidence of truth." That is, if knowledge is possible, it must be founded on judgments of consciousness, which (by the definition) end with themselves, and cannot form the premisses of an argument; we may know that we are thinking, but cannot thence conclude that we exist, or if we did, it would not be an intuition, and as an inference would be discounted from the present argument; we may have the impression that we see this paper, but cannot affirm that we see it, either by inference, for that would be no intuition, or by intuition, which is denied by the hypothesis. According to Dr. Ward, then, scepticism is the declaration of our inability to assert with any certainty any fact beyond our present impression: while a kindred philosophy, which he calls semi-scepticism, admits the premiss that no intuitions carry with them their own evidence, but asserts that certain intuitions can be proved true "by means of some prior self-evident truth," *i. e.* by means of a further intuition; it thus asserts in the second breath what it had denied in the first.

Scepticism cannot be argued with, because the sceptic confines himself and his opponent to the inner world of their own impressions, without any means of certain communication; he cannot admit the certainty of his opponent's existence, or of his words having any meaning. Semi-scepticism is self-contradictory, and not worth arguing with; therefore we may profitably omit the logomachy of the debate against them, and at once admit the contradictory of their premiss, and affirm that "some intuitive judgments carry with them their own evidence," or, as Dr. Ward says, "it is fully possible that intuitive judgments may carry with them their own evidence of truth" (p. 18).

After overcoming scepticism, the lecturer seeks for some sceptics to vanquish. Mr. Mansel is his first antagonist, though we do not see why Dr. Ward should consider him an enemy. Our author as yet has only proved that while some intuitions are certainly false, others carry with them their own evidence. Mr. Mansel does at least as much: he affirms that arithmetic, geometry, and morals "rest on similar bases, and are confined within the same limits, all being equally *necessary* and *valid* within the legitimate bounds of human intelligence." And beyond these bounds, he says, there is "an absolute morality, based upon, or rather identical with, the Eternal nature of God," the conviction of which is "forced upon us by the same evidence as that

on which we believe that God exists at all."* If Dr. Ward objects to this, it will probably be because he asserts that God's "absolute morality" is identical with our morality, or, in general, that necessary truth is in God under conditions precisely similar to those under which it is in man; in other words, that we have a positive, not only a negative knowledge of what God is; that St. Athanasius was wrong when he said, "it is impossible to know what God is, possible to say what He is not;" or St. Augustine when he said, "Totum ex animo rejicite; quidquid occurrerit negate; dicite, non est illud." But then Dr. Ward himself implies this theory when he tells us to think of "the one perfectly simple Being" as the "cumulus of all perfections," and to ponder on one perfection after another, and reflect on His possessing all of them in infinite extent," and thus to obtain a "highly complex idea," which yet is "a very real knowledge as far as it goes" (p. 52),—that is, as far as complexity can be said to correspond to simplicity.

Yet, in spite of this substantial agreement, Dr. Ward accuses Mr. Mansel of scepticism for saying, "It may be, indeed, that the conditions of possible thought correspond to conditions of possible being; that what is to us inconceivable is in itself non-existent. But of this, from the nature of the case, it is impossible to have any evidence. . . . In believing this, we desert the evident of reason to rest on that of faith, . . . [which] bids us rest content within the limits which have been assigned to us: it cannot enable us to overleap them, or to exalt to a more absolute character the conclusions obtained by finite thinkers concerning finite objects of thought." The question is only about asserting the "absolute validity" of our conditioned ideas, of giving our finite thought an "absolute character;" there is no thought of denying the validity of mathematical necessity for all objects in space, or of arithmetical necessity for all in time, only of questioning whether the ideas of space and time must necessarily apply to the idea of the Living God; whether "the conditions of possible thought correspond to the conditions of possible being," and whether our idea of substance corresponds to the external reality of substance, or our idea of God to His real Essence.

But Dr. Ward chooses to interpret Mr. Mansel to mean that no possible thought, no laws, however necessary, can be known to be objectively valid within any limits whatever; and upon this he believes himself entitled to suppress

* *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. vii. pp. 204, 206, 3d ed.

Mr. Mansel's instances, and to substitute one of his own, so as to make Mr. Mansel deny the validity of the laws of reasoning. That is, because Mr. Mansel doubts the absolute validity of intuitions, or their exact correspondence to the absolute truth, Dr. Ward insists that he shall also doubt their relative validity, or their correspondence to truth, "so far as they go."

And, next, to confirm this false assumption, Dr. Ward quotes and interprets Mr. Mansel's *Bampton Lectures*, settling in a very off-hand way what their argument must be, without taking the precaution to ascertain what it is. We slightly abridge Dr. Ward's sentences: "There are two totally distinct syllogisms, either of which would land us in the desired conclusion: 1. Whatever reason really declares is really certain; but reason really declares that we have no direct knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute; therefore it is really certain that we have no such knowledge. 2. No declaration of reason suffices to give us certain knowledge (for none can carry with it its own evidence of truth); but all direct knowledge of the Infinite is merely the declaration of reason; hence we do not possess any certain knowledge of the Infinite." Mr. Mansel does not use the first syllogism, therefore he must use the second. We reply, first, that Dr. Ward owns that some intuitions are false, and therefore has as yet shown no right to call a man a sceptic for doubting of the absolute validity of the particular intuitions of the Infinite and Absolute: next, that his dilemma, though the two major premisses are contradictory, and therefore complementary, and apparently exhaustive, does not really exhaust the alternatives; for there is a third syllogism, which we may gather from the quotation made by Dr. Ward,—“the light which is in us is not darkness, only it cannot illuminate that which is beyond the sphere of its rays;” that is, our intuition is valid within certain limits, invalid beyond them, in other words, “many of our intuitions are true, many are false,” and many uncertain; and Mr. Mansel's syllogism may be thus made: “No declaration of reason suffices to give us certain knowledge of that which is beyond the reach of the rays of reason; but the Infinite and Absolute are beyond such reach; therefore no declaration of reason suffices to give us certain knowledge of them.” This may be scepticism, but it does not come within Dr. Ward's definition, and is implicitly held by Dr. Ward himself.

We have no sympathy with Mr. Mill's philosophy, which Dr. Ward next attacks, but we have still less sympathy for unsound refutations of it. Mr. Mill, then, says that there

are "no truths cognisable by the mind's inward light, and grounded on intuitive evidence. Sensation, and the mind's consciousness of its own acts, are not only the exclusive sources, but the sole materials of our knowledge." In terms, this is a direct contradiction of Dr. Ward; but do both writers use the words "intuition" and "consciousness" in the same sense? Dr. Ward's judgments of consciousness only recognise the present *impression*; Mr. Mill reckons the consciousness of mental *acts* among the sources of knowledge. Acts are more than impressions,* and a consciousness of the act implies a consciousness of its quality; and this, we suppose, Dr. Ward would call an intuition, as when we say, "I am conscious that the mind necessarily attributes substance to all phenomena."

Up to this point Dr. Ward has only said that some intuitions are valid, without discriminating the valid from the invalid; and he has also allowed himself to use strong language against some persons who expressed doubts as to the validity of some intuitions, though they expressly admitted others, but perhaps under another name. Now, at length, he thinks it time to discuss the criteria by which true intuitions may be distinguished from false. It is strange that, after having accused a man of scepticism for not admitting any sources of our knowledge but sensation, and "consciousness of mental acts," Dr. Ward should have no better test of the validity of intuitions than the consciousness of the quality of the act by which we make them, viz. "the physical impossibility of doubting them for one moment" (p. 36); or the fact that, "so soon as any one has apprehended (the meaning of the subject and predicate), he forms by necessity that judgment which recognises that the subject and the predicate agree together. I am not aware," he continues, "that any further proof than this can be brought for the legitimacy of a mathematical intuition" (p. 66). In other words, though the judgment that "I cannot help thinking it," is only a "judgment of consciousness" (p. 6), and can have no results (p. 3), the judgment that "every one who understands the terms of the proposition by the constitution of his nature must assent to it," is the one legitimate test of intuitions. But I can only know what "every one" must assent to, through my consciousness of what I must assent to; the

* We are not sure that Dr. Ward would allow this, since (p. 400) he drops the distinction between *phantasia* and *intellectus*, and ascribes to the intellect every operation ascribed by the scholastics to the *phantasia*; at the same time he drops altogether the *intellectus agens*, and recognises no intellect but the *intellectus possibilis*.

constitution of other men's minds is only known to me through my own. Here, then, the most important of all intuitive judgments, that which is the test of the validity of all others, is represented to us as an inference from what has been already called a mere judgment of consciousness, "I cannot help thinking thus." Besides this, Dr. Ward adopts the three tests of Father Buffier; the first of which secures the immediateness of the intuition, the second appeals to universal suffrage for its validity, while the third appeals to the mind's consciousness of its own acts, and asks whether we must not conform our conduct to the truth which our reason affects to doubt? For, as Mr. Mansel says, our intuitive faith "has but a regulative and practical, not a speculative application." Would not, however, the following "intuition" satisfy Father Buffier's tests: "There is an upper and an under in space"? No insight can be more direct or immediate, none more universal, none to which it is more physically necessary to conform. Yet it is false.

We must not be understood to object to Dr. Ward's first criterion in itself; we only say that his other statements, contrived for the purpose of building up the charge of scepticism against Mr. Mansel and Mr. Mill, have cut away his ground, and annulled his right to use it. But let it be taken as proved that some intuitions are not only true and valid, but also universal and necessary: Dr. Ward's next step is to identify all these universal and necessary truths with God. And here few persons who have entered into the old controversy about the Logos and the Divine Ideas, will be disposed to object, except to two statements of Dr. Ward; for why should he seem to limit God's eternal gaze to "necessary truth" only?* (pp. 43, 44); as if God did not as necessarily "intue" every real and every possible contingent existence as He "intues" mathematical or arithmetical truth: and, secondly, is it in accordance with common sense so to identify all necessary truth with God (p. 45), as to leave no place for a distinction between the truths of space and time, which are only necessary because He has contrived and created them, and the truths of absolute morality, which are prior to all contrivance and creation, as being God's attributes? The

* Whoever knows the perfect definition of a principle may evolve all the consequences of that definition with rigid logical necessity. Hence the range of necessary truth varies for each intelligence with the extent of his power of definition; but the power of definition is coincident with the power of creation, as we proved in the first of a series of articles on the "Forms of Intuition" in this Review. Hence, to the Creator of all things, all possible consequences of every law which He institutes are known with a necessity analogous to that with which we know the consequences of the laws of space and time.

ideas of space and time, like all other ideas of created things, are necessarily in God from all eternity, but need never have been realised externally. The ideas of absolute morality are of the very essence of God, and the living realisation is His eternal life.

Mathematical necessity in itself is but hypothetical. While space or the idea of space remains as it is, all its relations necessarily remain as they are ; for any change in any one of them would involve the destruction of the whole idea. This does not prove that there might not have been hundreds of other platforms besides space for the formation of a universe ; of course we cannot imagine such, for our mind is only formed to correspond to the actual world, not to create a new universe. But moral necessity depends on a deeper reality ; God is not space, but He is Love, and Mercy, and Justice ; and He could not create free creatures at all except on these principles. Hence for material necessity a double hypothesis is required,—that God should choose the platform of space rather than another, possible to Him, but unimaginable to us, and that He should actually create in this platform. In the moral creation the first hypothesis is inadmissible. If God creates free beings, there is no choice of platforms, they must be obliged by the laws which are His attributes. But the second hypothesis holds—"it is in no respect necessary that God shall create beings possessed of freedom and intelligence ; it is only necessary that if He do create such beings, they are subject to this or that moral obligation." Thus, in spite of the absolute necessity of the moral law, "God is the free Author of every single moral obligation to which any one of His creatures is subject" (p. 105).

And this freedom of the Creator introduces a contingency of another kind into the moral law that binds free creatures. He may give them various degrees of intelligence, or, in other words, may promulgate to them more or less of this law. More or less, both in degree and kind ; for the very nature of the moral law varies within certain limits when applied to creatures. For instance, the idea of Purity must be very different in a being with no propensions or passions whatever, and in a being to whom the only idea of purity is a virtue founded on the repression of passion, and the direction of the propension to a permitted end. The moral law of creatures, then, is not the absolute morality of the Creator, though this is its model and its source, but is determined both in extent, by the capacity and knowledge of the creatures, and in mode, by their constitution, both of which depend on the arbitrary will of God.

These distinctions, surely, ought to have been made before Dr. Ward entered on the question of the relation between God and moral truth; he should have told us whether he meant absolute moral truth, which is in the relation of identity with God, or moral truth as it is adapted to created natures, and promulgated to man;—the natural rule of morals, which stands in a double relationship to God, depending in one aspect on His attributes, and so independent of His appointment and command, and in the other aspect dependent on His free command, whether implied in the constitution of our nature, or revealed in any other way.

For want of this preliminary inquiry (Dr. Ward only enters upon it afterwards), it is impossible to tell whether the Catholics and Protestants, who derived morality from the free command of the Creator, and who said, or were supposed to say, that God “might as readily have commanded cruelty, lying, and impurity, as He has forbidden them,” were speaking (1) of God’s absolute morality, or (2) of the natural rule of human beings, so far as it depends on that absolute morality; or (3) of His natural rule, so far as it depends on the constitution God has been pleased to give us. With regard to the Catholic theologians here glanced at, including, we suppose, Duns Scotus, Occam, Gerson, and Pierre Dailly, the controversy would require an historical research for which we have neither room nor leisure; and without such research it must be fought out upon details and fragments with the positiveness and contentiousness of the mediæval schools. Viewed in its bearings on the other tenets of these schoolmen, the doctrine here blamed seems to hinge on the second or third of the above suppositions. Thus, when Scotus* proves that the attributes which we assign to God are not the true counterparts of His transcendent life and essence, but only inadequate types and representations, it follows that as such types they are capable of infinite variation, and that God’s transcendent wisdom or power might be represented by very different wisdoms and powers in different creatures, according to His mere will. So in morals God’s mere will would be the only rule of law (the word ‘law,’ as a check upon absolute power, being totally inapplicable to God, in whom power and right are one and the same, and only applicable to creatures who can do more than they ought). Hence there is nothing in law, that is, in the rule given to creatures, that cannot be altered, abrogated, or suspended, by the same will that imposed it. Still, Scotus contends that the two

* In Sent. i. dis. 8, q. 4.

first commandments of the Decalogue are of eternal, substantial, and absolute obligation upon all free creatures; for he cannot imagine a conscience framed so as not to be bound to love and honour God. But it is possible to conceive circumstances, even for men, in which each material act forbidden by the other commandments might become obligatory in individual cases, through the command of God. In this case such acts would be meritorious, and expressive of love and devotion to God; and they have been from time to time commanded in Scripture, as in the case of Abraham. Our understanding can only comprehend morality under the conditions of our own nature. But God is free to make other natures, and their morality would be otherwise conditioned, while the absolute morality of God can be subject to no conditions at all.* Occam, perhaps, is more consistent in making even our love to God a contingent and conditional manifestation of morality, and in saying that God might surround even *odium Dei*† with such circumstances as would make it meritorious, just as we might say that some Protestants, while their idea of Catholicism remains what it is, are morally bound to hate the Church. Could God create free creatures liable to such a false conception of Him as should oblige them to hate Him? If Occam says yes, at least his answer assumes that there are eternal principles of morality which oblige a free being to hate a God whom he conceives to be bad.

So far as we have examined the Protestant writers, we are disposed to think that if the above distinction had been laid before them, they would have declared that they were only speaking of the third supposition, and that they meant, that if God had pleased, He might have so ordered our constitution that the physical acts which now display certain moral characters should have had a totally different moral signification. This seems the fair construction to put on the words of that most offensive writer Zwinglius,‡ where he compares the moral law to the domestic rules which a father enacts to keep his children from sensuality and sloth;—touch not the honey-pot—tie your shoes; the wife and elder children break these rules with impunity, but it does not follow that they are the less bound to avoid sensuality and sloth. Zwinglius clearly contemplated two laws: one derived from the eternal nature of God, which forbids sloth; the other adapted to our weak nature, forbidding certain acts which in us lead to or mani-

* Scotus in Sent. i. dis. 44, q. 1, and in Sent. iii. dis. 37, q. 1.

† Sent. ii. q. 19.

‡ De Prov. c. v. lib. i. p. 364 B.

fest sloth. If he does not speak clearly, it is, as Möhler says,* because the Protestants did not rightly understand their doctrines; they were confused and muddy, and would not have owned their system as it was developed by controversial adversaries, or even by their own fanatical followers.

That Puffendorf, another of these writers, was arguing about the contingent natural rule, and not about the absolute moral law, is clear from his words as quoted by Gerdil (Ward, p. 464): "It depended absolutely on God's good pleasure to give man, in creating him, such nature as He thought fit. How, then, can human actions have any property that results from an internal and absolute necessity, independently of the Divine institution?" This shows that Puffendorf was looking at the moral code on its contingent side exclusively; but it will not justify us in saying that he considered God's justice to be a contingent quality, regulated by His arbitrary will.

We do not admire this school, which has the air of wishing that God had made us beasts, so that we might behave like pigs without pangs of conscience; but there is an aspect of things in which its doctrine is true. But the school which Dr. Ward next attacks is far nobler (p. 78); it holds that "the only sense in which an act can be called with truth 'morally evil' is, that such act is forbidden—necessarily however, forbidden—by the Creator." This school attempts to combine the two truths; the necessary character of the moral law as it exists in and radiates from God, the Sun of justice; and the contingent nature of the constitution of creatures, by which they are brought in various degrees within the sphere of these rays. Dr. Ward, however, without making any such attempt to fathom its meaning, takes the theory in a lump, and brings against it "six different arguments, any one of which by itself would be amply sufficient to refute it."

Let us examine one of these; perhaps the second (p. 80) is most characteristic of Dr. Ward's method. "Our opponents," he says, "maintain that in calling [lying, &c.] morally evil, it is only meant that they are forbidden by the Creator" [he should not have omitted to say, "necessarily forbidden"]; "we, on the contrary, maintain that they are intrinsically evil, apart from all reference to the Creator's will. Our opponents must necessarily say that when I speak of a man as morally good, I mean no more than this,—that he conforms his conduct to his Creator's wishes" [really, this is too bad, this method of manipulating an opponent's proposition, first

* Symbolism, c. iii. § xxv. vol. i. p. 270, Robertson's translation.

leaving out the most important word, "necessary," then changing "command," or "will," into "wishes;" as if to suggest that he was arguing with men who frittered up the necessary immutable Will of God into a multitude of unstable wishes]. "But we," he continues, "maintain, that when I speak of him as morally good, I mean that he possesses those qualities that are intrinsically virtuous, independently of the Creator's wishes We understand by holiness the possession of certain qualities intrinsically virtuous; they understand by it the habit of conformity to the Creator's wishes."

Hitherto the argument has had for its object to burk the idea and the phrase, "necessary command," and to substitute in its place the term "wishes." The next step depends on our willingness to confound the moral rule of the creature with the absolute morality of the Creator, to such an extent as to hold that our obligation and duty is an exact image of God's obligation and duty; so that if it is our obligation to obey the Creator, it is also God's obligation to obey Himself. Now, we may deduce our duty from the Creator's command, and yet refuse to look upon the absolute morality of the Creator as a command imposed by Him upon Himself, as though to guard Himself from crime. Where the creature is obliged, the Creator is necessitated. The moral law is His Nature, His Attribute; He cannot will otherwise, for it is His Will. The creature can will otherwise, and is therefore obliged, fenced in, defended by the law. It is, then, no good illation to transfer the idea of human obligation, with all its human conditions, to God. Dr. Ward, however, does so. After interpreting the proposition "The Creator is all-holy" to mean "He possesses in the most perfect possible way all qualities that are intrinsically virtuous," he proceeds: "But what must be our opponents' version of this proposition,—'The Creator possesses in the most perfect way the quality of always conforming to His own wishes'? Or, to put it otherwise, this most solemn and fundamental truth, the Creator's sanctity, becomes in their mouths no more nor less than this: 'The Creator does in every respect exactly as He likes.'" Now, even supposing that his opponents were forced to admit the illation from man to God, their proposition would only be, "The Creator is all-holy, because He universally and necessarily conforms to His own necessary commands;" what can be more monstrous than to call this equivalent to the other? This, so far from being "frightfully revolting to piety," is certainly innocent, whether it goes to the root of the matter or not. But if the

illation is not admitted, that is, if the moral necessity that binds the Creator's will is distinguished from the moral obligation which He necessarily imposed on the free creature by the very act of creation, then it will not follow that because the creature's holiness consists in conformity to the Creator's commands, therefore the Creator's holiness consists in conformity to His own commands; and Dr. Ward's argument, so to call it, will have no sense at all.

We shall not examine any further the first portion of Dr. Ward's volume. Our readers will gather from what we have said, that we are not satisfied with its execution. Entirely convinced of the truth of the thesis to be proved, that moral truth is an attribute of God, an uncreated light that necessarily illumines the wills of all free creatures according to their measure, we opened the volume with every hope of seeing so great a theme properly treated; but metaphysical speculation does not seem to be Dr. Ward's strong point; and it is difficult to decipher a system where the dogmatism of the ontologist and the subjective process of the psychologist alternate in a way that spoils both. We do not find any difficulty solved in this book; there is ample flow of rhetoric, and a logic that unfolds errors so clearly that they look like truth; but some of the most knotty points have been touched as if the writer did not realise their difficulty, and other points, whose obscurity results from the crossing of distinct principles, are factitiously solved by adjourning the consideration of one of the principles, and, when it comes on the carpet, treating it as a mere exception and modification of a truth already settled.

Is it the consciousness of this argumentative weakness that makes Dr. Ward seek a kind of compensation in the unfairness and violence with which he treats his opponents? It is surely a great defect in any controversialist to have so low an opinion of those with whom he argues, as to fancy that he can prove them in four paragraphs to be either atheists or idiots; but in Dr. Ward such a practice is suicidal, for his only proof of the validity of intuitions is the infallibility of human reason on certain subjects. But now, if by a few facile strokes of superior intelligence he can demolish a whole school of Catholic thought, which counts illustrious names among its supporters, can strip off its pretensions, and demonstrate that its characteristic principle is "frightfully revolting to piety," how crushing is the dishonour which he heaps upon that human reason which he pretends to invest with such high powers of insight into the nature of Necessary Being!

In Dr. Ward this style of argument seems natural, and it is accompanied in him with many high gifts, with great devotion to Catholic truth, with generosity, earnestness, laboriousness, and extensive learning. But suppose that it should be imitated by pupils without these gifts, what manner of men would this style of teaching be likely to make of them? What quickness or decision would ever make up for the want of that moderation and human sympathy which is ever ready to acknowledge the truth which underlies the error, before it denounces or ridicules the falsehood? How would such controversialists fare in the intelligent society of a country like England?

It is a comfort to escape from the metaphysical to the psychological portion of Dr. Ward's volume, where he seems more at home, and where his geniality more fully reveals itself. Not that we can expect the leopard to change his spots, or the controversialist to lose his former personality, by the mere passing of an ideal barrier. We have the same contemptuous treatment of opponents; the great Bossuet fares no better than Mansel, Mill, or Viva; for, in reference to his doctrine that the desire of happiness is the one motive of human action, Dr. Ward says: "It is really difficult to imagine what can have led *any sane person* to put forth a theory which stands out in such broad contradiction with the most familiar and obvious facts" (p. 404). But the absurdity is Dr. Ward's own, who insists upon making the words *beatus* and *heureux* always point to eternal happiness, without reference to that present appeasement and calm which is the end of action: a temptation may be yielded to either because we love it, or because it annoys us; as we might throw our dinner to a hungry hound that we feared, and as Pilate yielded our Lord to the monstrous demands of the Jews whom he despised. A present annoyance outweighs a future one, which we may trust to the chapter of accidents, or to our own subsequent efforts to avoid. But the easiest way to prove Bossuet a driveller is to give perverse or inadequate interpretations of his meaning!

Still the second portion of Dr. Ward's volume may be studied with much profit. If we especially point out the chapter on the adaptation of our nature to virtue, it is only because the author has evidently lavished all his care and predilection upon it. It shows that our nature was so contrived as to be an instrument of virtue, not of vice; if our nature has received no addition or subtraction by the Fall, then Adam in Paradise had all the same propensions and passions that we have; they were given him to use, and

consequently their activity was compatible with the innocent and virtuous life to which he was there called, and it was, and still is possible, to put them to their legitimate use, and to make them the ministers and instruments of virtue. Thus virtue, which in its *à-priori* aspect is fidelity to the obligation of shunning evil and doing good, in one of its *à-posteriori* aspects is the harmonious and equable application of all our propensions to their proper ends; not but that circumstances may impose on some men the duty of altogether foregoing the activity of some propensions; but, in general, virtue must be manifested through them by their legitimate use, not by their destruction. Dr. Ward then shows in detail how each propension may be made the handmaid of piety, and may be trained to the service of God. If we single out his criticism upon the propension to knowledge, or intellectual exertion, it is not as a specimen of the rest of the chapter, but as an exception to the general excellence of its treatment.

It is difficult to analyse Dr. Ward's sentiments upon the use of intellect; it is hard to suppose that a man who is so distinguished for power of thought and speech should be other than a friend to their use; yet, in spite of his practical manifestations of the love of intellectual exertion, he certainly speaks of it with a degree of hatred and terror that seems quite irrational. Of all the propensions, that which leads us to employ our minds Dr. Ward considers the most mischievous and the most useless, the most violent and the most intense; to prove its danger, he refers to "the very close and, as it were, natural connection between great mathematical power, and extreme infidelity" (p. 289), and then he assigns three reasons for this coincidence. First, intellectual pursuits have no periods of reaction, like sensual pleasures, but may be constantly followed; but if men do this "in a reckless inordinate way, simply for the sake of the pleasure, and with no reference to moral duty, they become more thoroughly obdurate, more thoroughly insensible to higher and more spiritual motives, than perhaps any class of men that can be named." Secondly, there ensues "diabolical pride, . . . the ordinary, nay the necessary, accompaniment of great intellectual power, whenever the humbling exercises of piety are neglected." Thirdly, pride and insensibility united lead men to unbelief: "the mysteries of the Gospel, nay, the doctrines of natural religion, appear to their blind, carnal, grovelling, and proud intellect quite low and contemptible, such as it is impossible to believe without doing violence to their whole nature." Still, even intellectual

power, though "it degrades men to the very lowest moral level possible on earth," may be made beneficial. First, "it gives the leisured classes the moral power of consistently obeying God," by affording them an occupation which they can direct to His service; next, even when they do not turn it to this devout use, it makes "the leisured classes the greatest benefactors of mankind; for they apply their energies, in fifty different ways, to the investigation of principles and truths from which spring the greatest advantages to society." And if they turn intellect to no material use, at least they may keep themselves out of mischief by intellectual amusements. The third benefit of the propension is "the assistance which it has given in forming the Church's theology;" and Dr. Ward wonders how the body of divinity would ever have been elaborated if the exercise of reason had been a pain instead of a gratification.

And what would have become of humanity, we may ask, if the exertion of that intellect which is the characteristic by which it is elevated above the nature of brutes, had been always disagreeable and painful, instead of affording the keenest pleasure that we are capable of? It would seem as reasonable to apologise for the intellect itself as to apologise for the propensity to use it. With regard to the temptations to infidelity which mathematicians and men of science feel, perhaps one of the greatest of them is the hatred, terror, and affected contempt which some believers feel for intellectual superiority, the suspicion of infidelity with which they regard the most obvious objections to certain popular prejudices, and the galling police regulations with which they would always fetter the exercise of the mind. The claim for the indirect power of the Church over all matters of thought, whether metaphysics, geology, or astronomy, and for her plenary "right of peremptorily interfering in all these investigations, whenever she judges that any scientific conclusions lead to consequences at variance with that doctrinal deposit which is committed to her keeping" (p. xviii.), is not likely to be less contested by men of science, than Bellarmine's claim for her indirect right of peremptory interference with temporal governments was by politicians. Nor are scientific men likely to be soothed by being told that those decisions of the highest ecclesiastical courts which for generations fettered or perverted the course of science in several parts of Europe, were only illusory, and did not claim the interior assent of Catholics, but only compelled philosophers to teach that which they were neither able nor obliged to believe. To say that the intellect requires some external

standard (p. xxii.), is not to the purpose, unless it can be shown that the external standard of the truth of natural science is in the intuitions of theologians, not in nature. Neither are philosophers edified by the contrast between the fetters imposed on them, and the liberty which they sometimes see enjoyed by a teacher of religion to discuss, with a dogmatism which is only equalled by his ignorance, the subjects which belong to the sphere of science. St. Augustine declares this to be one of the sorest trials and scandals of intellect.*

We do not forget that this volume is addressed to those who are to be clergymen, otherwise we should have to object very strongly against a view of religion which seems to reduce it to a trade or profession, squabbling for precedence with other occupations, and either disparaging every other business of life, or admitting its legitimacy only as a method of passing away time which it would be impossible to devote to direct religious exercises (p. 383). Dr. Ward seems to regard the secondary ends of human action, not as occasions for man to exhibit his religion, but as necessary competitors against religion; and would have us reckon "national greatness, or intellectual power, or ancient family, or acquired wealth, to be worthless as the seaweed, except so far as they affect (for good or evil) the advance of sanctity." He had before owned that, without any relation to devotion, intellectual exercise had procured "the greatest advantages to society," and made its votaries "the greatest benefactors of mankind;" but now it appears that patriotism, or science, or nobility, or commerce is "worthless as the seaweed," that inferior objects of human action are not worth working for, and that where religion is not concerned we may as well sit with our hands in our lap as "labour instantly at whatsoever our hand can do." Combine this notion with that of religion being rather a set of functions apart than a quality of our every-day life, and the apology for the *dolce far niente* of Neapolitan blackguardism is complete. Patriotism, philosophy, and industry are placed in opposition to religion, and the business of life is confined to an inglorious non-intervention, to keeping the hands clean by doing nothing, or to securing the mind from evil thoughts by filling it with nugatory ones.

These whims and crazes are great disfigurements to the psychological part of the book, but still, after subtracting them, enough remains to form a remarkable work, which no discriminating person can read without learning much, and

* De Gen. ad lit. ii. 18.

clearing his thoughts on many subjects that were before obscure. It would be idle to praise Dr. Ward for his devotion to his subject, and for his industry in getting up his treatise; and if we have been reluctantly compelled to draw attention to its weak places, it is with no thought of undoing the labour of years by a fortnight's critical examination. Still, we think that the book abounds with faults which no critic can honestly overlook; and if we have devoted our Article to discovering some of these, it is from no want of an honest appreciation of the valuable matter that still remains behind, after all drawbacks have been allowed and discounted.

Communicated Article.

EDMUND CAMPION.—No. III.

CAMPION's biographers, Parsons, Bombinus, Bartoli, and More, who write rather to edify their readers than to trace the character and opinions of the subject of their memoirs, tell us nothing of what occurred to him at Rome beyond his conformity to the pious usages of pilgrims, his gradually-formed conviction that he was called to be a Jesuit, and his admission into the order at the end of April 1573. It appears, however, by his own statements, that he had already made up his mind about his vocation when he first arrived; so that all the stories about the interior voice which miraculously directed him in answer to his protracted devotions, and the severe trial which he made of its authenticity, are shown to be at least great exaggerations, if not pure fancies.

"On my first arrival into Rome," he said at his trial, in November 1581, "which is now about ten years past, it was my hap to have access to [Cardinal Gesualdi, of St. Cecilia], who, having some liking of me, would have been the means to prefer me to any place of service whereunto I should have most faculty; but I, being resolved what course to take, answered that I meant not to serve any man, but to enter into the Society of Jesus, thereof to vow and to be professed."

Then Gesualdi began to question him about the Bull of Pius V. against Elizabeth. Not that any hesitation was felt at Rome about its propriety, or any doubt of the ultimate success of the policy; the Cardinal simply wished to know what had been the effect of this step. If it had failed, like the Bull of Paul III. against Henry VIII., that failure was not calculated to produce discouragement. Had not the Israel-

ites, when they marched by God's express command against the men of Benjamin, been twice overthrown before they conquered? Still, there was some wish to make its bearings on the Catholics as easy as possible. "Being demanded farther," Campion continues, "what opinion I had conceived of the Bull, I said, it procured much severity in England, and the heavy hand of her majesty against the Catholics; whereunto the Cardinal replied, that he doubted not it should be mitigated in such sort as the Catholics should acknowledge her highness as their queen without danger of excommunication." This, Campion urged, could not be construed as an offence, much less as treason. But it was objected to him, that he had only asked for a mitigation of the Bull in favour of the Catholics, leaving the excommunication of the queen still in force and undetected; and his privity thereto was treason. "My privity thereto," he replied, "enforceth not my consenting, nay, rather it proved my disagreement, in that I said it procured much severity: and therefore, being here published before I could detect it (for who knew not that the Queen of England was excommunicated?), it excused my privity and exempted me from treason."

Campion urges that his conduct rather implied dissent from than agreement with the Bull. That this disagreement was a fact, not a mere plea, he might have proved from his *History of Ireland*, had the book been forthcoming. Just as the writers of the sixteenth century show that Otho of Freising disagreed with the temporal policy which had been pursued by Gregory VII., because he persisted in calling the risings against the excommunicated emperor by the name of "rebellion," so Campion might have produced the strong terms of condemnation in which he had spoken of those Irishmen who had risen against Elizabeth and Henry VIII. Shane O'Neil is a "wretched man," who "quenched the sparks of grace that appeared in him with arrogancy and contempt against his prince." Lord Thomas Fitzgerald, Deputy of Ireland, who, upon the receipt of false intelligence that his father had been put to death in England, had risen in arms, is represented by Campion as saying: "If all the hearts of England and Ireland that have cause thereto would join in this quarrel,—as I trust they will,—then should he (Henry) be a by-word—as I trust he shall—for his heresy, lechery, and tyranny, wherein the age to come may score him among the ancient princes of most abominable and hateful memory." This is language quite in conformity with that of the Bull of Paul III.; yet Campion's comment on it is, "With that he rendered up the sword (of

state), and flung away like a bedlam, adding to his shameful oration many other slanderous and foul terms, which, for regard of the king's posterity, I have no mind to utter." Can we doubt how the man who spoke in these terms of the risings in Ireland would have qualified the rebellion of the North in 1569, if it had been necessary for him to mention it in his history? Or can we doubt why, in his history of the divorce, he simply mentions the excommunication of Henry without a word about the sentence of deposition, which was the real focus of the controversy?

It is not to be supposed that Campion had shut his mind against the great Roman question of the day. His *History of Ireland* proves that he was fully instructed in the claims of the Popes to the temporal supremacy of all Christian kingdoms. He not only narrates but he believes, that "when Ireland first received Christendom, they gave themselves into the jurisdiction, both spiritual and temporal, of the See of Rome;" and he tells how Adrian IV. conferred the temporal lordship upon Henry II.; how that Pope, "an Englishman born, who, having in his youth taken a painful pilgrimage into Norway, and reduced the whole land unto Christianity, learned distinctly the state of Ireland" from the Norsemen who repaired thither, through whose intercourse with the wild and furious natives religion ran great danger of being defaced; "for though Christ were believed and taught, yet the multitude eft-soon grew to a shameless kind of liberty, making no more of necessary points of doctrine than served their loose humour." Moreover, "Henry II., building upon the Pope's favour, his born subject, had sent ambassadors to Rome in the first year of his reign, asking leave to attempt the conquest of Ireland." Adrian had such trust in the king, that he not only gave him leave to conquer the island, but conferred on him a kind of legatine power of correcting its religious abuses. Accordingly, the invasion took place; the reformation was enacted in the eight articles of the synod of Cashel; and the Irish clergy, in obedience to the papal Bulls, "denounced curse and excommunication to any that would maliciously gainsay or frustrate" the temporal right over Ireland that the Popes had given to Henry.

In the authentic documents connected with this transaction, we do not find a word about the self-donation of the Irish to the Pope; the right that he claimed over Ireland he derived from the alleged fact that "all the islands which are enlightened by Christ, and have submitted to the doctrine of Christianity, are unquestionably St. Peter's right, and belong to the jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Church." But

John of Salisbury, who was Henry's envoy, tells us the ground of this "unquestionable" right. "At my prayer," he says, "Adrian IV. granted Ireland to Henry II., to be held by right of inheritance. . . . For by ancient right all islands are said to belong to the Roman Church *by the donation of Constantine.*"

All that we find expressed in the Bull is, that the Popes had an unquestionable right over all Christian islands; the grounds on which this right was rested varied with the variations of public opinion. At one time the pretended donation of Constantine was alleged; but when there was a growing disposition to question the right of Constantine to give, if he ever had given, a right which he had never possessed, and which perhaps he could not transmit to his successors if he had possessed it, the claim was grounded on the vote by which the people had once for all exercised their right of electing their lord, and then abdicated it for ever. But the Popes themselves seem to have founded their right, first on the feudal law, then on the ground of divine right, because they were Vicars of Christ in His temporal as well as in His spiritual power; and then on the ground of the necessity of this right for the government of the Church, after controversialists had shown that they were Vicars of Christ in those powers only which He had exercised while upon earth.

If the Pope could give Ireland to Henry because "all islands belonged to the Roman See," the same reason was equally applicable to England. But Campion was far from allowing this. He mentions the fact that King John "made a personal surrender of both his realms in way of submission" to the Pope; "and after his assoilment received them again. Some add," he continues, "that he gave away his kingdom to the see of Rome for him and his successors, recognising to hold the same of the Popes in fee, paying yearly therefore a thousand marks. . . . Sir Thomas More, a man in that calling and office likely to sound the matter to the depth, writeth precisely, that neither any such writing the Pope can show, nor were it effectual if he could." Sir Thomas More was clearly a favourite of Campion. In his history of Henry's divorce he talks of the "incredible experience in affairs and penetration of intellect" which the chancellor displayed, and of his "sublime and almost divine wisdom;" and this appeal to his authority on the subject of the Pope's rights over England is decisive of the appellant's opinion.

The Bull of Paul III. against Henry VIII. was not published in More's lifetime; indeed, Paul was not yet Pope. Still,

More knew of the right of the Pope to settle the legitimacy of marriages and of their issue, and his claim to adjudicate upon the succession of the crown. Nevertheless, both More and Fisher were willing enough to bind themselves to obedience to the law of succession defined by the statute, which gave the crown to the issue of the union of Henry with Anne Boleyn, though they refused to swear that the marriage of Catherine had been null and void from the first; and More, after his condemnation, avowed his belief that Parliament had gone beyond its province in the two questions of the supremacy and the divorce. That is to say, they recognised the right of Parliament to give the crown of England to whom it chose, legitimate or not, but did not recognise its right to define the spiritual questions of the sacrament of marriage, and of the ecclesiastical supremacy. They must have held the opinion that the Church had power only over spiritual things, and not over civil and temporal matters.

That this opinion was deeply rooted in the English laity of the day, is clear from what we read in Hall's Chronicle about the general fast ordered by Wolsey on occasion of the sack of Rome by the Constable Bourbon in 1527, that the clergy in general neglected it; while the laity, to show their grudge against the spirituality, not only refused to observe it, but said that the Pope was worthily served for being such a "ruffian" as to exceed his powers in meddling with temporal dominion.

Accordingly, when Paul III., in 1538, deprived Henry of his realm; laid all places where he might go under an interdict; declared all his children by Anne, and the children of his supporters, to be infamous, illegitimate, and incapable of inheriting; forbade his subjects to obey him; forbade all Catholics to have any commercial dealings with him or his party; ordered all ecclesiastics to depart the realm, and the nobles to rebel; declared all treaties between him and other sovereigns null and void, and ordered that all his supporters, wherever caught, should be made slaves to the person capturing them,—his Bull found very little response in England. Not so, however, in the parts nearer the Scottish border, where, as an eye-witness tells us, even down to 1550, the name of the Pope of Rome was so venerated by the people, that whatsoever they were told he had said or done was to them as good as an oracle, or a dispensation of Providence. But in other parts of the country the Bull was entirely disregarded.

When Elizabeth succeeded to the throne, she took good care to profit by the experience of her father. She took the

line of comprehension, not of exclusion, and required obedience only, not a conscientious conviction of the purity of her origin. She founded her rights to the crown solely on the authority of Parliament, which had confirmed her father's testament. In the act of February 9, 1559, for recognising the queen's just title to the crown, there was no clause to assert the validity of her mother's marriage, which had been declared null in 1553; she contented herself with her parliamentary title: thus leaving liberty of conscience to those who, like More and Fisher, maintained the Pope's supreme right in spiritual matters, but at the same time acknowledged the supreme right of the civil government in all temporal matters, to the extent of bestowing the crown even on persons of base birth, though there were legitimate candidates for the throne. On a similar principle, Elizabeth claimed her ecclesiastical supremacy, not as a right inherent in the crown, but as a grant expressly made by the authority of the Legislature. Here Fisher and More would have stopped; they could never concede the right of Parliament to make such a grant, though they might possibly have come round to Margaret Roper's distinction, and admitted the king's supremacy over all ecclesiastical persons, so far as "the Word of God permitted," in opposition to the extravagant claims of the canonists.

But neither Paul IV. nor St. Pius V. were disposed to admit any compromise; they both joined issue with Elizabeth in maintaining that as illegitimate she could only succeed to the throne through their dispensation; and they were both ready to make all sacrifices to maintain the theory of the indefinite supremacy of the Pope, not only over spiritual affairs, but (directly or indirectly) over temporal matters also. When Elizabeth, on her accession, ordered Sir Edward Carne, the English agent at Rome, to notify the fact to Paul IV., and to assure him of her determination to offer no violence to the consciences of her subjects, the Pope, to whom the French ambassador had been talking of the rights of Mary of Scotland, replied that, "as a bastard, Elizabeth was incapable of succeeding to the English crown" (a curious decision in the teeth of the precedent of William the Conqueror, and Alexander II.); that "by ascending the throne without his sanction she had insulted the authority of the Apostolic See," which claimed feudal suzerainty over England; but that nevertheless, "if she could consent to submit herself and her claims to his judgment, he was still desirous of extending to her whatever indulgence the justice of the case should allow." Elizabeth, as might have been expected, instantly ordered

Carne to quit Rome, and the Pope did not mend matters by refusing the permission to depart. He had managed to set the quarrel with England on a political basis, in which the queen, whatever might be her conduct, would be sure to have the overwhelming majority even of the English Catholics in her favour. Paul died in 1559; and his successor, Pius IV., tried to reopen communications with Elizabeth, and sent two ambassadors, Parpalia, in May 1560, bearing a letter, in which the Pope exhorted her to obedience, and promised her "whatsoever she might desire for the establishing and confirming her princely dignity, according to the authority, place, and office committed to him by God." But neither Parpalia nor his successor, Martinego, in May 1561, was allowed to enter England, chiefly on the ground that it was "manifest that, allowing the authority of the Pope according to such jurisdiction as he claimeth, there will follow a great peril to the security and truth of her majesty's undoubted title to the crown," and that, though Martinego swore that he would do nothing prejudicial to the crown or state, yet the thing was already done. "The Pope hath, even at this instant time in Ireland, a legate who is publicly joined already with certain traitors, and is occupied in stirring a rebellion, having already, by open acts, deprived the queen of her right and title there;" and it was believed that the envoy was to try to "stir up a rebellion in the realm by colour of religion."

While the Pope thus encroached on Elizabeth's political rights, she and her council were more than even with him in encroaching on the spiritual liberties of her subjects. There was no moderation; in the midst of the blind passions of the moment, it appeared necessary to force men to renounce the Mass, in order to demonstrate to the Pope how little authority he had over the succession of the English crown; and the establishment of heresy by civil violence seemed the natural answer to the attempt to control the civil succession of the crown by ecclesiastical power. The passions of both parties were excited, and there was no room for moderate counsels to gain a hearing. To disapprove of the Pope's civil proceedings, was to approve of Elizabeth's ecclesiastical alterations; to take up a moderate line insured persecution from both parties.

Among those who were driven from England by the ecclesiastical violence of the first years of Elizabeth, by far the greatest theologian was Thomas Stapleton, who attempted to introduce some moderation at least into the theory of the relations between the papal authority and civil governments. He denounced the two extremes,—the opinions both of those

who claimed for the Pope authority over princes, because all temporal power was derived from him, and of those who derived this papal authority from the gift of the emperors. He disclaimed any temporal suzerainty of the Pope over princes, and he denied that the Pope had any right to dethrone them for any merely civil cause. The Pope could not justly interfere with temporal governments, except when they were hostile or detrimental to the Catholic religion; and in this case he had precisely the same right of interference as one state has in respect to another state whose internal condition is such as to be a serious danger to its neighbours. He may intervene either against the people, when they are about to elect a prince who will probably tamper with their religion, or against such a prince when he is on the throne. And he has two methods of interfering against the prince; first indirectly, through the people or parliament, whom he may excite to throw off the authority of their prince, and to dethrone him; and secondly, in case this does not succeed, through want of power or want of will on the part of the people, then he must take a more direct method, and give the realm to some Catholic prince, or proclaim that the first man who can conquer it shall have it.

Stapleton did not adapt his theory to the beginning of the quarrel with Elizabeth, but to the situation, as he found it existing after the lapse of a few years; and at Rome his theory, though it was not based on the broad ground occupied by the Popes of that age, yet served quite as well as theirs for the course they were following. It did not signify whether a theologian declared them to have a direct, or only an indirect, right of interfering in the temporal affairs of other states, provided interference was defended; and Stapleton was as acceptable as a Bozius would have been, when his practical conclusion tallied so exactly with that of the most fervid adherents of the direct right of the Pope in temporal matters. His programme was carried out to the letter; and, indeed, he is mentioned by subsequent writers as one of those English divines on whose information Pius V. chiefly relied—Harding, Stapleton, Morton, and Webbe.

Pius V. then, knowing how his predecessor's attempts to send an agent to Elizabeth had failed, changed his plan, and began to address himself to the people; and for this purpose (I quote Dr. Sanders), in 1569, he sent Dr. Nicolas Morton into England, "to declare by Apostolic authority to certain illustrious and Catholic men, that Elizabeth, who then wore the crown, was a heretic, and therefore had lost all right to the dominion and power which she exercised upon the Catho-

lies, and might be properly treated by them as a heathen and publican; and that they henceforth owed no obedience to her laws or commands. By this declaration many of the higher classes were led not only to consult their own interest, but to consider by what means they could deliver their brethren from the tyranny of the heretics. And they hoped that all the Catholics would join them with all their forces in this pious design. But though the affair turned out contrary to their hopes, either because all the Catholics did not yet properly know that Elizabeth was legally declared a heretic, or because God had determined to punish still more heavily the revolt of England, yet their design was a praiseworthy one, and was by no means without a certain success."

The success attained was the rebellion of the great earls of the North, in 1559. Its failure did not discourage the English advisers of Pius V. They soon picked up a new leader, the Duke of Norfolk, whom they assumed to be a sound Catholic, and to whose standard they fondly expected the whole realm to rally; it only required that the Pope's pleasure and censure should be once authentically known to the Catholics, and there would be no place for resistance; and afterwards the whole difficulty might be settled by a marriage between the Duke of Norfolk and Queen Mary of Scotland.

Persuaded by these representations, which had more weight with the Pope than the prayers of Maximilian and other princes, who were likely at least to know something of the probable political issues of the course, Pius V. launched his Bull against Elizabeth, in which he reasserted in the strongest terms all the papal claims which had ever found their strongest antagonists in England. The Pope alone is appointed "prince over all nations and all realms, to pluck up, to destroy, to dissipate, to crush, to plant, and to build." The conduct of Elizabeth, the "pretended queen," is contrasted with that of her sister Mary, the "legitimate queen," of England, whose policy had made all foreign connection hateful even to the Catholics. Elizabeth is declared a heretic, and therefore excommunicate, and "deprived of her pretended right to the said kingdom, and all and every dominion, dignity, and privilege;" all her subjects are for ever absolved from all allegiance to her; all are commanded "not to dare to obey her, and her monitions, commands, and laws;" all who do so are anathematised with her.

This Bull, says Sanders, was obeyed by one or two Catholics (*unus et alter*), who sacrificed their lives in publish-

ing or asserting it. The rest, either because they did not acknowledge the legality of its publication, and observed that the neighbouring princes and commonwealths made no difference in their relations with the queen; or because, when Pius V. died, they did not know that his successor had renewed and confirmed the Bull; or, at least, through fear (though they alleged the former excuses),—remained in their obedience; and their opponents braved the whole thing as a bugbear to fright babes with.

A very able Catholic lawyer of the period will add to Sanders' list of reasons. "I have been often told," says William Barclay, "by noblemen and men of good life, that the divine precept of honouring kings had struck such deep root in their minds, that no Bulls or indulgences to the contrary could alleviate the scruples they felt, or give them a feeling of internal security in violating so clear and plain a precept of natural and divine right as the allegiance they owed and had sworn to their prince." And he represents the people telling the Pope, "that as he is not the superior of the king in temporals, he cannot forbid their temporal obedience to the king. He is but the interpreter, not the enactor, of the Divine law, and therefore his interposition is only requisite when something obscure has to be cleared up, not in cases which need no explanation. Therefore, when the command is "to render to Cæsar what is Cæsar's, and to God what is God's," and "to be subject and obedient to princes and powers," it is the Pope's business to define what is Cæsar's and what is God's, but not to forbid subjects to give any thing whatever to Cæsar, for this is not to interpret but to abrogate the law. To define that our obligation of obedience to the prince is comprised within the limits of temporal matters, while all spiritual affairs are reserved to the jurisdiction of the Vicar of Christ, or that no king is to be obeyed when he commands things contrary to the law of nature or of God, or to good manners, is the Pope's right; but when he merely commands men "in no way to obey their prince, or his monitions, commands, and laws," he cannot be obeyed, because this is not interpreting but annulling the divine precept, and beyond the papal power, as determined by the canons. The same reasoning applies still more strongly to the abrogation of allegiance. When men are commanded to withdraw their allegiance from a prince, because obedience to him may hinder their spiritual good, they may reply, that this evil is merely an accident, which may be lamentable, but cannot be hindered. God's command is to obey the prince "with patience in well-doing." If he misuses

his power, God will punish him ; his subjects may not transgress God's plain command for any presumed advantage. Again, the Pope's absolution from the oath of allegiance only breeds a scruple about his power ; for it is known that he cannot dispense with the Divine law. God commands obedience to the Pope in spiritual matters, to the king in temporal affairs. This obedience will still be paid in spite of the denunciations of the Bull, which are fearful enough ; but the fear of an unjust excommunication will never force people to do that which they know to be against the law of God." Sanders (whom Camden follows, p. 186) and Barclay are sufficient witnesses of the reasons which induced the Catholics of England to treat the Bull as a dead letter. That Campion shared the common opinions of his brethren I have, I think, made evident. Like them, he at least hesitated about the Bull ; he doubted whether it justified Catholics in throwing off their allegiance ; it put him into the same sceptical attitude which precluded any kind of decisive political partisanship.

Its effect on Elizabeth and her government was, on the other hand, most decisive. That persecution which drove Campion first from Ireland and then from England was the immediate result ; and within two years it had produced a crop of penal laws, the first instalment of that sanguinary code which in process of time nearly effaced the Catholic Church from this island. No wonder that Campion, when asked his opinion about the Bull, declared that it procured much severity in England, and the heavy hand of her majesty against the Catholics. But no representation that Campion could make was likely to procure the reversal of a policy that was carried out in spite of the most earnest remonstrances of the emperors and kings on whom the Popes chiefly depended.

I do not know whether Campion went so far as to think, with several Catholic politicians of the period, that Paul III., Paul IV., and Pius V. sacrificed the Church of this country to their desire of maintaining in their integrity all the temporal prerogatives exercised or claimed by their predecessors, and that if they had frankly relinquished that temporal suzerainty which was the chief ground of the hesitations of their adherents, they would have given confidence to their friends, and disarmed their merely political foes. As affairs were managed, they rendered simply impossible the coexistence of the government of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth with the obedience of their subjects to the supreme authority of the Pope ; and those princes had no

choice but either to abdicate, with the hope of receiving back their crowns, like King John, from the papal legate, or to hold their own in spite of the Popes, and in direct and avowed hostility to them. After the indications which those princes had already given, it must have been a singular view of human nature which could lead St. Pius V. to expect Elizabeth to take the first course, as he did, even so late as 1571.

This expectation of success, founded on the enthusiasm of the English exiles at Rome, is the real answer to the charge, that in this business the Popes showed themselves equally ignorant of the teachings of history, and forgetful of the principles which the canon law lays down, after St. Augustine, for the excommunication of mighty delinquents: "Censures do no good, except when the person censured has few followers. When the disease has seized multitudes, the good have no remedy but grief and groans; . . . otherwise in plucking up the tares they may chance to pull up the wheat also; . . . indeed, when the contagion of sin has infected a whole multitude, the severe discipline of Divine mercy is necessary; for counsels of separation are both futile and hurtful, and sacrilegious; for they become impious and proud, and cause more disturbance to the weak good than correction to the determined bad."

But the evil had spread too far, and so in endeavouring to preserve a temporal prerogative that had always been disputed, and had more often failed than succeeded in practice, while in theory it was open to grave objections, those Popes lost England to the faith, and were so far from securing the prerogative for which they contended, that in the controversy with France in the next century it was resigned, not without debate, but without any great struggle. If Henry VIII. and Elizabeth had been treated with the same delicacy and circumspection that Lewis XIV. experienced, the end might have been very different to what it was; and if Lewis had been treated like Henry VIII., the Eldest son of the Church would probably have proved as bad a churchman as the Defender of the Faith.

The long sojourn of Campion in Rome before he attempted to carry out his resolve of entering the Society of Jesus, is accounted for by the Society being then without a head, while its third great congregation was assembled to elect a successor to St. Francis Borgia, the third general, who had died October 1, 1572, very soon after Campion's arrival in the city, and exactly five months after the death of St. Pius V. The choice fell upon Everardus Mercurianus, of Liege, April 23, 1573; and a few days afterwards Cam-

pion presented himself as the new general's first postulant. No further trial of his vocation was required than the probation he had imposed upon himself; he was forthwith accepted; but as there was then no English "nation" in the Society, the various provincials disputed who should have him, and he was at last allotted to Lawrence Maggi, or Magius, of the Austrian province. "He was incredibly comforted," says Parsons, "with this battle of the provincials for the possession of his body, because he saw that he was no more his own man, but in the hands of others who, under God, would dispose of him better than he could do for himself; he was perfectly indifferent to all functions, and all countries; but as his own inclination was for a country where he might strive against heresy, he was glad that Bohemia had been allotted to him. He thought that England owed some reparation to a country which had been first infected by the disciples of Wicliffe."

Campion was a man of common opinions, which he could urge and adorn with all the resources of rhetoric and the wealth of eloquence, and was consequently more dependent on authority for his ideas than upon any depth of research or originality of thought, and must have hailed the new obedience he had undertaken as a happy deliverance from himself. In England he had held, as we have seen, the popular opinions upon the papal sovereignty which had been inherited by the English Catholics, through Sir Thomas More, from generations of politicians. At Douai he must have found these opinions treated as nearly heretical, and the contrary doctrines energetically preached; still we find him at Rome with his old opinions, refusing any political place that Cardinal Gesualdi had to offer, and taking refuge from the storms of debate in a society where all his energies might be devoted to his own religious perfection, and to those scholastic employments which he ever cultivated, even in the midst of his greatest religious difficulties. In this I trace the same character which so long drowned scruples at Oxford in various employments, good in themselves, but then used to put off that important inquiry which ever loomed threateningly upon his horizon. So now by his entrance into the Society of Jesus he adjourned, but he did not solve, the question of the temporal supremacy of the papal sovereignty, which was once again to confront him, and to claim a decision which he could not give though he was to die for refusing it.

The congregation of the Society came to an end in the middle of June 1573. Soon afterwards Magius, the Austrian provincial, with certain Spanish and German fathers, and

Campion, left Rome for Vienna, where they arrived in August; Campion was immediately sent on to Prague, where the novitiate then was, in the company of Father James Avellanedo, the newly-appointed confessor to the empress. This father was afterwards known to Parsons at Madrid, and often told him "how exceedingly he was edified in all that journey with the modesty, humility, sweet behaviour, and angelical conversation of F. Campion," for whose sake "he remained ever after much affectioned to our whole nation."

It would take me too far out of my way to trace the importation of the half political heresy of Wicliffe into Prague; its adoption and propagation there by John Huss; the tumults to which it led; the overthrow of the famous university, which, indeed, was a natural result of a doctrine which taught that "universities, studies, degrees, colleges, and professorships are pagan vanities, and of no more use to the Church than the devil;" and at last the persecution in which a remedy was sought for these evils, and which Campion thus defends: "Huss would not have been punished except the pestilent liar had been captured in the act of running away, which the Emperor Sigismund had forbidden him to do on peril of his life, and except he had violated the conditions which he had accepted from the Emperor, and had thus nullified his passport. Huss's malice was too hasty, and he was caught. He was commanded to present himself at Constance to answer for the barbarous tragedies he had enacted in his own land of Bohemia; he despised the prerogative of the council, he sought security from Cæsar; Cæsar signed the agreement, the Christian world, greater than Cæsar, rescinded it; the heresiarch would not repent; he perished. Jerome of Prague stole to Constance with nobody's protection. He was taken, he made his appearance, he spoke, he was treated with great kindness, he went freely wherever he liked, he was healed, he abjured his heresy; he relapsed, he was burnt."

Cochlæus, in the first quarter of the next century, had still to deplore the fall of the University of Prague, that had once been the boast of Bohemia, but also that of the Catholic religion, which was so low that it would be difficult for it ever to recover its ancient state. Still half a century passed, and in 1570 religion had made no advance; men doubted whether it ever could. The Bohemian Catholics were few, and all of the poorest classes; the only wealthy persons of that religion at Prague were the Italian merchants, who united in a confraternity to assist the priests. The emperor also was Catholic, and had sent the Jesuits to the town,

bidding them rely on his assistance in case of any tumults. But the influence of the new order was only gradually felt. The toil of all the labourers only produced a harvest of seventy souls in 1573, in 1574, of fifty; in 1575 a few apostate priests were reconciled, one or two Hussite ministers, and forty-three laymen; and so on till 1580, when the whole influence of the court was lent to them, and 584 converts responded to their call. That was the first year of any distinct significance. A few years before Campion had exclaimed, "Surely this commonwealth will either return, through God's mercy and the help of the saints, to the unity of the Roman Church, or else, through the wrath of God, Satan will triumph, and it will be overwhelmed in the thick and horrible darkness of new sects, and will perish." So evenly did the balance seem to hold itself. But within another fifty years the restoration of religion was carried out in such a rough-and-ready way as probably sowed the seeds of calamities still to come; for minds forced into acquiescence will always hand down the tradition of the original wrong, and future generations will avenge the persecution of their fathers. "In 1620," says Cardinal Carafa, "the delegates began to restore religion in Bohemia, first at Prague, where they were not entirely without success, though it fell short of their hopes; yet the people could not complain of want of instruction; every one might converse with a monk or a priest as long as he chose. But the people did not seem to want him; they were more impressed when some of the chief inhabitants were exiled: it was hard to leave their property, harder to leave their friends, hardest of all to be sent to live in an unknown place. Several of the higher classes were converted in this manner, and many of the stiffer religionists followed in their wake; but the rest, though forced to close their shops and to forego all trading, only sought to gain time, though every now and then some few became Catholic. The Archbishop's toil was strangely unproductive; many laid the blame on the Calvinists; but the Hussites and Lutherans were as slow: the real truth was, they were waiting to see which side would prevail, when Tilly's victory at the White Mountain put an end to their doubts." The Cardinal afterwards records how much easier it was found to convert the fanatical Calvinists and Lutherans of the Rhenish provinces than the indifferent people of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austria. For "it is easier to pass from one extreme to another than to move from the middle point of equilibrium. A conceited Calvinist or stiff Lutheran will sooner become Catholic than a lukewarm and easy

Lutheran, who always promises well, but never seriously inquires for the truth, for which he does not care."

Campion's first residence at Prague was of very short duration; within two months of his arrival there the novitiate, into which he had not yet made his formal entrance, was removed to Brünn in Moravia, a city where the prospects of Catholicism were even more gloomy than at Prague. The very names of Pope and Catholic were in execration; magistrates and people were alike Protestant, the latter riotous and unruly. The clergy of one of the great churches was Catholic, that of the other alternated between the two religions: in 1570 a single energetic Jesuit had been sent there, who continued to preach in spite of the tumults that his presence excited. But the Bishop of Olmütz, the diocesan, saw that one father was not sufficient for the work, and had therefore procured the removal of the novitiate from Prague to Brünn, in hopes of being able to utilise the exercises of the novices and the spare time of the fathers.

Accordingly, Oct. 10, 1573, John Paul Campanus, Master of Novices, and John Vivarius, his socius, conveyed Campion and five other novices from Prague to Brünn, where they were soon joined by six more from Vienna. But in the following January the Bishop died, and for ten years the establishment was in continual peril: its goods were seized, its funds confiscated, its members accused before the tribunals, and its suppression decreed by the emperor, though the commissioners would not promulgate the edict. But after much inconvenience and continual changes of residence, the foundation was gradually consolidated, and in process of time was able to erect an enormous college with seven quadrangles, now turned into a barrack.

Here Campion spent the year of his probation. One of the first acts required of him was to inscribe in the album or blank book of the novitiate certain particulars about himself, his family, and his education, as prescribed in the third and fifth chapters of the Constitutions of the Society. I have already extracted most of the details, so I shall only print here that which I have omitted. "I have a deliberate intention," he says, "of living and dying in this Society of Jesus. And this is my present determination, even although I had not determined it before, by no man's advice, but of my own proper motion. . . . I have a tolerably happy memory, an understanding sufficiently penetrating, and a mind inclined to study. For this purpose, as also for the other duties of the Society, I am tolerably robust." The rules of the Society were such as to make the novitiate an

institution of great power and influence in a town like Brünn. The "six experiments" can mostly be turned to missionary purposes. According to the rule, the novice was to spend one month in complete retirement, during which he was to perform St. Ignatius's spiritual exercises; another month was devoted to the hospitals, where he had to make himself a slave to the sick inmates; for another month he had to beg alms for the novitiate from door to door, and to learn to bear the insults and the practical jokes of vagabonds; for another month he had to take his turn in all the most menial employments of the house; and at least a month was to be spent in catechising children and ignorant persons, either publicly or privately. This was precisely that for which the Bishop of Olmütz wished to have the novitiate at Brünn; this exercise therefore superseded many of the others, and the novices were scarcely settled before their master began to send them round into all the neighbouring villages to teach the Catechism. All had great success, but Campion was ever noticed to be the most successful, and the villages around Brünn contained many converts that he had led to the Church.

To show with what hearty fervour Campion entered into these exercises, and how utterly he gave himself body and soul to the new life he had undertaken, I need only quote the two following letters, which he subsequently wrote to the novices at Brünn, after he had taken his vows, and had returned to the college at Prague.

"How much I love you in the bowels of Jesus Christ, my dearest brethren, you may conclude from this, that in spite of my daily occupations, which scarce leave me time to breathe, I have managed to steal time from the midst of my functions and cares to write to you. How could I do otherwise, directly I heard of a sure messenger to Brünn? How could I help firing up with the remembrance of that house, where there are so many burning souls, fire in their mind, fire in their body, fire in their words—the fire which God came to send upon the earth, that it might always burn there? O dear walls, that once shut me up in your company! Pleasant recreation-room, where we talked so holily! Glorious kitchen, where the best friends—John and Charles, the two Stephens, Sallitzi, Finnit and George, Tobias and Gaspar—fight for the saucepans in holy humility and charity unfeigned! How often do I picture to myself one returning with his load from the farm, another from the market; one sweating stalwartly and merrily under a sack of rubbish, another under some other toil! Believe me, my dearest brethren, that your dust, your brooms, your chaff, your loads, are beheld by angels with joy, and that through them they obtain more for you from God than if they saw in your hands sceptres, jewels, and purses of gold. Would that I

knew not what I say ; but yet, as I do know it, I will say it ; in the wealth, honours, pleasures, pomps of the world, there is nothing but thorns and dirt. The poverty of Christ has less pinching parsimony, less meanness, than the emperor's palace. But if we speak of the spiritual food, who can doubt that one hour of this familiar intercourse with God and with good spirits, is better than all the years of kings and princes ? I have been about a year in religion, in the world thirty-five ; what a happy change, if I could say I had been a year in the world, in religion thirty-five ! If I had never known any father but the fathers of the Society ; no brothers but you and my other brothers ; no business but the business of obedience ; no knowledge but Christ crucified ! Would that at least I had been as happy as you, who have entered the vineyard of Christ in the morning of your lives ! I almost envy Cantensis and Charles, who have been brought in so young that they can spend their childhood with the child Jesus, and can grow up with Him, and increase to the perfect strength of the fulness of Christ. Rejoice therefore, my brethren, at the good you enjoy, and at the greatness of the honour God has done you. Let the remembrance of this be ever present to you, to resist the devil, the world, the flesh, and the difficulties and storms of all temptations. If we are not very stupid and senseless, let us say from our hearts, 'It is no great thing that I should serve God ; but it is really a great thing that God should have willed to have me for a servant.' I thank you all most heartily for the extraordinary charity which I experienced when with you, and when away from you, by your letters and remembrances, and at my departure as I was setting off ; especially I thank Melchior—and who else is it that I named before ?—my dearest brother, my friendly rival, my compeer in the society, but how high above me in merits ! His letters gave me and will give me the greatest pleasure ; so did the things he spoke about in his two epistles. I will join with the Father Rector in drawing up a plan, and after the affair is set in order, I will write out the whole for him, before the feast of the Annunciation, I hope. Stephen the Hungarian said that he would write, but has never written a word. With my whole heart I congratulate George and Charles, who have lately made their vows. These are strong chains, my brethren, and most strongly do they bind you to our Lord. Who shall tear you from His hands ? Shall this triple cord be broken by that miserable devil who is so impotent that he could not even drown the swine without leave ? Who, then, is he that he should be able to overthrow the image of God ? Never can he do so, unless we ourselves blot out the image, and conspire with him to our own mischief. I have spent a long time in writing to you—is that the first bell for schools ? I must leave off ; and to-morrow is the feast, when I shall be fully occupied, so I don't think I shall be able to write more ; however, I will take the next opportunity. I thank my dearest brother Cantensis, whose letter gave me the greatest pleasure, and I thank my God who has given him so good a mind at his age. I received from him the pictures,

the Agnus Dei, and the relics of our holy father Ignatius—a great treasure, for which I return great thanks. I salute you all in Christ Jesus from the bottom of my soul. My last request is, that you would humbly beg F. Rector and F. Aquensis to pardon my long silence ; they must ascribe it to my fault, and not to my forgetfulness of their kindness to me. I commend myself to the prayers of you all. Farewell.

Prague, Feb. 26, 1575.”

“Although the words of men, my dearest brethren, ought to have much less weight and influence with you than that Spirit who without sound of words whispers in your ears, yet since this work of love is not altogether useless or unnecessary, your charity will cause you to receive this fraternal letter, the witness of my love and duty, with your usual kindness. I write not to you as though you required the spur, for wherever you go your hearts are ever set upon every virtue ; but that I, while I employ my time in writing to you may spur myself, and may enjoy the perfume of the remembrance of your affection, and may testify my affection towards you. And I would that as I speak, and as you perform, so you might speak and I perform. For I know what liberty there is in obedience, what pleasure in labour, what sweetness in prayer, what dignity in humility, what peace in conflicts, what nobleness in patience, what perfection in infirmity. But the difficulty is to reduce these virtues to practice. And this is your work, to run over a portion of your earthly course in the chariot of Paradise. I, as the poet says, will follow as I can, *non passibus equis*. My dearest brethren, our life is not long enough to thank Christ for revealing these mysteries to us. Which of us would have believed, unless He had called him and instructed him in this school, that such thorns, such filth, such misery, such tragedies, were concealed in the world under the feigned names of goods and pleasures ? Which of us would have thought your kitchen better than a royal palace ? your crusts better than any banquet ? your troubles than others’ contentment ? your conflicts than their quiet ? your crumbs than their abundance ? your vileness than their triumphs and victories ? For I ask you whether, if you could all your lives, as they would like, feed your eyes on spectacles, and changes of scene and of company, your eyes would be the stronger ? If you fed your ears with news, would they be the fuller ? If you gave your mind its lusts, would it be richer ? If you fed your body with dainties, could you make it immortal ? This is their blunder who are deceived by vanities, and know not what a happy life means. For while they hope and expect great things, they fancy they are making vast progress, and not one in a hundred obtains what he dreamed ; and if perchance one obtains it, yet after making allowance for his pains, and his loads of care, the slipperiness of fortune, his disgraceful servility, his fears, plots, troubles, annoyances, quarrels, crimes, which must always accompany and vex the lovers of the world, he will doubtless find himself to be a very base

and needy slave. One sigh of yours for heaven is better than all their clamours for this dirt; one colloquy of yours, where the angels are present, is better than all their parties and debauched drinking-bouts, where the devils fill the bowls. One day of yours consecrated to God is worth more than all their life, which they spend in luxury. My brethren, run as you have begun; acknowledge God's goodness to you, and the dignity of your state. Can any pomp of kings or emperors, any grandeur, any pleasure, I will not say equal, but even shadow forth your honour and consolation? They (I speak of the good among them) fight under Christ their king, with their baggage on their back; you are eased of your burdens, and are called with the beloved disciple to be familiar followers of your Lord. They are admitted to the palace, you to the presence chamber; they to the common pasture, you to the choicest banquets; they to friendship, you to love; they to the treasury, you to the special rewards. Think what difficulties they have who even live as they ought in this naughty world; then you will more easily see what you owe to His mercy in calling you out of infinite dangers into His society. How hard it is for them to follow Christ when He marches forth in haste against His enemies, who have wives in their bosoms, children on their shoulders, lands on their backs, cares on their heads, whose feet are bound with cords, whose spirits are well-nigh smothered. Is not your happiness great, whom the King marshals by His side, covers with His cloak, clothes and honours with His own livery? What great thing is it for me to have left friends for Him who left heaven for me? What great thing for me to be a servant to my brethren, when He washed the feet of the traitor Judas? What wonder if I obey my fathers, when He honoured Pilate? What mighty thing for me to bear labours for Him who bore His cross for me? What disgrace if I a sinner bear to be rebuked, when He an Innocent was curst, spit upon, scourged, wounded, and put to death? Whenever we look into the glass, my brethren, we see clearly that the temptation of no pleasure, the fear of no pain, should pluck us from the arms of such a Master. You see I have nearly filled my paper, though I have plenty to do; it is time to check myself, and to remit you to that Teacher who by His sacred influences can impress these things much more strongly than I can on your minds. Hear Him, for He hath the words of eternal life.

For my part, I kiss not you only, but the prints of your footsteps, and I beg you to give a poor needy wretch an alms of the crumbs that fall from your table.

Prague, Feb. 19th 1577."

Such was the spirit in which he performed these services, "poor in seeming, rich in fruit, and in discipline for minds elated with success; they break the assaults of pride, they dispel the fanciful clouds of vanity, and remind poor unstable humanity of its worthlessness and mortality. To visit the hospitals, to attend to the sick, to follow them to their graves;

to endure the peevishness of the sufferers, their dirt, their groans, their stink ; and to learn to feel horror and disgust at no poison, no filth, no corruption but the filth of sin." In these exercises the political difficulties of Campion were not solved, but overshadowed for the time by the overwhelming importance of the business of religion. For grace does not supplant nature, nor dispense with the necessity of worldly prudence and common sense.

R. S.

Correspondence.

CATHOLIC EDUCATION.

SIR,—As you are desirous that the educational controversy may close as soon as possible, I will not introduce any new matter into my present letter, but will confine myself to answering the objections which have been brought against me by your March correspondents.

I will not even attempt so much as this, in regard to the preliminary question, how far the discussion itself is legitimate and permissible. On this, as it is unhappily no longer a matter for practical debate, I will make but one remark. Your March correspondents are all for the affirmative answer to this question ; though one of them, "F.," with some reserve and hesitation. Yet none of them has attempted a reply to my very intelligible inquiry. If the course which has been taken be indeed defensible, would it be equally defensible, I asked, that some anonymous correspondent should argue against the celibacy of the clergy ? If these writers think *not*, they should lay down some clear mark of distinction between the two cases. But if they think that such a letter *would* be defensible, let them expressly say so.

I turn, however, to the actual controversy : and at starting, I must comment on the few lines now contributed by "X. Y. Z." He first complains that I "have carefully omitted to discuss that part of his letter which refers to classical studies, and thereby done grave injustice to his argument and himself." From his mode of expression in the remainder of his sentence, your readers may have derived an impression, which I am confident he never intended to convey. They may have thought, that a considerable part of his two letters was occupied with the advocacy of classical studies ; and that my non-reference to those studies must have originated therefore in some reluctance to express my own opinion. But the fact is far otherwise. In his first letter he does not make any allusion whatever to classics ; and in his second, out of seventeen pages there are not three which refer to them directly or indirectly. Nor indeed was any more detailed notice of them to be expected. He wished to comment on certain particulars, in which he considered the

seminary system to be mistaken and injurious. But on classical studies he had no fault to find with that system ; and it would have been strange, therefore, had he said much about them. His comparative silence, however, accounts for mine. As the classics were not included in his assault on the seminary system, so neither were they in my defence of it. Afterwards, finding that my omission of the subject had led to misconception on my real convictions, I stated those convictions, in a letter addressed to the Catholic newspapers, with the greatest clearness which a due regard for brevity would permit. I have no wish whatever to keep back any part of what I think. On the contrary, if any person for a practical purpose wishes to know my opinion on any point on which I have formed one, I shall be only too delighted to express it.

"X. Y. Z.'s" second remark is, that "in nearly every reference to his letters I have more or less misconstrued, in some cases quite metamorphosed, their actual drift." He by no means implies that such misrepresentation has been intentional ; and I can assure him that I took the greatest pains to understand him rightly. At the same time, where divergence is so extreme as between him and myself, it is no easy matter for either of us to understand the other. I most cordially, therefore, second "X. Y. Z.'s" entreaty, that readers "will judge him by what he has himself written, and by that alone." I have already urged this in private, on one or two persons who had read my letter but not his ; and I will only add, that in the request which he now puts forth, he is but asking the commonest justice.

I felt it my duty, for various reasons, in my former letter to state fully and openly the unfavourable judgment which I had formed, on his propositions whether expressed or implied. I did this, however, fully expecting at his hands a vigorous and unsparing reply. Now that "personal reasons" have led him to retire from the controversy, I shall not be misconstrued if I adopt a different procedure. It will be absolutely necessary, indeed, in order to make clear the meaning of various statements in my January letter, that I should refer pretty frequently to the sense in which I had understood him ; but I will abstain most carefully from any attempt to argue for the correctness of my impression, or to fasten on him any view which he may wish to disclaim. Since the promotion of truth (so far as I am aware) is my one end in the whole controversy, it would be a simple pleasure to be convinced that he approaches, more nearly than I had supposed, to what I consider a sound view of the case : except, indeed, so far as my pleasure would be alloyed by deep regret at having judged him unfairly.

"X. Y. Z." further alludes to the fact, that my letter was more than double the length of his. Yet the real difficulty was, to prevent it from being much longer still. Surely it will be admitted by all, without any personal reference whatever to "X. Y. Z.," that in regard to any deeply important institution or principle, a plausible attack may be immeasurably more brief, than a satisfactory

defence can possibly be made. Take, *e. g.*, the rule of clerical celibacy, to which I just now referred. A very few pages would amply suffice, to state the obvious objections to that law of the Church in a most telling and powerful way. Yet how many pages would be enough for expressing, with any kind of adequacy, its deep and solid grounds of defence?

The remarks, which I have to make on your other correspondents, will naturally arrange themselves under three heads. First, I will consider what was the real point at issue; secondly, I will treat those objections which have been made against my general course of argument; and thirdly, those which have been made against my individual arguments one by one. First, then, what was the real point at issue? or, in other words, what was the precise thesis which I undertook to maintain?

In every human institution which has been formed with deep wisdom for some important end, if it continue for any considerable time, there will be frequent alternations between a period of comparative torpor and a period of active revival. Those who have originally devised the various details have passed away; and they are succeeded, perhaps, by others, far less clear-sighted in their views, and far less energetic in their character. These men are often worthy and excellent in their generation; they keep together in substance the system which they have inherited; and a considerable amount of substantial good quietly proceeds under their direction. But since they are not the persons to fix their gaze firmly and perseveringly on the desired end, and still less to discriminate among the various means conducive to that end, the good is alloyed by very serious evils. Various usages and habits are allowed by degrees to rise up, accidentally and at random, which are out of harmony with the spirit of the whole; and no serious attempt is made at progress in that vitally important task, the adapting old principles to new facts, the changing what is transitory and accidental in order the better to preserve what is permanent and essential. These men in their turn are succeeded by others, more congenial in spirit with the original founders; and thus this alternation proceeds, of which I spoke at starting.

Now whether such an institution be going through a period of torpor or a period of revival, in either case there are certain principles at work, which the most superficial observer will recognise as essential parts of its very idea. Still more will these be so recognised by one trained under its shadow. Such a man, even if Providence have cast his lot in the worst days of the institution, is able most readily to discriminate, between the principles themselves and their exceptional abuse or corruption. Nay his very appreciation and love of them may make him unduly impatient of their inadequate realisation. Meanwhile another man of different character regards with hostility these very principles themselves. In this manner there arises the well-known and world-wide distinction, between the conservative and the revolutionary reformer; between

him who would strengthen an existing institution by the more effective application of its recognised principles, and him who would overthrow it altogether and build another on its ruins. And often it happens that the conservative and revolutionary reformer, to their own great discomposure, are thoughtlessly confounded with each other, and placed in the same category; whereas either of them would greatly prefer the *status quo* itself, to such changes as his more extreme opponent would desire to introduce.

These remarks apply no less to the Church's seminaries than to other institutions. And if I had understood "X. Y. Z." to write as a conservative reformer of them,—if I had understood him merely to raise the question whether their recognised principles had been effectively carried out,—I should have felt myself wholly incompetent to take a part in the discussion. I have no personal knowledge of any seminary in Europe except one; and I suppose the extremest advocate of free discussion will hardly expect me to put forth a public criticism, on the practical excellences or defects which may be discernible in that particular college. But I understood "X. Y. Z." most differently. If there are two principles which (more than almost any others) would be admitted by the most casual observer as characteristic of Catholic seminaries, these would be the two: that youths are to be trained in the ecclesiastical spirit, (1) by the direct and constant agency of superiors; and (2) by a strict check on their reading of miscellaneous literature.* I understood "X. Y. Z." to protest against both these principles, as productive of the gravest evils; and accordingly to this controversy of *principle* I confined my argument. I applied myself to this question: in the ordinary diocesan seminaries, is it desirable that these two principles shall be religiously preserved, and that any necessary reform shall take the shape of carrying them out more vigorously, discriminatingly, consistently? Or is it rather preferable, that the principles themselves shall be abandoned, and superseded by those others which are suggested in their stead?

Your correspondent "S. A. B. S.," however, takes quite a different view of the point at issue. He considers that I "defend things as they are, or as they are supposed to be." "The question proposed," he says, "was, whether the education . . . that is given in Catholic colleges and seminaries . . . is altogether satisfactory in its results;" and he adds in effect that I gave an affirmative answer to this question. Yet it is really difficult to imagine, how I could have expressed myself more clearly than in the following passage, with which I conclude my whole reasoning. "I have only aimed at treating *part* of the question: 'X. Y. Z.' has attacked the fundamental principles on which the whole Catholic system of ecclesias-

* So, on one of these particulars, the *Quarterly Review*: "The Roman Catholic ideal, which is developed in its greatest perfection in their priestly seminaries, is to bring the mind of the ruling power to bear with the greatest, the most constant, and the most equable force, on the will and the intellect of its subjects." October 1860, p. 404.

tical training is founded, . . . and I have wished therefore . . . to illustrate and defend them. There is, of course, another totally different question, that of *fact*; how far this or that seminary . . . is conducted effectively *upon* those principles" (p. 271). But indeed I had implied the same thing throughout the letter. Thus "X. Y. Z." alleged (as I understood him) a certain very defective method of enforcing discipline, as prevalent in England. I did not attempt to argue the question of *fact*: I said that such a method would be "disastrous;" and that it would be "a most serious practical corruption, clamouring for reform;" but I added that "no seminary ever advocated it *on principle*" (p. 241). Here is the very distinction between the *theory* and the possible *practice*. On quite a different matter, I say that if a certain allegation be true, "it is a mere practical corruption requiring reform" (p. 246). I also "agreed heartily" with "X. Y. Z." "wherever he argues on the great desirableness that Catholic views and principles should be brought far more efficiently into contact with the general current of thought than is now the case" (p. 264). And I advocated a very important practical change, as conducive to this purpose. Is all this the language of one, who is simply wishing to "defend things as they are"?

In regard also to those various criticisms, which your correspondent "F." has made on me in so kind a spirit, I think he will find that most of them are sufficiently answered, by this account of the thesis which I was maintaining. And he will admit, I am sure, (whatever weight your other two correspondents may attach to the fact), that this thesis is of especial importance at the present time; since on two solemn occasions the English Episcopate has publicly expressed the strongest wish, that a much closer approximation to the full seminary system shall be carried out in England, than has hitherto been the case.*

The next matter which I am to consider, is the general course of argument pursued in support of my thesis. The objections to this will be exclusively found in the letter of "S. A. B. S.;" but they arise so simply from his misapprehension of that thesis, that any detailed criticism is unnecessary. Fortunately, indeed, for me, he has given an illustration of his meaning. He calls the seminary system "a system which educates men for zeal and devotion, and keeps them aloof from the movements of thought;" he refers to

* The first Synod of Oscott speaks thus (cap. 26): "*Summopere religionis augmento profuturum putamus, si seminaria, in quibus seorsim educarentur clerici, possent fundari.*" These acts have received the papal sanction.

The acts of the third Synod have not yet come from Rome: but in their "synodical letter" to the whole English Church, the Bishops there assembled thus express themselves: "For this we have determined to labour, for this (if it please God) to suffer, until we see accomplished the strong desire, or rather fulfilled the wise injunctions, of the holy Council of Trent, that each diocese should have its own seminary; episcopal in name and in character, dear to the Bishop as the apple of his eye, and jealously reserved to his own superintendence."

some statement of the immense practical evils which have followed from this; and he adds, that "the reply given" by me "to this statement has been drawn, not from facts, but from principles." Why, I fully *concur* in the statement; how, then, could I possibly think of *replying* to it at all, whether by means of facts *or* principles? I have no doubt whatever that results, the most extensively pernicious, must ensue from any such system as "S. A. B. S." describes; though I have no means of forming any definite opinion, how far it is true that the French seminaries adopt it. So far as England is concerned, I ventured, in my former letter, to make two practical suggestions, for the express purpose of averting so calamitous a state of things. First, I urged it as "very desirable . . . that a certain select number of priests should be duly prepared to cope with the great questions of the day; to help in fixing our controversial position; and to influence the most highly educated, whether of Catholics or Protestants" (p. 264). If these priests were trained "to cope with the great questions of the day," I suppose they would not be "kept aloof from the movements of thought." Moreover, the influence of such priests would make itself felt in every corner of the diocese: and nowhere more than in the seminary; for they could form the most trustworthy possible judgment, on the special qualifications to be desired for ordinary priests. This, then, was one of my proposals; and another was, that the whole subject of contemporary popular literature should be systematically treated in our ordinary diocesan seminaries (p. 258).

But perhaps "S. A. B. S." would mean to say, that the seminary principle, of prohibiting all indiscriminate perusal of worldly books, is in itself incompatible with a priest's requisite intellectual cultivation. If this be his allegation, any one who has read the remarks on literature, which I made in your January number, will understand the grounds on which I confidently deny that allegation. But as your correspondent "Derlax" has taken great exception to those remarks, I must rejoin in a later portion of this letter. When I come, therefore, to that portion, I will incorporate my answer to "S. A. B. S." with my answer to "Derlax." Meanwhile, on the question *immediately* before us, viz. the objections raised by the former to my *general* course of reasoning, I have said what is abundantly sufficient for their refutation.

I pass, then, from my general course of reasoning, to my individual arguments. And here my chief opponent will be "Derlax;" though there must be one or two occasional allusions to "F." also.

The first question is the suitable relation between superiors and students. "Derlax" says that "the real point of the discussion" turns on "the relative claims of the public and private school system;" and I most fully accept his statement. I gave, in my former letter, what I believed to be a true account of the system pursued in Protestant public schools; and after my remarks were in your printer's hands, I found my statement more than corroborated by one of the most unexceptionable possible witnesses, an able writer

in the *Saturday Review*. The theory of public schools, I said, was this, that "students should be left without the presence of superiors for a very considerable portion of each day" (p. 239). "The separation of masters from boys," I added (p. 244), "is no accident of that system ; it is the one fundamental idea, on which it is founded, and on which it is defended. Those who praise those institutions boast that a Protestant youth is really educated for his future position ; that he learns the invaluable art of pushing himself forward in the world, and holding his own, from the very fact that at school he is *obliged* to hold his own ; that he has practically no appeal to the masters, and must trust therefore for defence to his own courage and spirit. *To introduce the familiar intercourse of masters and boys would simply be to revolutionise the whole.*" The *Saturday Reviewer* colours the picture still more highly. "Boys, like nations, can only attain to the genuine self-reliance which is true manliness, by battling for themselves against their difficulties, and forming their own character. . . . The object of a public school is *to introduce a boy early into the world*, that he may be trained in time for *the struggle which lies before him* ;" that is, the struggle not for a heavenly but an earthly prize. "At public schools, as they now are, a boy lives *subject to a law whose provisions he knows beforehand*, and to a public opinion which he himself has a share in forming. He enjoys a freedom, limited indeed and provisional, but genuine as far as it goes : and as other boys enjoy the same freedom, he must expect to be bullied and fagged by those who are stronger than himself, and to be misled by those who are deeper than himself. . . . *But the moment the master begins to supervise his manners and pursuits out of school, the whole character of the institution is changed*" (Dec. 8, 1860). On the other hand, according to the seminary theory, the students are never, or hardly ever, left simply to themselves ; they are in the constant society, either of the superiors, or of others "commissioned by the superiors, imbued with their spirit, and enjoying their confidence." Every one must see at once, that the difference between these two opposite systems is as deep and radical an opposition of *principle* as can possibly be imagined. The latter is a parental, the former a constitutional, government : the students of a seminary are theoretically regarded, as spiritual children, the objects of tender and discriminating love ; the inmates of a public school are theoretically regarded, as free and independent citizens, subject only to a code of laws, which is, however, fixed, definite, and inflexible. The reasons for immeasurably preferring our own system to the Protestant are, I think, most numerous and unanswerable : but as I am not to introduce any new matter, I will confine myself to the vindication of those which I assigned in my last letter. And first, on far the most important.

The object, dearer to the Church in a youth's education than all the rest put together, is the preservation of purity ; nor need I add a word on its peculiar necessity in those who are trained for celibacy. In regard to this virtue, "Derlax" takes up a position, which no one

could have expected in a Catholic. He says, "it is unhappily too true, that the sacred virtue of purity is little prized and seldom pursued by the majority of Protestant boys and youth, wherever they may be" (p. 413). Since, therefore, "Derlax" was educated at a public school (p. 412), he was educated among youths, the majority of whom little prized purity, and seldom preserved it.* It is difficult for a Catholic to imagine a more hapless lot, than that of one who, at the most impressible period of his life, is exposed without protection to so foul an atmosphere. What, then, is our amazement, when we find that "Derlax," at this moment calmly viewing the past, says, "I spent there some of the happiest, and (*I hope*) most profitable, years of my life"! The only mode one can imagine of spending a "profitable" time at such a place, would be to live all the more exclusively to God, because of the awful perils ever externally imminent. But "Derlax" is led by experience to recommend these horrible institutions for our imitation. What his meaning therefore can be in the above sentiment, I am at a loss to think.

Let us consider the question, however, simply on its own grounds. And if your readers are disposed to think such a question not very fit for public discussion, let them remember how such discussion has become necessary. When a revolutionary change is publicly advocated, it is necessary that its opponents should *as* publicly state the evils which they anticipate as its certain result. It happens again and again, that painful things must be said, if we wish to struggle against evil things being done.

It is undeniable, then, that the constant intercourse of youths with each other, unchecked by the presence of those in authority, tends most powerfully to result in evil imaginations, and through them in external sin. It is undeniable, that even in the case of laymen such actions and imaginations, if long permitted during the period of youth, throw a blight over the whole later earthly existence. It is undeniable, that in the case of those trained to celibacy they are so overwhelmingly calamitous, that no proposed advantage could offer the slightest compensation. If any writer on ecclesiastical education wishes to revolutionise that system, which is our present protection for clerical purity, the first, the second, the third thing which we should expect from him would be, that he be most express, most earnest, most anxious, in explaining the safeguard which he suggests in substitution. I wish I could see in "Derlax's" letter any due stress on the preëminent and unapproached importance of this virtue in ecclesiastical students. I can find, indeed, but one suggestion on the subject: he says that "Confession would do more to purge the moral atmosphere . . . than the most skilfully-devised system of" surveillance. Here, however, at all events is a definite statement; let us endeavour, therefore, to appreciate its value. And I am confident that my only difficulty in the argument consists in the strength of my case. The very completeness with which the

* When, indeed, it is said that the "majority seldom" preserved it, I suppose it is meant that *few* preserved it.

present system does its work in the matter of purity, will make it most difficult, for those trained under it, to imagine the possibility of such a picture as I am about to draw.

It is strange that two of your correspondents criticise me as building up a theory irrespectively of facts, when one of the two is so egregious an offender in that very way. The seminary system has at least had in its favour, on this particular head, the experience of several centuries : for no one will deny that, on the whole, clerical purity has resulted under it most extensively. But as to "Derlax's" proposal, in what quarter of the world has any thing like it been ever attempted? He is calling on our Bishops to abandon a mode of discipline, which long experience has proved to be most successful in securing this all-important requisite ; he is calling on them to adopt in its stead another system most violently opposed ; and all this on mere faith in his own utterly unverified and most paradoxical theory.*

In Protestant schools there are several youths, no doubt, who have really a wish to preserve unsullied purity, but find the greatest moral obstacles in the way of complete success. Such youths, I grant, would receive inestimable benefit, from the Sacrament of Penance and free communication with a confessor. But "the majority" of these youths, as "Derlax" himself tells us, "prize" that virtue but little, and are very indifferent therefore to its attainment. How these would be benefited by having access to sacramental Confession, it passes my comprehension to understand. Let us endeavour, however, to trace the results of "Derlax's" proposal in a Catholic seminary. I will make, then, the impossible supposition, that some Catholic Bishop has adopted it, and that in his seminary the system of surveillance has come to an end. I will further suppose that some four or five years have elapsed, and that accordingly the spirit generated by the old discipline has had full time to evaporate. Some youth, whose imagination is already polluted, obtains entrance. Under the existing system, if at all effectively carried out, it will be impossible for him to begin corrupting the rest, without speedy detection and expulsion ; but this is the very provision which, by hypothesis, will have been abolished. Some of the boys are shocked, and betake themselves the more earnestly to prayer and the Sacraments ; but a considerable and ever-increasing number gladly and eagerly imbibe the poison. How is this to be prevented? As things are now, even those boys who most heartily detest tale-bearing on other matters, regard it as a sacred duty to inform the superiors, if impurity in any shape is beginning to spread ; nor (whatever the college discipline) could any Catholic confessor give them absolution, unless they promised to do so. It is one of the innumerable advantages derived from surveillance, that this most heavy and trying

* This combination *on paper* of two elements, so grotesquely heterogeneous as the public school and the Confessional, can only remind a sober thinker of the well-known passage : "humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam," &c.

obligation is but rarely imposed on the boys : for the superiors themselves so soon become acquainted with whatever passes. "Derlax" would wish, perhaps, to revolutionise that doctrine of Catholic morality, which *imposes* the indefeasible obligation of thus warning superiors. But unless he is able to do so, in what does his scheme result? He is resolved that a superior shall not be a "spy" over the students ; and in order to avoid this, he brings about a state of things, in which they are under the strict obligation of being informers against each other.

"Derlax" himself would admit, I am perfectly certain, that such a check to impurity as would be obtained by a superior's surveillance, is bought at the price of far less evil, than that which would result from the repeated and habitual information of students against each other. Since, therefore, he wishes the former to be removed, much more must he desire a complete absence of the latter. What, then, would be the course of events on such a supposition? It is notorious that the one hope of successful conflict against the evil which we are now considering, is to take it in time. "*Principiis obsta : serò medicina paratur, cùm mala per longas convaluère moras.*" But under these circumstances it will be *impossible* "*obstare principiis.*" The evil will have risen to a terrible height,—our wicked students will have gone on day after day, week after week, delighting in these evil imaginations,—before its existence is even suspected by the ruling body. The confessors, indeed, will have arrived at an early knowledge of what is going forward ; but they must not give the slightest hint, outside the sacred Tribunal, of the knowledge which they have there obtained. They will impose on their penitents the obligation of revealing such facts to the superiors ; but this, as we have seen, is a circumstance which "Derlax" would regard as a greater evil than surveillance itself. Nay, as to those superiors who are themselves confessors, it will be impossible for them to take any steps whatever in the matter, whether sooner or later, out of the Confessional : for (1) they cannot distinguish between the knowledge which they have gained *in* confession and *out* of it ; and, (2) even if they could, since they disavow all surveillance, they would always be *suspected* of acting on their sacramentally-acquired information. A more deadly blow than this last would be, to the whole practice of sacramental Confession, it is impossible to imagine. Still, through the increasing paucity of confessions, the other superiors will in time begin to suspect, that some very serious evil is at work : though even then they will be altogether ignorant of its precise nature ; and will not be able even to guess, as to the relative demerits of those, who have for some time been absent from Confession.

I say, then, (1) that before they have arrived even at this general suspicion, the evil will have reached most alarming dimensions. I now ask, (2) What steps will it be possible for them to take? The only remedy which "Derlax" even suggests, is the Sacrament of Penance ; but how is this remedy to be brought into practical ope-

ration ? I see nothing for it, except to put earnestly before a student that he cannot be ordained hereafter, unless he is now regular at Confession ; or, in other words, that his whole future earthly prospects depend on it. Here, then, is the issue of this ingenious scheme ! All his ordinary life out of school is to pass on the free-and-easy method, without external surveillance ; *the one* vigorous discipline, exercised on him by superiors, is to thrust him, as it were by main force, into the Confessional.

We are treating the case, it will be remembered, of youths who, by this time, will have become reckless and abandoned in sinful thoughts and habits. Without their sincere and efficacious repentance, without their radical change of heart, the Sacrament avails them nothing ; nay, according to the great majority of theologians, there is no Sacrament at all. Can any thing be more improbable, than that such change of heart will be produced, by the mere fact of finding themselves pushed (as it were) into the presence of a Confessor ? Several would probably refuse to enter the Confessional, and would give up all intention of being ordained. Others would plainly tell the priest that they have no sufficient dispositions ; nor can he take any notice of this, out of Confession. Others will be driven to sacrilegious Confession ; and these will take refuge in the sophism, which prevails extensively among Protestant youths in the matter of enforced "communion," that the responsibility is on the shoulder of those, who have put upon them this stringent pressure.

And this is actually the scheme for preserving ecclesiastical purity, which has been devised by one who piques himself on being "practical," and who complains of me for being "ideal" and theoretical !

It has been suggested to me, that some may regard my remarks as disparaging to the Sacrament of Penance. Let me use, then, an obvious illustration. I maintain most earnestly, that the one divinely-appointed type of education is the parental relation. This simple statement will of itself suffice, to meet the few plausible objections which may be made against the seminary system. For instance, it is sometimes thought that the constant intercourse of superiors and students would produce so much restraint, as to be inconsistent with that affectionate relation which is so desirable. Do we find this, I ask, between parent and child ? On the contrary, the good parent checks external evil by his presence, and inflicts punishment where it is found necessary, while yet inspiring the most affectionate confidence by his whole demeanour.* I will apply this illustration,

* Lancicius, the well-known Jesuit writer, has a beautiful treatise, "*De Conditionibus boni Superioris*," in which the parental relation is throughout taken as the true model. He remonstrates with those superiors who "*loco paterni amoris*" exhibit "*novercalem asperitatem et pompaticam quandam gravitatem*" (n. 11). He protests against any unwillingness to grant a subject some indulgence, which he may regard as necessary to his health ; such unwillingness being grounded on the supposition, that he *fancies* himself ill for the sake of self-indulgence. Lancicius points out how differently *parents* act (n. 72). He tells superiors that when any subject is accused to them

then, to the objection before us. Suppose some parent were to act on the principles so graphically described in the *Saturday Review*; suppose he were to take care indeed that his children attend regularly at certain hours of study, but were to abstain altogether from "super-vising their manners and pursuits out of school." On remonstrance being made, he replies, that no serious evil can ensue; for that he himself escorts them to Confession, once a fortnight or once a month as the case may be. Various comments on his conduct are imaginable: one comment is *not* imaginable; viz. that he is favourably distinguished from other parents, by his greater value and reverence for the Sacrament of Penance.

So much on this primary virtue of purity. The other dispositions, which I mentioned as the end of ecclesiastical training, were such as these: constant recollectedness; the practically recognising interior perfection as *the* one really valuable attainment; burning love of souls; deep sense of sin (p. 241). I gave reasons for my opinion, that towards such an end the seminary system is the only possible means. So little has "Derlax" attempted any *argument* against me on this head, that I cannot even guess which premiss of my syllogism he denies. Does he deny that such *are* the ends of ecclesiastical training? or does he assert that the public school will achieve such ends? I doubt if this last proposition be maintained by any one; I am quite confident that all the more prominent defenders of public schools would as earnestly repudiate it as I should myself. It cannot be repeated too often: the real question between seminaries and public schools, is not one of means, but of ends.

It remains to speak of college rules. The public school leaves students to themselves out of study time, and inflicts punishment when transgression of rule is discovered; but the seminary aims at establishing so close a surveillance, that transgression of rule shall be almost impossible. Each acts conformably with its own end. It is held in seminaries to be an important means of sanctification, that the student should obey these rules for God's sake; and it is of great moment, therefore, to remove, as far as possible, the temptation to break them.

Surveillance, then, it appears, is of two different kinds. First, there is what we may call external surveillance, as in the case of purity and of college rules; where the end desired, is to guard against certain external acts or words: and secondly, there is moral surveillance; where the end desired, is to implant, by means of influence and example, a certain interior spirit. In answer to "F.," I will add, that the former should become gradually less, in proportion as the students are trained in conscientious habits; whereas the latter

of any offence, they should at once inform him of the accusation, and ask for *his* account of the matter (n. 76). I wish I had room for longer extracts from this admirable work; for a very influential member of the Society told me, that it is quite recognised as containing their true principles of government. Now Jesuit seminaries, more than any others, have been suspected of the "police" or "regimental" administration, which is so different from the parental.

should be even more assiduously brought into operation, in dealing with the more matured. On the true method of influencing youths, I must express my unreserved and most hearty agreement with "F." There has been no more important contribution to the controversy, I think, than his treatment of this matter, both in this and in his former letter. I quite admit, also, that during those periods of comparative torpor which I mentioned at starting, there will ever be a tendency to certain grave mistakes in connexion with surveillance. I mean particularly, such as the aiming at mere external regularity and the exclusion of gross sin, without any constant effort towards discriminating character and training carefully the interior man. "F." thinks that in my former letter I ignored the possibility of such development; but, on the contrary, I spoke of it as "disastrous," and as "a most serious practical corruption which clamours for reform" (p. 241). No one can be more alive than I am to its great injuriousness; yet the arguments, which I have stated in this and in my former letter, lead me most confidently to this conclusion. Take the worst corruption of the seminary system which is practically possible: I am sure that, for the real ends of ecclesiastical education, it is immeasurably superior to the public school in its highest perfection.

"F." further asks my opinion on the case of lay students; and as I think that none of your correspondents has hit the exact point of distinction between lay and clerical education, I will briefly respond to his inquiry. Before the clerical student, it is perfectly safe, and therefore most desirable, to display a high standard of perfection, and urge it earnestly on his acceptance. If the worst comes to the worst, he falls back into the rank of laymen, and the Church is saved from the calamity of an indevout priest. But the lay student has no inferior position on which he *can* fall back; and if too much religious admonition is attempted, there is the greatest fear lest he abandon in disgust all attempt at avoiding mortal sin. Yet it is most desirable that those lay students, who are willing to coöperate more fully with the solicitations of grace, should have adequate scope and guidance. This, therefore, is the great practical end to be borne in view: to make higher views and rules of life readily accessible, without importunately obtruding them. But happy at last is the parent, whose children are called to the higher state and correspond to the call! And this whole consideration gives great argumentative support to the solemn declaration of the Holy Father, in union with the English Bishops, that it would conduce *extremely* (*summopere*) to the increase of religion, if seminaries could be founded in which clerics should be separately educated.

Let us next proceed to the second matter at issue, the treatment of the affections: and here "Derlax" saves me some trouble, by arguing ably in behalf of my conclusion. I maintained that "our existing system affords both great scope and great encouragement to the healthy development of human affection" (p. 247). I protested against what I understood to be "X. Y. Z.'s" statement,

that those who have warm human affections are on that account in a lower state of perfection. And I further explained, that the rules against "particular friendships," so far as I understand them, by no means imply any discouragement of those manly friendships, founded on the love of God, which are in many ways so advantageous. "Derlax" represents me as holding the precise contrary to this; and with great simplicity says, that a certain quotation which I make from Father Newman "tells entirely against" me. It tells entirely against the thesis which "Derlax" ascribes to me, and for that very reason is in favour of the thesis which I maintained. There is much more which I would say on this matter, if space permitted; I will here only observe, that what I have just said must be understood with one proviso. I certainly implied, as a truth which would be admitted by all Catholics, that in ecclesiastical education the CHIEF means of eliciting the affections should ever be, impressing both the intellect and imagination vividly and efficaciously with religious truth.

We now enter on the question of general literature: and on this head so little has "Derlax" attempted to meet my real argument, that a sufficient answer to his remarks will be obtained, if the reader will but peruse again that portion of my former letter which they criticise. My statements are contained in pp. 248-9, and from p. 253 to p. 259; both passages resting on certain principles, drawn out from p. 237 to p. 239. In order, however, that I may explicitly face "Derlax's" objections, I will here give a brief analysis of those statements.

1. There is but one true standard of right and wrong, in reference to human action. It is that found in the Catholic ascetical writers; and it may be briefly summed up by saying, that men are more commendable, in precise proportion as they make it more the one end of their earthly life to grow in the love of God and in interior perfection.

2. It is so essential a part of education that hardly any other except preservation of purity can be more so, to train youths in the realisation of this doctrine; in the habit of practically measuring all human action by this one standard.

3. It is most difficult so to train them: (1) because of the flesh, and (2) because of the world; or in other words, (1) because of our violent tendency, since the Fall, to value things by a worldly standard, and (2) because we are so closely hemmed in and surrounded by a world which does so.

4. All writers on human life and conduct, who do not imply this standard of praise and blame, must imply some other inconsistent with it; for no one will be so wild as to maintain the other alternative, viz. that they do not imply praise or blame at all. I am not at all meaning that such men, in every page and corner of their writings, express or imply praise or blame on some course of human action; for I have expressly stated the reverse (p. 259). But they do so in their general drift and spirit.

5. The free and unrestricted study of able and attractive writers, who imply some standard of praise and blame inconsistent with the Christian, tends in the greatest degree to imbue youths with the same detestable standard ; and that indeed the more injuriously, in proportion as the more unconsciously.

Of these five theses, it is the fourth alone which "Derlax" even professes to combat ; and in repelling his attack, I must make one preliminary remark. I expressed an opinion (p. 249) that some few writers are inconsistent with themselves, in their implied standard of morality.* Take, *e. g.*, Scott, one of those cited by "Derlax." Will "Derlax" himself gravely assert, that Scott ordinarily implies the doctrine which I have mentioned ? the doctrine, that men are only commendable, in proportion as they make the ascertainment and fulfilment of God's Will the one predominant aim of their whole life ? And yet, when Scott is describing Jeanie Deans, through his artistic sympathy with his own mental creation, many parts of his novel almost contain that implication. A remark altogether similar may be made on Shakespeare ; and I think that a still more favourable judgment may be formed of Southey, if I can trust my memory of works which I have not opened for very many years.

I now reply to "Derlax ;" and I shall be really surprised if, on reflection, he adheres to his own argument. Of the nine writers whom he mentions, I will say nothing of Keats and Tennyson, because of my very insufficient acquaintance with their works. But as to the rest, let it be clearly understood what "Derlax's" course of reasoning requires him to maintain. He must maintain that Thackeray, and Macaulay, and Shelley, and Byron, and Scott and Shakespeare according to their ordinary drift, measure human action by a standard, which is in no important respect at variance with that set forth in the *Imitation of Christ*, and in the *Spiritual Combat*. If he do not maintain this, his objections are not merely irrelevant but unmeaning. If he do maintain this, he is far beyond the reach of argument.

He says that according to my view "all books . . . which deal with secular subjects . . . as a religious man would deal with them, are religious books." Not so : I mentioned (p. 248) five very comprehensive classes of secular books, in regard to which no such statement is implied in my reasoning. But I do think that where the matter handled is *human life and conduct*, the opinion ascribed to me by "Derlax" is a true opinion : those books, which imply praise and blame according to the Christian standard, are "religious books ;" those which do so according to any other standard, are (so far) antichristian and detestable. This is the very lesson, which it seems to me so inestimably important that ecclesiastical students shall fully learn.

But "Derlax" considers that I would wholly debar youths (if I could) from using these books at all for purposes of recreation. I

* My words were : "Some few books . . . belong partly to one" class "and partly to the other" of those which I had mentioned.

said the direct contradictory : I said that "many selections might be made from" them which would be invaluable for purposes of recreation (p. 259). How far recreation was even any part of the end proposed by "X.Y.Z." in his recommendation of them, is a question which I am not to discuss ; certainly I *understood* him in a sense totally different from that ascribed to him by "Derlax."

It is of vital moment, then, that an ecclesiastical student shall be carefully preserved from all sympathy with those views on the standard of morality, which are implied by such writers as those cited by "Derlax." But this implies no objection at all to his studying those very books ever so carefully in the spirit of *antipathy*. It is desirable, as I said in my former letter, that he shall be trained (so far as time and circumstances will admit) to admire in them whatever may innocently be admired, while preserving unsullied his detestation of those evil principles, which underlie almost every thing there expressed or implied on the relative value of human actions. And thus I answer the objection raised by "S. A. B. S.," to which I have already referred ; viz. that on the restrictive system a priest would never be trained to cope with "the great movements of" secular "thought." On the contrary, it is that system alone which will *enable* him to cope with them. So far as he is himself unconsciously implicated in the same worldly snare, he will ever be joining irrelevant issues, and meeting the great errors of the day in a paltry and narrow spirit. To detest vice while knowing it, is a student's problem in applying himself to Moral Theology ; to detest the *world* while knowing it, is but another application of the same principle. I would but explain, that it is only those "movements of thought" which extend over the general mass of society, with which an ordinary priest need know how to deal : if they are confined to the educated and thoughtful class, it will amply suffice that a certain select number of priests be fitted to encounter them.

I have now rejoined, on all the more important matters of principle which have been brought into controversy. There is not a single objection, indeed, raised by any of your March correspondents, to which I am not perfectly ready with an answer ; but I am so reluctant to encroach on your space, that I will forbear. I will conclude, therefore, when I have referred to one further particular, on which I laid stress in my former letter ; a particular, which, though involving no principle, is most intimately connected with every practical detail from first to last. *Our seminary students must have completed their education by the age of twenty-three years.* If it were possible for our Bishops to defer their ordination some six or seven years, it is hardly too much to say, that every single detail in their course of instruction would reasonably be affected by the change. But every one knows that this is altogether impossible ; and the question, therefore, is simply this, how the few years given may be most profitably employed.

It is absolutely requisite, then, for the due discharge of his future

obligations, that by the age of twenty-three the student shall have mastered various most important branches of knowledge. (1) He must be so completely versed in the more primary portions at least of Dogmatic, he must have so definite an impression of the various doctrines contained in the Catechism, and so ready a power of reproducing that impression, that he shall be able to bring home those doctrines deeply and persuasively to the imagination and affections of the young and of the uneducated; and to train such persons in habits of familiar acquaintance with the great Objects of faith. This is at all times of most primary importance; but under present circumstances, considering the constant tendency now existing of secular knowledge to supplant religious in the poor man's education, such a training of the ecclesiastical student is our only hope against evils, the alarmingness of which it is difficult to exaggerate. (2) He must be so firmly grounded in the principles of Moral Theology, and in their application to the various circumstances of ordinary English life, that he may be ready to pronounce with prompt discrimination on an indefinite number of more or less complicated cases, which are ever coming before him without a moment's notice. Results the most disastrous may at times ensue from a mistaken decision. (3) He must be so imbued with the spirit and the details of Ascetical Theology, that he may coöperate with the Holy Ghost wherever a soul is being drawn to higher perfection; and that he may be able, in all ordinary cases, to give solid practical advice, as to the kind and degree of prayer, meditation, and the like, which should be practised. (4) He must possess some sufficient knowledge of human nature: without such knowledge, the first of the three above-named qualifications will give him but little power of really teaching doctrine, and the last will be as likely to lead him wrong as right. (5) He must know so much of Scripture, not only as may suffice for the spiritual edification of his flock, but also for their protection against those anticatholic deductions from Scripture, which abound in England through all classes, except perhaps the very lowest and most uneducated.* (6) He must be sufficiently grounded in elementary controversy. He must be acquainted with those Protestant heresies which still prevail among our poorer countrymen, not only in that abstract and unreal shape which they assume in theological manuals, but as they are practically held in real life; united not unfrequently with much that is good and admirable. He must be further well acquainted with those more modern semi-infidel

* I need hardly say, that if an ordinary priest is found by Protestants to be insufficiently acquainted with the text of Scripture, such a fact increases their prejudice against Catholicism more than almost any other imaginable circumstance. Considerations of controversy alone make it highly important that a seminary student shall at least be made thoroughly conversant with text and context of the New Testament. I think indeed that this is most highly important, for reasons far higher than controversial; but I am now dwelling on what must be admitted by all who will give their mind to the matter.

I feel most deeply how unfit these things are for public discussion; but it is not I who began this controversy.

"movements of thought," which at this moment are so widely prevalent in the half-educated and even uneducated classes.

I might with ease add considerably to my list of requisites, but I have said enough for my purpose. Nor am I entering at all on the truly arduous question, how sufficient knowledge may best be secured to an ordinary Church-student; for my business is merely to comment on your correspondents' suggestions. And the fact being (so far as I can see) quite obviously and undeniably as I have stated it, that "practical" man "Derlax" considers that "a full and systematic classical education" should be given "previous to any direct theological course" (p. 411). A full and systematic classical education!!! Why, under any view of the case, the classical education must end (as it always ends) at the age of 18, never to be resumed; and "Derlax" is surely scholar enough to know, that at that very time the mind is but just beginning to be sufficiently mature, for any of the *highest* intellectual advantages which classical study has to bestow. Accordingly "F.," who is evidently an excellent scholar, does not even think of stating, but implies as a matter of course (p. 410), that if classical education, really worthy of the name, shall be imparted, it must proceed "*pari passu* with the strictly ecclesiastical course to the very end." And Father Campion, as we see in your March number (p. 366), proposes that secular studies shall be *exclusively* pursued to the very age of 23, when *our* students receive ordination.

"Derlax" says that I have preserved a "politic reticence" on my "view of what should be the intellectual method of education" in our ordinary diocesan seminaries. I have preserved no "reticence" whatever, "politic" or otherwise; see p. 261 in your January Number. If it is on the question of classical studies that he desires a more explicit statement of my opinions, I am most happy to give it. I think that a reasonably good *grammatical* mastery of Latin and Greek is attainable, and for many reasons very desirable. I think that the pagan classics are the best instrument for imparting that mastery; but I also think that any attempt to carry classical studies beyond this point, so long as the education ends at the age of 23, must necessitate the omission of matters, which are far more important for the future career.

As this will, I suppose, be my last letter on this momentous question, I cannot more appropriately close it, than by that very sentiment with which my old opponent, "X. Y. Z.," takes leave of the controversy. He entreats his readers "to bear in mind the vital importance of the interests at stake; before which all mere personal considerations shrink into comparative insignificance." I cannot express the earnestness with which I concur in the same entreaty. This is no mere episodic or subordinate inquiry; it concerns the very heart of Catholic life. Since the discussion *has* taken place, God grant that it may have a salutary result, and that His real interests may be promoted.

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,
W. G. W.

SIR,—You have kindly allowed me, with the writer's sanction, a perusal of "W. G. W.'s" second letter before its publication, with the view of my preparing any reply I may think necessary for appearance in the same Number of the *Rambler*. You request me, however, to condense my observations into as short a space as can be conveniently managed; and with that request I shall gladly comply, in charity to your readers, who must already be wearied out by a protracted controversy, and because I quite agree with a correspondent in your last Number, that where differences run so deep down any understanding between the disputants becomes hopeless. A few words, however, and they shall be as few as possible, must be said in reply to "W. G. W." And, as this is to be the final letter on the subject, I hope he will allow me to apologise by anticipation for any unintentional misconstructions of his meaning I may fall into, though I shall do my best to avoid them.

As regards his general comments on myself and your other correspondents, I still think, notwithstanding his pointed and of course perfectly sincere disclaimer, that he has in fact missed the real point at issue by confining himself to building up, what I called in my first letter, his own "ideal of a Catholic college," and avoiding the question raised by his opponents as to what experience teaches of the practical working and results of various systems. For it is not, be it remembered, merely the question of how far his ideal is or is not carried out at this or that particular college, but how far the "seminary system" where it *is* carried out produces the results which he anticipates from it, or the reverse. And if it should be replied, that it is not consistently carried out any where, there could scarcely be a stronger proof of its practical failure.

1. I am greatly surprised that "W. G. W." should think it possible for "X. Y. Z.," or any one who agrees with "X. Y. Z.'s" high estimates of the value of classical studies, to have no fault to find with the working of the "seminary system" in that particular. It is surely notorious that the classical education imparted at seminaries, whether English or foreign, is greatly inferior to that of a good Protestant school. Were this a mere temporary accident, it would be both ungenerous and foolish to notice it at all; but it is a very different matter when "W. G. W." argues that "nothing beyond a reasonably good *grammatical* mastery of Latin and Greek" is attainable or desirable under that system. On the general question I will add nothing to what has been said with equal force and elegance in "X. Y. Z.'s" second letter. But on the question of *time* I will say a word. The canonical age for ordination is twenty-four. Priests are not unfrequently ordained in England at twenty-three by dispensation; sometimes they are not ordained till later than twenty-four. I will take the standard age, and allowing as at present three years for theology, the general education of a student, which would include, of course, "philosophy," might still be pursued up to twenty-one. At that

age many of the students at the English Universities graduate. I see, therefore, no impossibility, as far as time is concerned, in prefixing what is called a "liberal education" to the special and professional course, though I do not deny that a longer time would be an advantage. Let me add, at the risk of being accused of stating a truism, that a man who had had a thoroughly good intellectual training will master any special subject (and especially such a subject as theology) more *rapidly* and more *effectually* than a man who commences his special studies earlier with a less matured and cultivated intellect. To train a select number of priests, as "W. G. W." proposes, by an exceptional process, for controversial purposes, may have its advantages, but it clearly would not at all obviate the importance of a good intellectual training, not for a select few, but for the general body. In his first letter "W. G. W." said that a man who had had no University education appeared to one who had "like a barbarian." Without committing myself to so extreme a statement, I can understand its force, and I think it would be very deplorable that an ordinary priest should be liable to be regarded in any such light by the educated portion of his congregation. And, with respect to "W. G. W.'s" six requisites of knowledge for a priest, I would ask him if he imagines them to be usually attained, even in a moderate degree, under the existing system? If the opposite is notoriously the case, and he will hardly deny it, he might at least pause before urging that argument against any modification of the existing system.

2. I come to a far more fundamental point, the distinction of the public-school and private-school systems. And here I really think that "W. G. W." has wholly failed to meet my arguments in defence of the former, though he quotes a description of it from the *Saturday Review*, which is tolerably correct, though somewhat coloured by that passion for epigrammatic smartness which is the darling sin of *Saturday Reviewers*. It does not, however, go his length in the matter of friendly and familiar intercourse. First, I wish to repeat my conviction that every one, or nearly every one, who has been at a public school will agree with me in considering "W. G. W.'s" picture, or rather caricature, of the moral condition of such schools enormously overdrawn. Secondly, I must repeat, what has been already urged by myself, and, I think, by "X. Y. Z." (for I have not his letters by me), and cannot of course be denied, that our public schools, in origin and essential character, are not *Protestant but Catholic*. The system was inaugurated at Eton and Winchester long before the Reformation; from them later institutions have copied it; it was an outgrowth of English character, and is not a Protestant invention, but a Catholic bequest. It lost at the Reformation, not the freedom and confidence which are its leading features, but the Catholic tradition, Catholic teaching, and Catholic Sacraments, without which no human system, however admirable, can be expected to preserve Christian purity. This

brings me to my third point, in which, in fact, the whole weight of my opponent's argument is made to rest. And here I feel that he gains an immense and unfair controversial advantage by assuming, as he necessarily does, the "completeness with which the present system does its work in the matter of purity." It is obviously out of the question to enter on such a matter in detail here, it is invidious to touch on it at all. But it is also impossible to allow an assumption to pass unchallenged on which the whole issue of "W. G. W.'s" argument really depends; and which, at least, ought to be proved before it is made the basis of argument at all. My words shall be as few as possible. If we may credit the universal testimony of friend and foe as to clerical immorality in certain parts of Europe and America, the "seminary system" is not so sure a guarantee for its prevention as "W. G. W." seems to imagine. And in regard to the particular class of moral evils apprehended from the unrestricted intercourse and friendship of boys, I have no hesitation in stating my conviction, and I confidently appeal to the experience of public-school men in confirmation of my statement, that they are almost or entirely non-existent at our great public schools. I further believe, and here too I speak from good authority, that such evils flourish, and while human nature remains what it is always will flourish, in proportion as such free intercourse and friendship is put down by the strong arm of force, or subjected to a worrying *espionage*. Less than this I could not say in the interests of truth, after "W. G. W.'s" comments on my former letter; but I pass most gladly from a very disagreeable part of the subject. He is perfectly correct in supposing I did not intend to substitute for *espionage* a political use of the confessional; indeed, I should regard it with horror as a shocking and odious profanation of that holy Sacrament. I have asked several priests, who assure me that a confessor is not bound or authorised to require his penitents to turn informers as a condition of absolution. To myself such a notion appears not only most "disparaging to the Sacrament of Penance," but the surest means of deterring men, and still more boys, from coming to the Sacrament at all, were it once understood to be openly avowed and acted upon.*

3. On the matter of "particular friendship," I am utterly and honestly puzzled to understand what "W. G. W.'s" view really is, taking into account his various statements on the subject. To avoid any danger of misconstruction, I will merely say that, *if* I am to infer from his present letter his agreement with my own opinion, as expressed in my last, I am sincerely glad of it, for I attach great importance to the subject. At the same time I have

* It cannot, therefore, be so "grotesquely heterogeneous" to the confessional as "W. G. W." supposes, and if it were, it would tell equally against that system for lay schools. Far more reasonably ought it to be said that the world and the confessional are grotesquely heterogeneous, yet most of the persons who resort to confession are persons living in the world.

learnt, for the first time, from his second letter that he supposed "X. Y. Z." to hold the view that those who have "warm, human affections" are in a lower state of perfection, or that he had "protested against" what I (erroneously) imagined from his first letter to be his own view, and the precise opposite of which I understood "X. Y. Z." in his first letter to maintain. I may add that the free toleration of particular friendships seems hardly consistent with a system of close *surveillance*, and is certainly understood to be very strongly discountenanced by the "seminary system."

"W. G. W." has done little more than recapitulate some of his former observations on "literature," and it is sufficient therefore for me to refer to my reply to them. He enumerates seven false principles as generally stated or implied in non-religious books, to which criticism I venture to take exception. But I meant nothing so absurd as that the standard of the *Imitation of Christ* or *Spiritual Combat*, is habitually maintained in such works. They seldom touch at all on the class of subjects those treatises deal with; nor do I see the force of the objection, as I never recommended such reading for the formation of the religious and ascetical temper, but for recreation, refinement of taste, and enlarged knowledge of human nature and human thought.

Your correspondent expresses surprise that nobody has noticed his analogy between a discussion of clerical education and clerical celibacy. I suppose it was because nobody recognised the existence of any analogy between the discussion of a fundamental principle of ecclesiastical discipline based on the universal tradition at least of western Christendom from the earliest ages, and the discipline of the details of an educational system which had no existence till three centuries ago, which has never obtained universally, and is considered by many to be a failure where it has been tried, and which does not now exist in England, as "F." has pointed out, in any form which can lay claim to direct ecclesiastical sanction; not to say that the discussion did not refer only to *clerical* education. After all, the real question lies in a nutshell. Are the clergy to be, as a writer in your last Number worded it, "only machines for distributing the Sacraments," or are they *also* to aim at influencing the social, civil, and educational life of their generation? I am not to start any fresh grounds of argument here, and will say nothing therefore of my reasons for holding the latter view to be true, and, under existing circumstances, of inestimable importance. But I may just observe that it is the one which, as a matter of fact, always has been acted upon, with various degrees of consistency and success, and probably always will be. And if the clergy are to aim at such a result, it is surely clear as daylight that a close and restrictive system, even *if* otherwise desirable, would be alarmingly inadequate to fit them for accomplishing it. There are many other points in "W. G. W.'s" letter which I could willingly have touched upon, but I will content myself, before concluding, with a brief recapitulation of certain facts which have been

brought out on one side in the course of the controversy, and have not been disproved or even denied on the other. It has been repeatedly asserted, and cannot, of course, be denied, that the public-school system of this country is Catholic in origin and essence, and is distinctly English, not distinctly Protestant, nor has it been denied that it possesses some very great advantages. On the other hand, it is notorious that the "seminary system," so far as it exists here at all, was introduced from Douai, the nursery of our clergy during the ages of persecution, and is in its peculiarities distinctly French, and therefore, in the judgment of many, very ill adapted for the training of English youths. It is again notorious that in France itself the "seminary system," however well it may have succeeded as regards the character of the clergy, has egregiously failed as regards their work. They influence the women, but, as a general rule, they do not influence the men, the exceptions being, just as we should have expected, among those who have been differently trained, like Gratry, Ravignan, and Lacordaire. As regards the important matter of purity, there is some difference of opinion among your correspondents (perhaps there will be less among your readers) as to the facts; but even supposing them with "W. G. W." to tell entirely in favour of the "seminary system," its defenders have failed to account for the manifest unfairness of ascribing to a particular method of school-discipline a distinction which is abundantly explained by the difference of religion, and which accompanies the difference of religion, and not the particular discipline, in general society no less than in schools and colleges. In taking leave of this controversy, I cannot do better than reëcho the sentiment which has been already expressed by the principal writer on either side, and add the humble utterance of my own hearty desire that this great question may receive the attention it deserves, and that its discussion may promote the solid interests of the Catholic Church in England.

Your obedient servant,

DERLAX.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have read an article on Eton in the current *Edinburgh*, which complains of the number of masters there as insufficient for the requisite amount of familiar intercourse with the boys. Whatever be thought of the justice of his criticisms, it is evident that the writer does not consider this deficiency as any part of the public-school *system*, but merely as an accidental fault in the present arrangement at Eton.

SIR,—Will you do me the favour of giving insertion, in your May Number, to the following brief correspondence, which, by obviating a possible question on my last letter, may help to shorten the educational controversy?

Your obedient servant,

March 18.

F.

(No. 1.)

SIR,—You will observe that in a letter of mine which appears in the current *Rambler*, on the subject of ecclesiastical education, I have presumed you, when you speak of the use to be derived in such education from the cultivation of the affections, to have more immediately in your view the *relations between superiors and students*. I do not understand you to exclude (as you will see by my words) other “developments of affection,” such, for instance, as that implied in the term “particular friendships.” Still, it was under the idea that you were speaking more immediately of the treatment of boys and young men by those intrusted with their education, that I expressed my cordial agreement with you in that part of your subject. The difficult question of “particular friendships” in ecclesiastical education seems to me to stand upon a distinct footing, and, at any rate, was not present to my mind when I was commenting on your letters.

The more carefully I examine your words, the more strongly I am confirmed in my original impression of your meaning. Neither do I think it possible that, since I distinctly implied, and argued upon, that impression of it in my first letter, you would have so plainly acquiesced in my construction in your reply, in the *Rambler* for November last, had I mistaken, or materially understated, the drift of your words.

However, as “W. G. W.” has assumed you to refer exclusively to the subject of “particular friendships,” and as a writer, who signs himself “Derlax,” in the current *Rambler*, has confined my own argument on the “affections” to that portion of the subject, to which he thereby appears to give a more prominent place in your meaning than I had presumed it to occupy, it would be a satisfaction to me, if, after having attentively read that part of my letter in the *Rambler* for March which relates to this question (pp. 405-7), you would kindly state whether, on the whole, I have correctly understood you.

I am, dear sir, yours faithfully,

F.

March 15.

(No. 2)

SIR,—In reply to your note of the 15th inst., I have no hesitation in saying that you have taken a perfectly correct view of my meaning in the matter to which you refer. You allow, I observe, both in your note and in your letter to the *Rambler*, for my having intended to include other developments of the affections, such as that implied in the term “particular friendships,” which is certainly true. But it is none the less true that I had very specially in mind the evils to be apprehended from an indiscriminate mode of government in those intrusted with the education of youth, and the immense advantages to be expected from their tempering discipline by personal influence, and striving to cultivate an affectionate and confidential intercourse, grounded on a spirit of hearty sympathy with those placed under

them, which should distinguish their rules alike from the stiffness of mere official routine, and the vexatious interference of a system of minute inspection.

I may take this opportunity of saying that, although you had no other assistance in arriving at my meaning than such as my letters themselves supplied, your construction of it, when you have undertaken to interpret me, is throughout your letter substantially correct.

As I understand that, contrary to my expectations when I wrote my concluding letter in the current *Rambler*, the controversy is likely to be continued, you will perhaps allow me to make one further remark, which certain portions of your comments upon "W. G. W.'s" letter naturally suggest. I am unable to comprehend how the delineation of an imaginary picture, whatever its merits,—for on that point I offer no opinion,—can be put forward as a defence of systems materially different from it both in theory and in practice. Still less can it be regarded as an *answer* to observations having for their exclusive scope, not the construction of a theoretical optimism, but the realities and requirements of actual life.

One word I will add of a more personal nature, not in petulance, but in explanation. I have written gravely on a serious subject, with the sole motive of doing what little in me lay towards the great work of raising the tone of Catholic education in England. I have not urged random views hastily adopted, but have stated convictions which represent the gradual and accumulated growth of the thought and observation of past years. In reply, I have been met with little of argument, with not a little of ribaldry, misconstruction, and abuse. Of that I do not complain. To bear, however humble, a part in such a cause, a Catholic may well consider it an honour to toil, and even to suffer, though his first reward be kicks and cuffs from those he seeks to aid. On the good feeling, the strong common sense, the honest love of fair play, which I am sure are characteristic of English Catholics, I rely for ultimately gaining a kindlier and more generous appreciation of my motives and my aims.

I am, dear sir, yours faithfully,

March 17.

X. Y. Z.

SIR,—As a priest of very many years' standing, and who passed a number of years in one of our chief ecclesiastical colleges, both as a student and a superior, I feel desirous of expressing the great pleasure I have derived from the perusal of three interesting letters, on the subject of ecclesiastical education, which appeared in your last Number.

If out of those three letters I select that which bears the signature of "F." as the one that has especially attracted me, it is not because I am otherwise than most sensible of the value of the others, but because "F." has fallen upon a line of argument which exactly tallies with my own course of thought and experience.

Since he appears to disclaim any great personal knowledge of the character of college students, as distinguished from other lads of the same class and age, I deem it to be a bare act of justice to state that my seventeen years' experience as a college teacher and officer entirely coincides with all that he has said upon the dispositions and habits of boys and young men under education, and upon the mode of treating them which is most likely to insure for superiors that esteem and confidence, without which mere discipline can do but little. I allude particularly to the dangers of dealing with young men upon rigid and indiscriminating principles. Such a system I agree with your correspondent in thinking to be rather foreign than English; but, at all events, I have witnessed many lamentable applications of it by men whose memory, for the sake of their deep piety and moral worth, is deservedly cherished in affectionate veneration.

In conclusion, allow me to thank you, sir, for the good service you have done to the public by opening your pages to this most interesting and, as I think, most profitable discussion. Surely if it were wrong in an anonymous writer to start it, it is as unwarrantable for anonymous writers to denounce it. But, for my own part, I cannot bring myself to believe that such a discussion, conducted as it has been in a spirit of submission to authority, and with great moderation of tone (on one side at least,—the fervid vehemence of one of your correspondents inclining me to suspect some recent revolution in the writer's opinions, or to prognosticate some future one),—that such a discussion, I say, is in any wise inconsistent with the objects, or external to the province, of a "lay periodical," if I clearly understand what is the precise meaning of the phrase.

March 16, 1861.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

P. Q. R.

Current Events.*

HOME AFFAIRS.

THE foreign policy of the Government, its really vulnerable point, has escaped the attacks of the Opposition, who feared a victory which would be unpopular, and who had no grounds of principle on which they could found an argument. When an Italian debate was provoked by several of the Catholic members, and by some Radicals who were happy to break a lance in a cause which is adopted by the whole country, the Tories held aloof, and the motion was therefore so made that it could lead only to a demonstration, not to a trial, of strength. The policy of such a measure was altogether defective. The Catholic members might have founded their right to protest against the foreign policy on its hostility to the interests of the religion of so large a part of the empire; or they might have held out a hand to all the Whig and Conservative, as opposed to the Radical and Tory, opinions in the House and the country, by taking their stand upon the analogy of our own constitution, and the examples of our history. In one case they would have appealed to the principle of religious liberty, in the other, to the real interests and duties of the country. But they could not have agreed among themselves on either point, and they were compelled to adopt a line in which the greatest sacrifices to public prejudices could not command a single Protestant ally. The result was not at all to the advantage of the cause which it was intended to benefit, nor conducive to the political reputation of the House of Commons.

The policy which has made itself popular in this country proceeds on the assumption that the old Italian governments were bad and the people unhappy. Their subversion, therefore, was justified by their faults and by their weakness, by the attempt

and by the event. Good government and order could, under the circumstances, be restored only by the free, constitutional State of Sardinia. England, therefore, though restrained by the fear of war, or by the theory of non-intervention, from direct interference, was bound to throw her moral weight into the scale in favour of a people justly revolting against intolerable oppression, and of a power justly aggressive, in the sacred interests of order and of national prosperity.

It would have been possible to meet ministers upon each point at every step of their defence. It might have been argued that, under some at least of the fallen sceptres, the people were prosperous, and without just grounds of discontent or of rebellion; and it might be made clear to every understanding, by recalling the defects of our government a few generations ago, when rebellion would have been justified neither in the eyes of contemporaries nor in our own, that such evils are an insufficient excuse for cashiering sovereigns; with still greater effect it might have been shown that the Sardinian constitution is very far from satisfying English notions of freedom, that its effect and its purpose have been to make the government more powerful, not the people more free. Such an argument would have been possible, and with Protestants it would have been effective; but for the Catholics it was not practicable. It might have placed them at the head of the political thought of the country, and have enabled them to mould to a large extent the views of existing parties. But that is a position we are unable and incompetent to occupy, for the reason that we are not in possession of a political system, nor even of a comprehensive political principle.

* In consequence of want of space, we are obliged to confine our notices of current events to those of special Catholic interest, necessarily omitting several of the highest political significance, as the affairs of Poland, the Austrian Empire, of the American States, and of Schleswig-Holstein and Germany.

We are not so united in a common doctrine respecting authority, liberty, and right, that we should be ready to pursue it to its consequences, and to accept its results. We stand, not upon a political principle, but upon a religious interest, which we are unwilling to avow, and which we seek to disguise by whatever arts seem most specious, most popular, most suited to the audience, or to the occasion. We have therefore not even the pretence of agreement, nor the reality of consistency, nor the appearance of sincerity.

March 4th. Mr. Hennesy opened the debate in a very elaborate and spirited speech of more than two hours, which was heard with great favour by the House, and in which he argued, with the help of statistics, in favour of the conquered against the conquering power. This mode of argument is fallacious in two respects. Statistics, to be worth any thing at all, must be complete. It is a science in which there is no concluding from examples, no generalising from special, selected instances. A statistical account must be very comprehensive in order to be in any degree instructive. A few figures no more enable us to institute political comparisons than a brick serves as a sample of a house. It is clear that nobody will allow himself to be convinced against his will by an arbitrary selection of figures. Unfortunately, Mr. Hennesy appears himself to believe, not only in the efficacy of this weapon in debate, but in its value for inquiry. He considers it not only as an argument, but a proof. Now, it is certain that in a period of war and revolution, commercial prosperity must suffer. But at no time is it necessarily a sign of good government. It is a great error to trust to material tests in the ethical order. Material well-being may coexist with the worst moral and political evils. Despotisms often succeed in encouraging trade and industry. No governments have more conspicuously failed, or rather more ostentatiously disregarded the real objects of political existence, than the Directory and the Second Empire. Yet in all material things, in all things most easily reducible to figures, they immeasurably surpassed nearly every government

of the Continent. Viewed in this light, good government really loses its value. The moral and political sense is suspended, we learn to look with favour on Irish and Radical aspirations after French institutions, and to sympathise with the Israelites longing for the fleshpots of Egypt instead of the prize that was to crown their trials.

Sir George Bowyer replied to Mr. Layard, apparently without preparation, and therefore without arrangement, precision, or effect. He simply condemned what has occurred in Italy, and threatened England with the consequences. Unfortunately a passage was quoted from a pamphlet he had written in 1848, expressing sympathy with the Italian movement at that time, which he did not repudiate; and the belief in his sincerity, the quality by which he commands the respect and patience of the House, was entirely dispelled. For at that time Sir George Bowyer sympathised with the Italian movement, of which Pius IX. was the indirect author, and for a time the hero and the chief. He would not, therefore, condemn the late events, so far as they have been inspired by hatred of foreign domination in Lombardy, and we suppose in Tuscany. But in the Roman and Neapolitan dominions he utterly condemns them. Yet the imputation of misgovernment, the only one on which revolution is justifiable, was directed with much greater force against the Southern than against the Northern States. It was never asserted that the Tuscans, for instance, were oppressed. It has, on the other hand, been clearly shown, from his own statements, that the late King of Naples governed upon a system as thoroughly in contradiction with the first elements of political right as that of the French Convention. Therefore, the just revolution would be condemned, the unjust revolution approved. Instead of a principle of political ethics, the supposed interests of the Holy See were assumed as the standard of right and wrong. The expulsion of the Austrians might be rejoiced at, if it was the result of a movement favourable to the influence of the Pope. The destruction of the Neapolitan tyranny must be deprecated, because it would

place the Pope in a position of extreme difficulty.

The different opinions that divide European society with regard to the Italian revolution are not very numerous. There are the Legitimists, as they are called, a dynastic party, who in their prosperity sacrificed the Pope to the King, and now serve the Pope for the sake of the King. Their sentiments were those which prevailed among the aristocracy after the aristocracy had become dependents on the court, and they have formed a league of late with those who are absolutists among Ultramontanes. With this party authority alone has rights, and the right of the State is restrained solely (but absolutely) by that of the Church. They adhere, not to the *fait accompli*, but to the *status quo ante bellum*. Whether resistance is lawful on behalf or by command of the Church, is a question they have luckily not had to decide, for it is one which would dissolve their union. They agree only on the practical question that a legitimate government may not lawfully be resisted by the people for popular ends. Consequently the Austrians at Milan, the Pope at Bologna, the Bourbons at Palermo, ought all to be maintained or restored. Strictly speaking, this is the counter-revolutionary party, which is but a phase of the revolution. At the opposite extremity stand the simple revolutionists, who are known in Europe by the name of Liberals. In their eyes the people are the supreme arbiters of their own destinies, and government can subsist only subject to their consent and approval, for it subsists only for their benefit. The State has no objective distinct ends of its own; if it suits the people, it fulfils its object, and the object of all government, says Sydney Smith, is "roast mutton, potatoes, claret, a stout constable, an honest justice, a clear highway, a free chapel. . . . *Erin go bragh!* A far better anthem would be *Erin go bread-and-cheese, Erin go cabins that will keep out the rain, Erin go pantaloons without holes in them!*" To persons in this frame of mind, it is absurd and monstrous that Venice should be ruled by an army of hateful foreigners, or Romagna by a body of unpopular clerics. Piedmont offers

a popular representative government, therefore let Italy belong to Piedmont. This is, if not a very elevated or intelligent, a very consistent and intelligible view. There is another party which does not stand so high as this, which seeks to reconcile feelings of religion with modern notions of freedom, and to effect a compromise between the Liberals and the Legitimists. They uphold the cause of freedom wherever they discern it, as a safeguard for the interests of religion. They make no harmonious union of religious interests and political doctrines, but make one subserve the other. Liberalism suits them only when it does not clash with Catholicism. They have no political theory that cannot clash with religion. By an honourable inconsistency they sacrifice politics to religion, where they feel the antagonism, and do not understand that between political and religious truths antagonism is as impossible as between scientific and religious truths. This party is to blame as much as any other for calamities which it is the first to deplore, for it hushed the conscience of the Catholic world at the first acts which led to the present disasters. Those who applauded the invasion of Lombardy have no right to lament the annexation of the Marches and Romagna; for those events are connected as cause and effect, and if the guilt in both cases is not equal, it was greatest in the first. But there is one error even still greater than that of the liberal Catholics of France. It is wrong to be inconsistent and to put religious interests in contradiction with popular rights. But Sir George Bowyer has contrived to sacrifice the just rights of the government in one case, and the just rights of the people in the other, and by a comprehensive ingenuity to identify the cause of the temporal power with an infamous revolution in the North of Italy, and with an infamous tyranny in the South. No other combination of error could be devised more exhaustive or more mischievous.

March 7th. The debate was resumed by Mr. Edwin James, as the advocate and familiar friend of Garibaldi, and as a conscious partaker in a fair share of the eulogy bestowed

upon him. Against the system of police under the late government he spoke with power and effect. He vindicated the Dictator from the charge of piracy, because he robbed no treasure, and appears to be as incorruptible as Robespierre. This was very far from the question, which was as to the justice of the invasion of Southern Italy by Piedmont.

Mr. Maguire and Mr. Monsell also spoke, but both seemed to be endeavouring to make out such a case for the Roman Government as might be received by the House of Commons, an endeavour which it is impossible not to feel to be derogatory and hopeless.

The strangest episode was a speech by Mr. Roebuck in defence of Austria, for which he afterwards had to account to his constituents at Sheffield, who are sufficiently advanced Liberals to prefer democratic absolutism in France to representative government in an aristocratic state like Austria. It was evident that Mr. Roebuck was not master of the subject, that he knew little of the internal condition of Austria, and that his judgment had been only very recently formed. He was also open to the imputation that he had believed the favourable reports given him at Vienna by men in power, and that he had commercial reasons for both thinking and speaking favourably of them. His speech was heard with cool surprise by the House. The Radicals jeered at him, and the Catholics, some of whom had tried to serve the Pope by throwing obloquy on the Austrians, could hardly be gratified at the courage of a man who took higher ground than theirs.

Mr. Gladstone uttered a vehement declamation against the governments of Naples, Romagna, and Modena; but he committed the great rhetorical error of supporting his statement with facts which failed to bear them out, whilst it would have been easy to cite better instances. Under the direction of Mr. Gladstone's friend Farini, when governor of Æmilia, a publication was commenced of documents from the archives of the late government, in order, by exhibiting it in the worst possible light, to justify the revolution by which it fell. The work was intrusted to the advocate Gennarelli, already known in literature as an ardent enemy of the Pope's. It contains valuable

and authentic information, but as an argument in justification of the revolution it is a *petitio principii*. It cuts away entirely and irrevocably the ground on which the Roman Government has been commonly defended, so far as that was not already done by the Lyons papers; but it affords no more than they did a defence of the revolutionary party. Nobody who read the official conversations of Cardinal Antonelli, as reported in the English despatches, can reasonably speak with favour of his system of government, and no Catholic entitled to authority has done so since their publication. At the same time they throw the darkest shadow on the insurrectionary party. The collection of Gennarelli is made on the fallacious assumption that disaffection implies misgovernment; that no government is overturned that does not deserve to be overturned; and that severity of repression is the cause, not the consequence, of resistance. As a rule, it cannot be said that an insurrection is a proof, or a natural consequence, of maladministration alone. Material suffering from pressure of taxation, servitude, a defective system of economy, or any other cause, has often led to ill-will or violence against a particular class, against nobles, capitalists, Jews, but hardly ever to the subversion of the State. This has more commonly been brought about by speculative causes, by the enthusiasm for a doctrine, such as inspired the Reformation and the Revolution, and sacrificed the existing state to theories. Distress originates no revolutions, and theory justifies none. France teaches that the vindication of national independence is a just motive of revolution; England claims the same for constitutional government, America for democracy. We have seen in modern times as many movements of this purely theoretical character as movements provoked by wrong. The great difficulty we have in distinguishing the character of an insurrection comes from the mixture of motives and objects which combine to produce it. There is no *primâ facie* presumption either in favour of an insurrection or against it; for there is no general reason to assume that authority represents right. Toryism and Liberalism are alike incompetent to solve the problems of the day; indeed,

in each case we must distinguish the merits or demerits of the government from those of the revolutionary party. We cannot, for instance, support the Neapolitan government because it was attacked on the indefensible ground of Italian unity; nor can we defend the aggression of the Sardinians because it was directed against a government which deserved destruction as richly as that of Naples. Genarelli's documents prove great harshness on the part of the authorities, and great discontent on the part of the people in Romagna. They do not show whether the harshness or the discontent was originally without justification, or that it was always the former that produced the latter. But they show distinctly that the general disaffection proceeded from home causes, not from foreign influence; that it was well known to the authorities, and that the revolution there was not the work of corruption, as at Naples, or of intrigues, as at Rome. Cardinal Massimo writes from Imola, 12th August, 1845, that there were no hopes of the present generation, that there were very few above the age of eighteen, even among the country people, who were well disposed towards the government, and he rightly attributes it to the consequences of the French occupation for nearly twenty years. A judge writes from Ferrara, 15th September 1843, that the whole population is hostile; and from Ravenna the agents of the government report that there are not above thirty men in the town who are well disposed, that almost all might be included in the designation of 'Liberals.' The delegate Folicaldi writes from Ferrara, 10th December 1849, that the dislike of ecclesiastical rule makes many wish to be Austrian, although, he says, the Austrians not only did not intrigue for the purpose, but would be opposed to it. And yet in 1857, when the Pope was at Bologna, it was the opinion of those who best knew the state of the country, that within three years it would be an Austrian province.

April 19th. Lord Ellenborough brought the Roman question before the House of Lords in the form of a question, whether, the temporal sovereignty having been lost, any thing had been done to secure the spiritual independence of the Holy See. This

was a point which had not been raised in the House of Commons; and it is obvious that it is a matter in which Protestant powers are more interested than Catholic powers; for Catholic governments have been more jealous of the independence of their national churches in respect of Rome than solicitous for the independence of the Pope. They have desired to influence the Holy See rather than to deliver it, and have been interested in preventing the influence of others from exceeding their own, not in preserving the Papacy free from all influence. During many years of foreign occupation, the chief Catholic powers have evenly balanced each other. After the revolution of 1831, the occupation of Ferrara by the Austrians was followed by that of Ancona by the French; since 1848 the same balance of power has been renewed on a larger scale. Prussia and England are excluded from the kind of influence obtained by services rendered to the temporal interests of the Church, but they have the best reasons to desire that the spiritual authority should be perfectly free. As they are Protestant countries, they cannot reasonably share it; as they are free States, they cannot consistently abridge it. They can neither claim the same concessions which the Church makes to Catholic powers, nor impose the conditions which she accepts in absolute States. The despotic system in France, and the Josephine system in Austria, may rejoice at any thing which trammels and hinders the Papal power, for they have both much to fear from it. But England and Prussia must desire that in the vast sphere of religion, in which they cannot influence a large minority of their subjects, they should obey an authority which is free from all temporal considerations and from all political motives. They were therefore interested above all others in providing for the spiritual independence of the Head of the Church, and they alone could mediate between the parties that are contending for power in Italy.

After saying that the revolution has not destroyed a single power that had been for centuries of the smallest use to Europe or to civilisation, or which existed apparently for any good purpose, and that the Italians rose for the purpose of vindicating rights reserved

to them by nature, Lord Ellenborough proceeded to say: "The French went to Rome for the purpose of giving the hand to the Pope, and obstructing the progress of democracy. They remain there—not intentionally, but practically—with the effect of giving the hand to democracy, and of degrading the Pope. . . . France might, in the first instance, have declared that the whole of the Roman States should be preserved under the dominion of the Pope; but that would have been an extreme measure. She did not adopt that course in the first instance, and to do so now is too late. The Emperor could not adopt it in the first instance, because it would have been inconsistent with the principles on which the French empire is founded. The French Emperor is in a very different position from Louis XIV. Louis XIV. claimed to have the whole power of the State, but the Emperor has declared that he owes his power altogether to the people, and he cannot contradict himself; he cannot act in contravention of the principle on which his government is founded, for there are moral limits to the action of all monarchs. He therefore could not adopt the extreme course of declaring that the whole of the territory of the Roman States should be placed under the dominion of the Pope. The clergy of France have expressed their sympathy with the Pope; and I will say nothing whatever against the feeling which has been manifested by them towards the Pope. On the contrary, I respect those feelings; I think they are natural and generous, not only as expressions of sympathy with misfortune such as the Pope has been subjected to, but that they are feelings of sympathy hallowed by religion. But what I think the French clergy, and most of the Roman Catholics in Europe, desire is, not that the Pope should continue in the state in which he now is, but that he should be restored to all his old powers. That is impossible; and the question is, is it desirable that the Pope should remain in the position in which he now stands, and is it desirable for France or for Europe that he should do so? . . . In point of fact, my lords, the Pope is in a position such as no clergy in France—no clergy any where—no Roman Catholics any where—could wish the head

of their Church to remain in. It is an object not only to the great Catholic States, but to all States in which there is a large Catholic population, that the Pope should be permanently established in a state of entire spiritual independence." It is remarkable that the portion of his speech which was most loudly cheered was that relating to Austria. "My lords, Austria has not been fairly treated in this matter. At the Congress of Vienna she gave up the Netherlands, and in exchange she received Italy. I say Italy, because, though Austria herself only got a portion of that country, princes of the Austrian house were established in other portions; and it was perfectly understood that it was the mission of Austria to maintain Italy against the French. Genoa was given to Piedmont for the same purpose. The Italian territory of Piedmont was to be the advanced guard of Austria against France. That was the intention of the Congress of Vienna. Whether it was a wise one or not I shall not now inquire; but with that intention Austria was established in Italy, and in endeavouring to maintain and extend her influence in that country, she only performed her original mission and fulfilled obligations which she contracted at Vienna. . . . I must say that of all things I do deprecate any attempt on the part of any body of Italians whatever to interfere by arms in the differences which may now exist between Austria and Hungary or any other States. (Loud cheers.) Austria, in her integrity and in her strength, is absolutely necessary to the safety of every State in Europe. (Renewed cheering.) It would be impossible to preserve the balance of power if her integrity were assailed (cheers); and any man who now entertains a desire of raising commotions and of creating a war against Austria in Hungary, would be criminal in the presence of Europe, and the enemy of every man within its boundaries." (Loud cheers.) It is evident from the whole course of the debate that these remarks, and the cheers with which they were received, proceeded from no real hostility to the revolution, but from hostility to France.

Lord Clarendon gave the best defence of a neutral policy in the question of the spiritual power, when he

said that the Pope "might very fairly say that on the political part of the question we are not impartial, because we are determined at almost any price to secure the unity of Italy; and that on the religious part of the question our interest as Protestants inclines us to regard with favour whatever will weaken his power." Of the French occupation of Rome, he said: "Having reference to the events which have since occurred, particularly considering the feelings and opinions which have recently been manifested in the French Chambers, and the natural impatience of the existing state of things which notoriously exists at

Rome, I think that the Emperor of the French may well say, that if he were now to withdraw his garrison from Rome, not alone Catholic France, but Catholic Europe, would hold him personally responsible for any insult or injury which the Pope might sustain. . . . For this I do not blame the present Pope or any of his predecessors, because, without destroying the basis on which the Papacy has always rested, and without departing altogether from the system which has prevailed for centuries, I believe it to be impossible for any Pope to grant those reforms which the spirit of the age and the exigencies of the times require."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

The draught address of the French Senate, Feb. 25, in reply to the speech from the throne, was in favour of the Imperial policy, which seeks to improve the material condition of the French clergy, while it tramples upon their higher interests. It speaks with lively satisfaction of the efficacious solicitude of the government in promoting religious education, in improving the condition of the clergy, multiplying parishes and curacies in the rural districts, and aiding the communes to build or repair the churches, presbyteries, and the schools. While in Italy, it says, "two interests of the first order, which the Emperor wished to conciliate, have clashed, and Italian liberty is struggling with the Court of Rome." To the first the Emperor suggested a course of legality, and to the second a compromise, and washed his hands both of unjust aggression and of impolitic resistance. The Emperor's filial affection has been unceasingly remarked in the defence and maintenance of the temporal power of the Pope; and the Senate fully adheres to all the acts of his frank, moderate, and persevering policy, and will continue to place its confidence in the monarch who covers the Papacy with the French flag, and has constituted himself the most vigilant and most faithful guardian of Rome and the Pontifical throne.

The project of the address of the Legislative Body, adopted in committee Feb. 27, says that "diplomatic documents, and the last despatch of troops to Rome, have proved to the whole

world that the Emperor's constant efforts have secured to the Papacy its safety and independence, and have protected its temporal sovereignty, as far as possible, considering the force of facts and the resistance opposed to wise counsels. The Emperor has thus fulfilled the duty of the eldest son of the Church, and responded to the religious sentiment and political traditions of France; and the Legislative Body leaves the solution entirely to the Emperor's wisdom."

In the Senate, the Catholic party proposed an amendment tending to pledge the Emperor more distinctly to remain at Rome. It cannot be denied that the first speakers for the amendment, by placing the questions of all the dispossessed Italian sovereigns on the same footing, and thus implying the Legitimist doctrine, gave a real opening to Prince Napoleon, who, in his remarkable speech of Feb. 28, said that the amendment came from some "holy council of Legitimists and clergymen," and that the policy of the speakers might be summed up thus: "A second expedition to Rome, war with Piedmont, Italy thrown into the arms of England, war between France and England; and all this to gain the alliance of the Pope, whose policy we disapprove; of the Duke of Tuscany, who fought against us at Solferino; of the Duke of Modena, who would never recognise our dynasty; of the King of Naples, who could not keep his own crown; of those whose influence in Italy we have destroyed; and of a few bishops who will approve a policy

that will find an echo in a certain party, but never in the nation." The Prince afterwards showed the folly of supposing that the King of Naples and the Pope were so intimately linked together, and he cited from the yellow book a despatch to show that, when the Neapolitan government was asked to concert measures with Piedmont to reëstablish the temporal power of the Pope, the answer was, "We cannot;" not that the Neapolitan government was opposed to the vicariat of Victor Emmanuel over Romagna and the Legations, because those provinces were ill governed: but the Marches and Umbria being governed just as ill, the Neapolitan cabinet would consent to the King of Sardinia governing the former, if the King of Naples might govern the latter. M de Martino wished, in fact, to divide the Papal States between Piedmont and Naples. The Prince next attacked the policy of Cardinal Antonelli, which he treated with great disdain, and asked, "Does so childish a government deserve all the consideration with which we surround it?" He then accepted M. Larochejaquelein's argument against the union of the temporal and spiritual powers in the same hands, and declared that but for this consideration he should be for national churches, of which the sovereign was the head; but that he would not admit for Rome that which he rejected for Paris. He did not like to see a policeman by the side of the priest to compel people to spiritual obedience. The Prince then pronounced himself in favour of Italian unity, and proposed to reconcile the Pope's independence with the subjection of Rome to a new sovereign by dividing Rome into two, and giving the Trastevere and Vatican to the Pope, and the old Rome to the King of Italy. Here the Pope should have a garrison, and a budget furnished or guaranteed by all the powers. "Thus the Pope, encircled with the reverence of Christendom, with a special jurisdiction, and his own flag, would have all his independence; Rome would become, so to say, the sanctuary, the oasis of Christendom." M. Billault said that the Papal government would have every thing or nothing, and refused all compromise. It would not accept a budget from the Catholic powers, but it demanded first annates, and then, when these were

found impracticable, the Peter's pence: but there is no element of regularity in these, and the resources of charity always dry up after a certain time. The only solution was that proposed by M. Rossi in 1832: "There is a complete incompatibility between the Roman government and the people; the future only presents one solution to preserve the temporal power, the suzerainty of the Pope, and the endowment of the Holy See by the Catholic nations." M. Billault, however, steadily refused to give any assurance that the French occupation of Rome would be continued; but the progress of the debate two days later forced M. Baroche to assure the Senate, that there was not the slightest intention of recalling the troops, and it was only on this assurance that the address was at last voted, and the "Cardinal's amendment" lost by the narrow majority of nineteen votes: nine ministers, two members of the privy council, two prefects, and seven other great office-holders more than made up this majority.

In the Legislative Body several new speakers made a great sensation by their defence of the Papal sovereignty, or their demonstration of the crookedness of French and Piedmontese policy, which is scarcely the same thing. But it was clear that no policy could be founded on the recommendations of MM. Flavigny, Kolb, Bernard, Plichon, Segur, and Keller; and, on the assurance of M. Billault that "France recognises in the maintenance of the absolute independence of the Holy See one of the fundamental principles of its policy, which it can neither neglect nor abandon," the address was carried with only thirteen dissentient votes. M. Jules Favre's amendment for the immediate withdrawal of the French troops only found five supporters.

It is clear, then, that the policy of France, so far as it is public, extends only to the continued occupation of Rome. No plan is proposed for securing the independence of the Pope in any other way.

At Turin the Government has been much more honest in declaring its end, but equally dark about the means by which it was to be accomplished. "We must go to Rome," said Cavour, in the first Italian Parliament, that had already conferred

on Victor Emmanuel the title of King of Italy,—“we must go to Rome, but without trenching upon the independence of the Pope, without bringing the Church under the domination of the State.” A united Italy is impossible without Rome for its capital; those who would be content with Florence, only accept it as a temporary expedient; sooner or later they will have Rome. And if France still occupies it, if the French Government has even pledged the Senate and Legislative Body that the troops shall not be withdrawn from Rome, this pledge means nothing; the French will go, not by compulsion, but by persuasion.

The first step in the process of persuasion is to prove to Catholics that a united Italy, with Rome for its capital, will secure instead of compromising the independence of the Church. If it would deprive the Pope of much of his independence, or reduce him to be grand almoner of the king, it would be fatal, not only to Catholicism, but to Italy. The union, however, of spiritual and temporal power in the hands of one man is a caliphate that is impossible in Italy. But it will not hurt the Pope, because (1) the temporal power is no real guarantee of his freedom. It was so, “when sovereigns, resting on divine right, regarded their domination as a right of absolute property over men and things;” but since 1789 governments have reposed upon the consent of the people, and a government by divine right has no possibility of existence; there is too great an antagonism between the people and the ruler. (2) And no reforms are able to salve over this fundamental antagonism; the principle of divine right must be given up, in order to satisfy the people. But the Pope cannot give up this principle; and all reforms which are substituted for such a renunciation are mere shams, can never be really and honestly intended. Indeed, Cavour says, the Pope “cannot grant” them without “violating his duty as Pontiff: he only tolerates them while he cannot abolish them; he can never carry them out, and give them fair play; his refusal to grant them is not obstinacy but firmness, for which Catholics ought to be grateful to him.” (3) But if the incompatibility between popular rights and

the papal or clerical government is thus evident, nothing remains but to separate absolutely the spiritual from the temporal functions, and in this the Pope will regain his freedom. “It is precisely the separation of the powers which will give him the independence of which he stands so much in need. When the Church is once emancipated from all connection with the temporal authority, and separated from the State by distinctly-marked limits, the Holy See will no longer be shackled by concordats and the prerogatives of the civil power, which up till now have been rendered necessary by the temporal power of the Pope;” (4) and this independence shall have “ample guarantees.” “We will inscribe the principle of the reciprocal independence of Church and State in the fundamental statute of the kingdom, and we will insure, by all possible means, its complete realisation. But the surest guarantee is the thoroughly Catholic character of the Italian people. Italy has often made great efforts for the reform of ecclesiastical discipline, but she has never raised her hand against the religion with which it is connected. The country of Arnold of Brescia, of Dante, of Savonarola, of Sarpi, of Giavnone, has ever, like them, sought only the reform of the Church, that the Church, purified, should subsist, and become more free.” (5) If all negotiations upon these principles have hitherto failed, this is perhaps because they have never been fully explained before. But they will be carried out, whether the Pope likes it or not. “Arrived in Rome, we shall proclaim the separation of the Church from the State, and the liberty of the Church.” After it has been done, “the great majority of Catholics will approve, and will cause to fall upon the right head the responsibility of the struggle into which the Court of Rome would have sought to enter with the nation.” But perhaps Pius IX. will remember the first aspirations of his reign, and will “seek to acquire the immortal glory of having reconciled the Italian nation with the Church, and religion with liberty.”

The “reciprocal independence of Church and State,” as interpreted by the acts of the Italian government, means the secularisation of education, the suppression of religious orders,

the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, the exile or imprisonment of Bishops and priests who protest against this new liberty, and the total suppression of all ecclesiastical immunities and privileges. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Church and State can be mutually independent, except when the Church holds the position she occupies in England or the United States, where the civil government does not recognise the Church as a corporation at all, and where the clergy have exactly those civil rights which the laity have, and no more. But what revolution, what spoliation, must take place in Italy, before the Church is reduced to such a condition!

There is, however, no idea of entirely dispossessing the clergy of their property; but rather, as in France, of binding the secular priests to the State, by endowing them with a portion of the confiscated property of the regulars, and of estranging them from their Bishops, partly by keeping the sees vacant, partly by making it the interest of the inferior clergy to support a system which the Pope and Bishops denounce, and partly by interposing between them in the exercise of that absolute power which has lately developed in continental episcopacy. The appeal of a priest against his Bishop is received with as much favour by the State as with disfavour by the Roman congregations. As in France, they will still be in the pay of the State, and the State, as paymaster, will encroach on their liberties. The pittance which the clergy receive in France justifies the imperial Government, in its own eyes, in imposing upon the French Church the heavy yoke of those Gallican "privileges" which grew out of the relations of the wealthy and powerful Church of France with the Bourbon monarchs; the wealth has perished, but the servitude is to remain. The State names the Bishops, and has all the direct rights that it ever had; but it also supervises the Bishop's pastorals, takes care that they do not step over the line that divides religion from politics (which line it belongs to the State only to define), and orders the prefects to punish them when they do so (Circular of M. Delangle, April 9). It revives old laws founded on narrow national

prejudices, and banishes all foreign fathers belonging to orders not legalised from the French soil; as if France was too good and too great to receive missionaries, as if France teaches, but is not taught. Under such pretexts the Redemptorist houses of Lille and Douai were closed last month, and the House at Boulogne lost its best members; while the provincial journals only lament the expulsion of the Redemptorists in a way that is meant to provoke the expulsion of the Jesuits also. This act is evidently intended to show the interpretation that a revolutionary government puts upon the phrase "reciprocal independence of Church and State."

There is no wonder, then, that, in spite of passing indications of a willingness to treat with Piedmont, through the Abbate Passaglia, the Pope should have definitively declared his inability to come to terms with a "modern civilisation" of this lopsided kind, in his allocution of March 18. Between Rome, France, and Italy, the case stands thus: France keeps Rome; Cavour goes there to give liberty to the Pope; the Pope excommunicates him, and departs to another land.

After the fall of Gaeta, the declarations of France against the temporal power, and the vote of the Parliament at Turin that Rome should be the capital of the new kingdom, no human resource remained to which the Pope could look for deliverance. His army and his revenues were gone; the Austrians could no longer uphold him; the surrounding territory was in the hands of the Piedmontese; he alone stood in the way of Italian unity, and the expulsion of foreigners from the Italian soil; while the power that kept him in Rome declared that it could not restore him, or permanently prolong its occupation. Whilst the conflict lasted, Pius IX. enjoyed in full measure, as a temporal sovereign, the sympathies of the Catholic world. The policy to which his power fell a prey was felt to be instigated by an iniquitous ambition quickened by religious rancour, and the whole Church protested against it. It is not difficult to understand why the protest was of no avail. A large part of the people in Italy deemed themselves politically justified

in taking part in the movement against their rulers. Thousands to whom their religion is a sacred treasure, acted for mere temporal reasons irrespective of her interests. For political wrong can no more be excused than moral wrong by considerations of expediency to the Church. The interests of religion can no more be cited as an apology for tolerating a tyrannical government than as an excuse for robbery. The law by which the right must be vindicated, and the divine order preserved, against the sovereign and the subject alike, is as peremptory as any obligations of the moral code, and the duty of supporting right and opposing wrong cannot be suspended in favour of any supposed advantage to the Church. Her claims as an institution cannot be opposed to her precepts as a doctrine. Whilst the Italians had political motives to take advantage of the revolution, the Catholics of other countries felt no paramount religious obligation to arrest its progress. Efficient support came from the Legitimists in France, from the Austrians, whose political interests were identified with those of the Papacy, from Ireland, and from parts of the Continent which were the ancient recruiting grounds of the pontifical mercenaries. It would neither be easy to show that any of these fractions of the volunteers acted from motives exclusively religious, nor possible to discern in such moderate action proofs of a profound and universal feeling of the necessity of the temporal power. Whatever the political wrong of the revolution might be, it was not universally felt that it affected the interests of the Church in a manner that demanded, on religious grounds, an energetic resistance. In this way we can explain the general inaction, in spite of the unanimous expressions of reverence for the person of the Holy Father, and of the very general disapproval of the whole movement by which he was menaced, and in spite of the efforts of a portion both of the clergy and of the laity to supply more efficient aid. The temporal power was lost at Castelfidardo; there is no apparent prospect of its immediate restoration, and during the whole winter the Head of the Church has been in the most disastrous position. The problem addresses itself

now to the reflections of all Catholics, what efficient substitute can be provided for that which is, at least temporarily, lost.

The common abhorrence of the means by which this event has been brought about, has commonly taken the expression of at least general attachment to the temporal power. It belonged of right to the Holy See, and there was therefore no room and no occasion for the inquiry whether it was enjoyed for the benefit of religion. Even if there had been a common sense that it was in truth injurious, and that the Church would be better governed without it, it was not competent to the Holy See to volunteer the surrender of rights sanctified by the prescription of more than a thousand years, or becoming in the faithful to propose a sacrifice for which there was no compensation. Nobody could presume to speak with confidence whilst the will of God, expressed in the facts of history, was not made manifest. No man could say that what had been lawfully acquired, and what God permitted to be retained, ought to be given up. The freedom of the Church would be in danger, and it was certain that the solution of the difficulty would be shown only when it became inevitable. It could be taught only by the logic of events, not by the logic of reflection. A decision could be brought about only by compulsion. The sacrifice of power, like the sacrifice of property, could not be the spontaneous act of the Church. Not a voice was raised within her pale to weigh spiritual interests against temporal rights. In the midst of the general demonstrations, the masters of religious thought maintained an impressive silence. Whilst the body of the faithful gave utterance to an indefinite, and therefore inadequate conviction, the teachers of the Catholic world held aloof. They did not anticipate the decrees of Providence, or set up a higher criterion than that by which the Holy See was obliged to regulate its conduct, or, by combining considerations which it was impossible to reconcile, confuse the conscience and damp the zeal of the faithful. Yet they did not despair of the wisdom and the mercy of God, and did not believe that the trials and changes in the Church were with-

out just reason or providential end. Those who sought for the first signs of the coming light should have looked to the high places of theology. There they would have been struck by a strange coincidence of conduct, and by a wonderful unanimity of thought. The Catholic hierarchy exhibited, indeed, an almost universal agreement in a matter on which they were officially compelled to speak in support of the words of the Pope. Several religious orders were silent because they were not compelled to speak, and because their members could not disengage themselves from the general responsibility. Yet even here no serious difference of opinion has been shown among those who are personally most competent to judge. In France the immediate impression of the political guilt and of the religious hypocrisy of the government has given a more aggressive, polemical, and consequently a less apologetic or spiritual character to the Catholic writers. Many of them, indeed, have incapacitated themselves from judging the Roman question by their patriotic approval of the Italian war. The tone of the eloquent and bitter writings of the Bishop of Orleans is so destitute of applause for the condition of the Church in Rome, as to show that the writer knew its great defects, whilst he repelled unjust attacks. Lacordaire and Gratry have spoken more decidedly against a superstitious reverence for the externals of the Church, a timorous reliance on material advantages, and the dependence of the spiritual on the temporal power. Each of these eminent men anticipated the deliverance of the spiritual power by means of a crisis such as at last arrived. In America the republican habits of thought diminish the respect for the outward splendour of a court, and the freedom of religion accustoms men to dissociate its prosperity from the temporal power of the Church. For some time, therefore, Dr. Brownson, who generally speaks in harmony with several, at least, of the American Bishops, has confessed that he has no better argument for the temporal power than the declared will of the Pope himself, and has carefully distinguished the question of right from the question of expediency. Arguing on grounds of right,

not on grounds of religion, he declares himself in favour of the subjects against the temporal power; and his argument would be complete if his vision were not distorted by the theory of nationality, which is inseparable from republican politics, and if he did not forget, in attributing authority to the Pope in disputes between kings and subjects, that the State is older than the Church, and that political philosophy is altogether independent of Christianity. Speaking of the Sovereign Pontiff, he says, "We have always maintained that, as temporal sovereign, he stands on the same footing with all legitimate temporal sovereigns, that his temporal sovereignty is a proper temporal sovereignty, not a spiritual sovereignty, or altered in its character by the fact that he holds also the spiritual sovereignty of the Church. . . . Are the Roman people to be deprived of the exercise of rights which the Church recognises, or does not condemn in other people, because their sovereign is Supreme Pontiff?"

In Italy it is not so easy to set aside entirely religious considerations. In many places the clergy have suffered by the revolution. Several of the religious orders are so identified with the old *régime* that their property is confiscated where it prevails; others are proscribed by the Sardinian laws. Moreover, it is very difficult to separate oneself from one party without adopting the other, and excommunication threatens all who abet the spoilers. Yet it cannot be doubted that the influence of Gioberti would lead men into the camp of the Piedmontese, although the spirit of their laws would have been most hateful to him. The influence of Rosmini is still greater among the clergy; for though a reformer, he never put himself in antagonism with authority, and he was, what his rival was not, a priest of extraordinary sanctity. Where his influence can be most distinctly traced, a sense of the peculiar evils and disorders of the Church in Central Italy prevails over the desire to preserve the temporal rights. Several of the religious orders feel in like manner. From the nature of things, our knowledge of the sentiments of the Italian clergy rests upon private communications more than on public expressions. It is enough

to say in general that, those who know Rome best are the least disposed to regret the temporal power. In this country we will only say, that the personal reverence towards the Pope in his tribulation is the strongest feeling; that it is joined to a sense of the evils which come from the impossibility of adapting the Roman system to the wants of the time, and of an urgent necessity for such a change as that which seems to be at hand. The same causes which imposed a necessary reserve on all, until the decisive moment came, have prevented among us the expression of these sentiments. There are not many among those to whom we listen with the greatest attention who have had opportunities of judging the condition of the Church in Italy, or who are sufficiently familiar with the character of modern society to use those opportunities well; and the joint responsibility of religious communities incapacitates others. Yet England is no exception to the rule, that where the greatest sanctity and the greatest wisdom are united, there is a belief that the revolution which has overthrown the temporal power has been directly a blessing to the Church.

It was easy to foresee that the silence so scrupulously observed, and yet so ominous in its contrast with the current of popular feeling, must come at length to an end. In a time of extreme confusion, it was not possible that the faithful should be permanently deprived of the voice of those to whom they were most prepared to listen; and since the capitulation of Ancona it has been a constant subject of anxious thought whether the time for silence had gone by, and the time for speech was come. On the one hand, all have felt that it was not possible to oppose or to divert the course of Catholic feeling, and the efforts of the episcopate to discourage with admonitions which were not yet verified an enthusiasm which was generous in its source and in its aim, and neutralise by resistance and warnings a demonstration of unanimity. The churchman had no right to interfere with the sense of political duty, and the historian could not assume the office of the prophet, or justify by anticipation the ways of God with His Church. However fortunate the de-

struction of the present form of government in Rome might be deemed, there was no excuse for contributing to it on the ground of its benefit to the Church. It was undertaken from very different motives by men with whom there could be no alliance, whose means and whose ends were criminal. No earnest Catholic could, for religion's sake, accept the complicity of the revolution; and in considering, not the object or the mode, but the result of its action, the utmost he could say was, *Felix culpa*. The time to say it was when the contest was over. In speaking too soon there was a danger of encouraging the design, instead of accepting the event; yet it was equally important that the right moment should not be allowed to go by. It would have been idle to say for the first time, after the Pope had left Rome, that it was well he should go. The conscience of the Church would have appeared to be at fault, and the justification of his flight would have been as arbitrary, and would have seemed as puerile, as that commonly given for his resistance. Even those who are now most constant in affirming that the States of the Church are essential or necessary for the authority of the Pope, would then say with the same ingenuous optimism, that the Church could be as free without such accessories as with them, and might be more powerful in consequence of her losses. The Catholic body would have lost their own confidence, and would have incurred the imputation of thoughtless insincerity, if between the loss of the political independence of the Holy See, and its deliverance from the grasp of the revolution, none amongst them had spoken of consolation, by pointing out the providential character of the events as they occurred,—the evils of the past and the hopes of the future,—and had communicated to all the confidence which is felt by the divines to whom we have referred, that there is far more to rejoice at than to deplore in the crisis which the Church has experienced.

It would have been inconsistent with the character and position of the German ultramontanes if the earliest and most authoritative declaration of these opinions, in all their integrity, had not proceeded from among them. The same spirit in which they culti-

vate ecclesiastical science guides them in all the practical interests of the Church. It may be simply from the confidence which the superiority of German science confers, that they hold conscience supreme over policy, that they do not sacrifice truth to expediency, and that they observe no regard for persons or opinions, and no conditions in dispensing it. So accordingly it has been. All that we have referred to yet has been a political justification of the Italian movement. The religious question involved in it is a more important consideration.

In the first of a series of public lectures on the present state of religion in the world, delivered at Munich, Dr. Döllinger spoke of the position of the Holy See in Rome. Two things are clear in judging of the nature of the temporal power. The policy of France and Sardinia towards the Holy See cannot be defended either in their acts or in their demands; and the Pope is not free to make the surrender demanded of him, because he holds the rights of his office in trust, and is bound by his oath and by his elective character. The Papacy has been in the actual enjoyment of these rights from the end of the fifteenth century. That which is understood by the temporal power was acquired about the time when other monarchies arose out of feudalism, and suzerainty grew into sovereignty. Until then the Popes had never been secure in their possessions, and during the first 700 years of Christianity exercised their highest ecclesiastical authority and the widest political influence without any temporal basis whatever. Of all the 1800 years of modern history, the Popes have only had 300 years of quiet. In many cases the Popes who did most for the spiritual benefit of the Church were those who relied the least on the territorial security for their power. The mode of succession on the pontifical throne which the Church requires is not suited to prolonged political existence. Monarchy which is not hereditary is not generally durable, and the Popes had an additional disadvantage in the shortness of their reigns. No elective sovereignty strikes roots in the attachment of the people, and that of the Popes could do it less than any; for the change of system was frequent, as the Popes were generally old men, and it was often ex-

treme, as they succeeded each other from different countries. In our time reforms in matters of detail have been continually made, and the government has been less oppressive than in most Continental States; yet it has been unpopular, and unable to maintain itself without foreign aid. For forty years it has been in opposition with the feelings of its subjects, and with the aspirations of the Italian people. Government, in the modern sense, is repugnant to the ecclesiastical character; and local self-government, such as subsisted in the old municipalities, was made impossible by the French. Most of all, the office of judge is unsuited to the office of a priest. Not a voice was raised in 1814 for the restoration of the ecclesiastical princes in Germany. They had not been oppressive, yet they were not regretted. Both as an elective monarchy and as a priestly monarchy, the Papacy now stands alone. It cannot resist the current of the age, and only strengthens it by concessions. By a natural consequence of the political development of the modern world, the position of the Pope as a temporal sovereign has become intolerable and untenable. The destruction of the Austrian supremacy in Italy has made a change inevitable. Without foreign aid the Papacy cannot stand against the disaffection of its subjects and the strong tide of national unity. During the joint occupation by French and Austrians, the suspicion of influence was avoided by the balance of the two great powers, and the freedom of the Holy See was at least preserved. But that security is gone while the French alone uphold the Pontifical throne; and even the fall of the Piedmontese monarchy could only lead to the restoration of a state of things not endurable for many years, and ruinous to the finances and the authority of the Roman government. The time has arrived when the Papacy must be delivered from the protection and the designs of France.

This is the substance of Döllinger's discourse. The idea which runs through it is, that the temporal government, never of real substantial necessity to the Church, ceased to be a benefit when Consalvi accepted the inheritance of the French, and that it has become an obstacle instead of a security to the liberty of

the Holy See since the revolutionary movement has prevailed. The lecturer looks at it simply as a religious question. He condemns all the causes that have led to this conclusion, and which are the pretexts for the abolition of the Roman government — the institutions introduced by the French under the first Napoleon, the revolutionary and the national movement in Italy, the political ambition of the Piedmontese, and the plans of the French Emperor for a change in the condition of the Church. All this he condemns, and accepts the surrender of the temporal dominion simply as a spiritual necessity. For the sake of religion he rejoices at an event to which politically he is opposed. We have seen only one lecture, and of the second we only know that he justified the first on the ground that it was based not on opinions but facts—proved and known facts, which could not be refuted, and might easily be substantiated. We do not know whether it proposed any plan for the safety of the Pope. It is not difficult to see to what the above observations point. There is no security for freedom in the French occupation, which cannot be permanent. Still less could it exist in a united Italy, with laws opposed to the spirit and rights of the Church. The recovery of the Austrian power would not introduce a state of things in which the court of Rome would be saved from the dangers by which she is now surrounded. Flight is the only alternative. It is clear that Döllinger does not contemplate a long duration of Italian unity, or a permanent exile, or the restoration of the temporal power. We cannot tell what securities for liberty and independence he would demand when the Pope should return to his See, except that Italy should be divided, that there should be no independent authority in Rome, and that the revenue should be supplied by the old system of domains from which the political power arose.

Exactly simultaneous in time, and conformable in substance, though widely different in spirit with this lecture of the great German divine, a pamphlet appeared, written by the first of Italian divines. Passaglia undertook his mission to Turin with a view to prepare the way for the surrender of the political power of the Holy See, on condition of obtaining ample securities for the free exercise of the spiritual power. After his return — whilst enjoying very highly the confidence of the Pope—he was esteemed in Rome the leading advocate of the policy of conciliation and compromise, and his pamphlet is written to recommend it. He too thinks that the temporal power must be abandoned, but imagines that it is possible to preserve perfect independence in the midst of a united Italy. He speaks like a patriotic Italian, whilst Döllinger's lecture is virtually a protest against nationalising the Church.

It appears to us a very serious question whether there has not been too great a delay in coming forward on the part of those whose votes are better weighed than counted. The hopelessness of saving the Roman State was evident many months ago, when the Piedmontese invaded Naples, and the Pope was preparing for flight. A very serious responsibility has been incurred by Catholics in allowing the expression of their reverence and attachment to the Holy See to silence so completely the sense of the dangers and evils of the Roman government, and of the urgency of a great reform. It may have helped, in conjunction with the hostile fanaticism of the revolutionists, to delude the advisers of the Pope into the belief that in their policy of passive resistance they were defending what was regarded by the Catholics of every country as the common cause of the Church, and it may have led thousands into the belief that the triumph of the Italian revolution is a victory over an essential bulwark of their faith.